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AMERICAN LAW REVIEWS MEET
CHANGING SOCIETAL NEEDS:

A

TRIBUTE TO THE DENVER LAW

JOURNAL UPON ITS 50TH ANNIVERSARY
By VED P. NANDA*
L

T WO decades ago, Earl Warren, then Chief Justice of the
United States, greeted the inaugural issue of the U.C.L.A.
Law Review, in these words: "The American law review properly has been called the most remarkable institution of the
law school world."' A decade later, in 1962, he said in the tribute "Upon the Tenth Anniversary of the U.C.L.A. Law Review":
"So far as law reviews are concerned, my views are strengthened. If it were not for their critical examination, we would
have a great void in the legal world. Courts would have few
guidelines for appraising the thinking of scholars and students
or of the bar itself. It is largely through them that we are able
to see ourselves as others see us."'2 Coincidentally, in 1962

Professor Fred Rodell wrote a reappraisal of law reviews, "Goodbye to Law Reviews -Revisited," '3 in which he tempered his
criticism of law reviews so forcefully and eloquently expressed
in his 1936 goodbye piece. 4 Although he still ridiculed the language used by law reviews and their style- "the nonsensical,
noxious notion that a piece of work is more scholarly if polysyllabically enunciated than if put in short words" 5 - he no
longer berated them for being occupied with technical, legalistic,
and superficial subjects "that are not worth the bother of
writing about them." He acknowledged that "it calls for a
*

Professor of Law and Director of International Legal Studies Program,

University of Denver College of Law.
'1 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1 (1953).
2 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1 (1962).
3 48 VA. L. REv. 279 (1962).
4
Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REv. 38 (1936).
5 Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews- Revisited, 48 VA. L. REv. 279, 287
(1962).

6 Rodell, supra note 4, at 45.
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spot of word-eating on my part . . .when I put the finger on
'7
style, not substance, as the greater evil."
Even a cursory glance at the selection and treatment of
the subject areas covered within the traditional framework of
law reviews- symposia, lead articles, student notes and comshould convince a critic that in the
ments, and book reviews
last 10-15 years law reviews have assumed a mature posture.
Not only do they reflect societal concerns by noting, investigating, and analyzing major political, social, and economic developments (of course, primarily within a legal setting), but also by
anticipating likely legislative and judicial developments, they
offer a unique forum for the healthy debate which is essential
for weighing various alternatives. To illustrate, the Columbia
symposium on nonfault insurance, 8 the Harvard review of
equal protection, 9 the Michigan symposium on civil procedure,1 0
the New York University symposium on consumer credit reform,11 the Virginia symposium dealing with federal regulatory
3
agencies, 12 and the Yale discussions of negative income tax'
and the proposed equal rights amendment 14 are among many
recent probing and incisive commentaries.
Some law reviews have experimented with nontraditional
approaches, 15 such as the increased use of investigative reporting and analysis, and social science methodology, especially
empirical research, in studying practical problems encountered
by government, business, the judiciary, or legislatures. Of
course, the quality of research and writing will vary with the
nature of the project undertaken and the kind of resources,
competence, and time a law review can afford to commit to
the project. However, initial results are gratifying; and the
need seems apparent to continue seeking the assistance of
other disciplines including anthropology, business administra7Rodell, supra note 5,at 287.
8 Symposium on Nonfault Automobile Insurance, 71

COLUM. L. RV.

139 (1971).
9 Developments in

the Law-

Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.

1065

(1969).
10 Empiric and Comparative Perspectives of Civil Procedures, 69 MICH.
L. REV. 797 (1971).
Part I,44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1
"i Symposium: Consumer Credit Reform(1969); Part II,id. at 272.
12 Symposium-Federal Regulatory Agencies: A Response to the Ash
Report, 57 VA. L. REV. 923 (1971).
13 Tobin, Pechman & Mieszkowski, Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?,
77 YALE L.J. 1 (1967); Comment, A Model Negative Income Tax, 78
YALE L.J. 269 (1968).
14 80 YALE L.J. 81 (1971).
15 On a related subject, see Cavers, "Non-Traditional Research by Law
Teachers: Returns from the Questionnaire of the Council on LawRelated Studies, 24 J. LEGAL ED. 534 (1972).
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tion, economics, engineering, medicine, political science, and
sociology in understanding both national and international problems in the contemporary world so as to use law as an effective
tool for providing structure and authority in regulating human
interaction.
A number of law reviews are now devoted to a single
field of law: for instance, computers and the law at Rutgers;
ecology law at the University of California, Berkeley, Boston
College, and Northwestern School of Law at Lewis and Clark
College; family law at Louisville; human rights at Columbia
and Harvard; international law at California Western, Case
Western Reserve, Columbia, Denver, Georgia, Georgetown,
George Washington, Harvard, Miami, Mississippi, New York
University, Stanford, Syracuse, Texas, Vanderbilt, and Virginia; land and water law at Wyoming; law and social action,
social problems, and social order at Yale, Columbia, and Arizona State respectively; law and society at Wisconsin; 16 law
reform and legislation at Harvard and Michigan; natural resources at New Mexico; space law at Mississippi, and urban
law at Detroit. Lawyer of the Americas at the University of
Miami focuses on legal developments in the Western hemisphere, and there might be others in the future to specialize
in other geographical areas.
Even in the broad category of international law, emphasis
varies: for example, international law and policy at Denver;
international and comparative law at Georgia; law and politics at New York University; law and policy in international
business at Georgetown; international law and economics at
George Washington; international studies at Stanford; space
law at Mississippi; international law and commerce at Syracuse; and law of the Americas at Miami.
A recent addition in 1971 at U.C.L.A. is the Black Law
Journal, established to provide "the theoretical framework for
17
practical daily application of black legal ideas and concepts."'
Its objective-to further skills and competence in the "defense of black clients in the courtrooms of white America and
the creation of new black laws and systems wherever possible"' 8 - presents still another dimension in the evolution
of American law reviews.
Professional law reviews, which are not student enter16 Wisconsin Law Journal began a new section on law and society in
1965.
17McKissick, Foreword, 1 BLACK L.J. 1 (1971).
18 Id.
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prises, are not included in this brief account, although a perusal
of their content and methodology would show an equally keen
awareness of the expanding demands made upon legal systems and the need to explore innovative substantive and
methodological approaches to meet these demands.
II.
The Denver Law Journal had its genesis in Dicta, the
monthly record of the Denver Bar Association, in 1923. In
October 1949 it was expanded to include lead articles and
student notes under the joint auspices of the Denver and
Colorado Bar Associations and the University of Denver College of Law. 19 Professor Arnold M. Chutkow succeeded Professor Allen P. Mitcham as the College of Law representative
in July 1954, as students assumed an increasing share of edi20
torial and business responsibility.
With the March 1955 issue, Dicta became a bimonthly
publication. 21 Following Professor Chutkow's untimely death in
December 1956, Professor James R. Carrigan represented the
College of Law on the editorial board from January 1957, to
October 1959, when Professor John Phillip Linn succeeded
him. The publication changed its name to the Denver Law
Center Journal in 1963 and under Professor Linn's leadership,
published in 1964 the first student written "One Year Review
of Colorado Law. '22 In 1965, volume 43 marked the institution
of a new format, a quarterly law review, the Denver Law
Journal, published solely by the students of the University of
Denver College of Law. Professor William B. Stoebuck had
succeeded as the College of Law representative on the editorial
board the previous year, and one year later I became the faculty
advisor to the Denver Law Journal.
By now, students were ready to accept the challenge and
responsibility of producing their own publication, and, since
then, my role as the faculty advisor has been the most rewarding and enjoyable task at the College of Law.
A short account of trends in the Denver Law Journal will
show that it has attained increasing influence with the bar,
the bench, the legislature, and the teaching profession in not
19 Announced in a joint statement by the presidents of the Denver and
Colorado Bar Associations. 26 DrCTA 231 (1949).
20 Student editors were listed on the masthead of Dicta beginning with
Volume 23. Professor Mitcham was the first faculty representative on
the board of editors.
21 Notes from the Secretary, 32 DICTA 165 (1955).
22 One Year Review of Colorado Law, 41 DENVER L. CENTER J. 61 (1964).
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only providing a forum for intellectually stimulating and challenging ideas, but also by exploring practical problems.
Volumes 1 through 42 were primarily concerned with
Colorado law, although there were occasional discussions of
national problems. Volume 43 foreshadowed developments with
noteworthy studies such as: a symposium on oil shale; developments under the Uniform Commercial Code; developments in trusts and estates; the Civil Rights Act of 1964;
damages; field interrogation; and the impact of the United
States intervention in the 1965 Dominican Crisis. Five student
notes marked the beginning of a new phase of emphasis on
student writing which, with each succeeding issue, has assumed
an increasingly important place in the overall function and
objectives of the Journal.
Volume 44 contained a symposium on "Selected Problems
on Law and the Individual," a special issue on law school
curricula, and a comment on a wide variety of subjects, including the law of demonstrations, the Colorado Children's Code,
legal aspects of the Torrey Canyon disaster, and the "Right to
Treatment." A survey, "The Law Review-Is it Meeting the
Needs of the Legal Community?," 23 involved data compilation
and analysis, using social science methodology.
Volume 45 included three symposia, dealing with the
transfer of technology in transnational business, environmental
control, and legal aspects of student-institutional relationships.
Volume 46 contained a symposium on "Riots and the Law,"
lead articles on paralegals, automobile liability claims, the
Highway Beautification Act of 1965, civil commitment, and
eugenic sterilization, and a number of student comments and
notes. In Volume 47, several noteworthy symposia and studies
appeared, including an empirical student piece "Rural Poverty
and the Law in Southern Colorado," a piece on the implementation of Miranda in Colorado, symposia on water law in
Colorado and the implications of science and technology for
the legal process, and probing analyses of the Federal Highway
Safety Act of 1966 and scenic easements.
In 1970, the editorial board of the Denver Law Journal experimented with a special magazine issue. Unencumbered by
traditional law review format, the issue provided interesting
and informal material on a variety of issues. The Journal readership enthusiastically recommended continuation of a regular
2844 DEN-vE L.J. 426 (1967).
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magazine issue, but lack of resources has thus far precluded our
undertaking such a project.
Volumes 48 and 49 show the Journal's efforts to strike a
balance among various demands- the interests of a majority of
our audience in Colorado law, issues of national and international significance, and the Law School's policy favoring interdisciplinary and empirical research. The consistently high quality
of the various lead articles and student writings in these volumes
has enriched legal literature. Future issues of the current volume
will include symposia dealing with problems in Colorado property law, and new concepts in law and legal education.
III.
The last few years have evidenced a great deal of hard
work on the part of Journal members. There have been false
starts, frustrations, irate authors, and dissatisfied subscribers.
Happily, however, these problems have been accompanied by
steady progress as reflected in the quality and quantity of
student writing, the continuing availability of excellent articles both solicited and unsolicited, the use of interdisciplinary
and empirical research, and experimentation with innovative
ideas.
Steps currently taken to improve the quality of the publication comprise a more effective student training program
and an organized effort to promote student writing. Close
contacts, both formal and informal, with the faculty, bench,
and bar provide a generous source of expertise upon which
the Journal beneficially draws.
The Journal is attracting outstanding students and it continues to offer a unique learning experience at the College
of Law. It provides the single most valuable tool to learn and
practice effective legal research and writing techniques, and
it has shared its experiences with the newly launched Denver
Journal of International Law and Policy. In view of the competence, imagination, and diligence of the current staff and
editors of the Journal, and given the past trends, it should
sustain the excellence it has attained and should have a national impact. Increasingly, judges will turn to the Journal
for authority, legislatures will examine Journal studies for new
possibilities, and, most importantly, the legal community will
look to the Journal for new concepts and ideas in the law.
On this 50th anniversary of the Journal, I salute the editorial
boards I have worked with as the faculty advisor and acknowledge my deep sense of satisfaction and gratitude.

FOREWORD
By WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

T

HE need for adequate legal representation for indigents
appears and reappears with regularity. Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932), was the progenitor of the right of an indigent to counsel in capital cases; and it has spawned a sturdy
line from Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), to Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). The law has not answered
all the problems of the indigent in the criminal system. Nor
has it resolved many of the questions in civil cases where the
indigents are clamoring for assistance.
The response of the bar to these needs has been gratifying.
Legal aid societies have risen to the occasion, supported mostly
by private funds. In the public area the public defender systems and Neighborhood Legal Services under OEO have rendered highly competent service.
In the fiscal year 1972 it is estimated that NLS has worked
on over one million legal problems - 18 percent dealing with
consumer and employment questions; 9 percent with administrative problems; 11 percent with housing; 42 percent with the
family; and 20 percent with miscellaneous matters. (Criminal
cases are largely excluded from its purview.)
As respects criminal cases, there has been the charge that
since government in public defender cases is both on the side
of the prosecution and of the defense, the indigent client is the
loser. The current Symposium on the actual operation of the
Denver system largely dispels that illusion.
Overall, the encounters of indigents with the law offer
overwhelming problems in light of the proliferating bureaucracy
under which we live. The so-called right to counsel means a
right to competent counsel- a recurring plea because once a
person loses his case the charge is often made that his counsel
was not competent.
This Denver Law Journal Symposium is only a start on
the many bristling problems in this field. But the beginning
is excellent, and a challenge to all who follow to use like
standards of excellence in appraising the elusive raw material
they encounter when they start a study of a particular court
or particular community.
William 0. Douglas
October 1972
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BACKGROUND

Right to Counsel

T

HE right of the indigent defendant to be provided effective
counsel and the historical development of that right have
been well-covered elsewhere.' Of interest here is the system
used for representation of the indigent in felony cases in Denver,
Colorado and the comparison of public defender representation
with that provided by retained counsel.
All systems for representation of the indigent have been
subjected to much criticism when compared to the defense
available to persons who are financially able to retain counsel.
It is frequently stated that retained counsel essentially manipulate the system in order to minimize the effect of the system
on their clients, whereas court-appointed counsel provide in'See, e.g., Craig, The Right to Adequate Representation in the Criminal
Process, 22 Sw. L.J. 260 (1968); Katz, Gideon's Trumpet: Mournfuland
Muffled, 55 IOWA L. REV. 523 (1970); Siegal, Gideon and Beyond:
Achieving an Adequate Defense for the Indigent, 59 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S.
73 (1968); Note, The Right to Effective Counsel: A Case Study of the
Denver Public Defender, 50 DENVER L.J. 45 (1973); Note, Judicial Safeguards of the Rights of Indigent Defendants, 41 Nom DAME LAW, 982
(1966); Note, The Right to Effective Counsel in Criminal Cases, 18 VAND.
L. REv. 1920 (1965).
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ferior defense for the indigent because of such things as inexperience, high case loads, and inadequate investigative services. These criticisms are usually based either on the personal
experience of those who have acted as defense counsel 2 or on
observations of the system in operation. 3 Since inferences about
performance of counsel can be supported by the selective use
of cases, samples, observations, and opinions of participants in
the system, potential error arises from observation of the system with a predisposition for or against defense counsel, either
in their appointed or retained role.
A better approach is to examine statistically the result of
the representation of criminal defendants, both the indigent
and those capable of retaining private attorneys. This study has
sought to do this, drawing comparisons over systemic- and
defendant-related variables to measure the performance of the
Denver Public Defender (P/D) against that of retained counsel
in Denver (R/C).
Description of the Denver Felony Defense System
Persons charged with committing a felony in Denver are
processed through county court for preliminary matters and
district court for trial. In both courts, the state is represented
by prosecutors from the office of the District Attorney for
Denver. The court appoints the P/D to represent defendants
financially unable to obtain counsel; only in the event of conflict
is a member of the practicing bar appointed.
B.

Colorado is unique among states with public defender
systems in that it uses full-time public defenders exclusively.
The Denver office had approximately 19 full-time assistant and
deputy public defenders and four investigators in 1970. The inexperienced P/D's were assigned to misdemeanor and juvenile
cases; the more experienced, to felony cases. At least three P/D's
were assigned to county court to handle felony advisements and
preliminary hearings. At the district court level, two P/D's
were assigned to each of the four court divisions that process
felony cases filed in that court. In addition, there was at least
one P/D available to fill in at the district court level. When the
case of an indigent defendant was filed in district court and
assigned to a division, one of the P/D's in the division handled
the case from that point on.
2 Seegal,

Some Proceduraland Strategic Inequities in Defending the In-

digent, 51 A.B.A.J. 1165 (1965).
3 Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a
Public Defender Office, 12 SocIAL PROBLEMS 255 (1965).
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Under this system, an indigent defendant whose case was
processed through both county and district courts had at least
two different P/D's involved in the case. 4 This number could
increase due to illness, schedule conflict, or turnover in the
P/D office.
The defendant may choose to retain, his own counsel, or
it may be determined that he is not indigent and therefore must
engage his own attorney. There are a large number of lawyers
who represent felony cases in Denver. For example, in one sample examined, there were 150 different lawyers involved in
representing about 325 defendants. In another sample, there
were 43 lawyers for 76 defendants. On the average, there are
about two defendants per lawyer in these samples. However,
as in most jurisdictions, a large bulk of the defendants are represented by a few lawyers. In these samples, beween 15 and 20
percent of the lawyers were retained by about half of the
defendants. However, in contrast to many urban areas in the
country, Denver does not have the "courthouse lawyer"; instead, the lawyers who handle the bulk of the cases operate
from well-established and well-maintained offices.
C.

Study Objective and Perceptions of Counsel
Specifically, the objective of this study is to examine the
processing of felony defendants by P/D and R/C in order to:
(1) develop a quantitative description and comparison
of defense counsel in the processing of criminal
cases, and a quantitative measure of the interaction
of defense counsel with the criminal justice system,
(2) measure time between steps in the processing of
cases and determine how these times vary with the
type of counsel, and
(3) develop models of felony processing that take into
account the type of defense counsel and other relevant factors which may be useful components in
a study of the total criminal justice system.
Since the major focus of this study is a comparative analysis
of defense counsel in the processing of felony cases, some of
the viewpoints and subjective evaluations that persons in the
Denver criminal justice system hold concerning retained counsel
and the public defender system are summarized here. Many of
these cannot be substantiated or refuted without case-by-case
4This system changed in late 1971. Cases are now assigned a P/D at the
county court level and this same P/D follows the case through the district court when it is bound over.
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observation and evaluation. This was not the approach taken in
this study. However, some of these viewpoints will be evaluated
in light of the results discussed in the following sections.
Generally, the assistant and deputy public defenders are
held in high regard by actors in the criminal justice system. 5
Although not all P/D's are held in equally high regard, some
P/D's are considered as fully competent as the best R/C's. On
the other hand, some persons feel that if a defendant can afford
private counsel, he may be represented by an attorney of higher
quality than those in the offices of public defender and district
attorney.
Many consider the P/D superior to R/C because he is a
criminal law specialist with skills comparable to those of a
district attorney. By practicing daily in the criminal system,
the P/D is currently aware of cases, practices, and procedures.
On the other hand, he has a heavy case load (between 150 and
200 district court defendants per year) 6 which affects the amount
of time and attention he can devote to individual defendants.
This heavy case load may be the underlying reason for the
common complaint about the infrequency with which clients
of the Denver public defender are seen,7 as well as the charge
that the P/D generally pleads his client out with poorer "deals"
than would the R/C in similar circumstances.
The P/D is viewed by some as working more for causes than
for the client. Some perceive retained counsel as expediting
cases faster than the P/D. Perhaps the R/C, with lighter case
loads, can get into the case faster, investigate it, and get quicker
dismissals and pleas to lesser offenses - if the fee is forthcoming -while
the P/D is hampered by a high case load and
limited investigatory support."
But on the other hand, it is commonly believed that R/C
sees delay as an advantage and benefit for his client. This can
be accomplished through motions and trial date continuances.
As mentioned earlier, a P/D client in 1970 would have at
5 Note, The Right to Effective Counsel: A Case Study of the Denver Public
Defender, 50 DENVE L.J. 45, 63 (1973).

6 Based on the representation in the data base of 1970 filings, the P/D
represented 1,138 defendants. This would be an average of approximately 125 defendants for each of the eight P/D's assigned to district
court. If carry-over cases from previous years are added, the yearly
case load increases at least to 150 and probably higher.
7 The ten P/D's with heaviest district court case loads recorded a total
of 2,175 jail visits and 700 office visits during 1970. This covers prior
year filings; therefore, the average visits (jail and office) would be
less than three per defendant outside of courtroom contacts.
8
Note, supra note 5, at 61-81.
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least two different attorneys - one at county court and another
at district court. The most frequent complaint about the Denver
public defender is the number of different P/D's involved in
a case prior to disposition. A defendant could have up to 10
different P/D's involved in his case. As noted earlier, action
was taken in 1971 to remedy this situation.
A number of other observations were made; e.g., the defendant feels that since the P/D is paid by the state, he must
be working with the state. This becomes important because
many defendahts believe it. Also, the attitude of the bar regarding criminal practice has changed in recent years. The
court-appointed counsel system in Denver prior to 1966 was
generally considered unsatisfactory to the bar; today, however, some feel that it could be operated effectively. 9
D.

Methodology, Analysis, and Data Sources

Major areas examined in this study of the processing of
felony defendants are (1) type of disposition, including trial
and nontrial disposition, (2) sentencing, and (3) time to disposition. The approach systematically investigates the relationship of type of defense counsel in each of these areas and accounts for a set of defendant-related and system-related factors.
Such defendant-related variables as plea, offense, prior record,
and bail/jail status are considered. System-related variables
include continuances, motions, level of activity in the case, and
time.
By comparing these factors or variables, hypotheses are
suggested that seek to account for the differences in performance
between R/C and P/D. Where significant differences remain
between R/C and P/D on a two variable anlysis, three and even
four variables are used in an attempt to understand the relative
activity of R/C and P/D. Court organization, procedures, practices, and rules are introduced when appropriate to interpret
results. Statistical techniques permit analyses of the interaction
between the qualitative variables and an assessment of the
statistical significance of the interactions. (In this study the
.95 and .99 confidence levels are used unless otherwise specified. 10 )
9

The Denver Bar Association has recently initiated a program whereby
its members will volunteer their services and represent up to two indigents accused of crimes free of charge in order to relieve financial
and case load problems of the P/D.
10 Confidence level refers to the probability that the results obtained were
not due to chance. In this case, there is only a 5 percent probability at
the .95 level, or a 1 percent probability at the .99 level that the findings
are due to factors other than those postulated.
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The findings relative to defense counsel processing of
felony cases in Denver are based on the following data sources:"1
a)

b)

A sample of defendants charged with burglary in
1970 who were processed for preliminary matters
in county court and bound over to district court for
disposition.
All felony filings in Denver District Court during
calendar year 1970. Those charged with offenses
against the person, property, or public health and
safety form the basis for much of the analysis. The
cases were traced to disposition or until November
30, 1971, if still pending.
II.

A.

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

Defense Counsel in Denver County Court

With the exception of dangerous drug cases, the preliminary
processing of persons charged with a felony occurs in Denver
County Court. At the first advisement, the defendant is given
the reason for his arrest and is advised of his rights; bail and
the date for second advisement are set. At the second advisement, the defendant is notified of the charge in the complaint,
and is given 10 days in which to file for a preliminary hearing.
If the defendant waives the preliminary hearing, the case is
bound over to district court on the complaint which serves as
the information. Dismissals may result from the preliminary
hearing or from other matters prior to the preliminary hearing.
Also, the charge may be reduced to a misdemeanor as a result
of negotiations between prosecution and defense, the case then
being disposed of at the county court level.
A sample of 135 defendants charged with burglary was
examined to determine manner of processing and associated
time spent in county court according to type of counsel. The
P/D represented approximately 75 percent of the defendants
in this sample; R/C represented about 22 percent. Four defendants switched from R/C to P/D between the advisement
period and the time of the preliminary hearing.
Eighty-six percent of the defendants represented by R/C
made bail, and eight out of 10 of these defendants made bail
within 7 days of its being set. Only half of the defendants represented by the P/D made bail during the course of the case, and
11 Basic individual case data on Denver District Court cases were obtained
through the cooperation of the Colorado State Court Administrator's
Office. This was supplemented with additional information from case
jackets for selected samples of cases with the assistance and cooperation

of members of the District Court Clerk's Office.
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only 25 percent of these defendants made bail within 7 days
of its being set. The most frequent bail was in the $1,000 to
$2,500 range regardless of counsel. The fact that the defendant
can make bail (other than personal recognizance 12 probably
relates to and is a part of the determination of indigency and
eligibility for counsel appointment.
The median time between first advisement and bind-over
to district court is 6 weeks for all defendants. The median time
for defendants represented by R/C is 8 weeks, compared to a
median time of 6 weeks for defendants represented by P/D.
When a preliminary hearing is held, the median elapsed time
remains at approximately 6 weeks regardless of the type of
counsel. The rate of waiver of the preliminary hearing is approximately 42 percent for both types of counsel. When waiver
occurs, the median elapsed time for defendants with R/C is
10 weeks; for defendants with P/D, it is 5.5 weeks.
In general, defendants represented by R/C have longer
median times between steps; in particular, between (1) first and
second advisement, (2) second advisement -and preliminary hearing, and (3) second advisement and bind-over to district court
when the preliminary hearing is waived. Although the reasons
for these differences are not certain, it is clear that continuances
and counsel changes do not account for the different time intervals for the two types of counsel during the time that the
case is being processed in county court.
There are two time intervals where the median times for
R/C are shorter than P/D: (1) between arrest and first advisement, and (2) between arrest and entry of counsel. First advisement was held on the day of arrest or within one day of arrest
for 56 percent of the total sample. However, first advisement
was held wthin this period for 72 percent of the R/C defendants
as compared with 50 percent of the defendants with P/D. Both
first appearance and entry of counsel represent critical events
from the defendant's point of view. Presumably, the defendant
with R/C contacts his attorney early in the process. His attorney
may then be a factor in quickly setting the first advisement
where bail can be set so that the defendant may arrange for
bond and be released from jail.
Although a delay of 2 days between arrest and first advisement may be caused by a weekend, this does not explain a delay
of 3 or more days. Without considering the extreme cases (i.e.,
12

defendants on bail, about 25 percent were on personal recognizance; this percentage was the same for both R/C and P/D defendants.
Of all the
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the five defendants in the sample whose first advisement occurred 20 or more days after arrest), there was a period of 3 to 11
days between arrest and first advisement for 17 percent of the
defendants represented by P/D. Only one defendant with R/C
had a delay beyond 2 days.
This problem is obviously related to the fact that the P/D
is usually not appointed until there is an indigency determination which is generally made at the second advisement. For 87
percent of the defendants who were represented by P/D, appointment was not made until second advisement. 13 These defendants were without representation for a median of 8 days
after arrest. Furthermore, 84 percent of these defendants were
in jail during the period that they were without representation.
Initially, processing of the indigent and appointment of counsel
in 1970 was slow compared to that of defendants who could
afford counsel. After this initial period, the processing times
appear to have been faster for P/D defendants.
The advisement procedure is such that the date for preliminary hearings may not be set for 2 to 3 weeks after arrest.
In many cases the preliminary hearing is not held until 1 month
after it is set. The effect these time periods have on negotiation
and bargaining cannot be measured here because the cases in
this sample were bound over to felony trial court. However,
for those incarcerated defendants (i.e., most P/D clients), this
processing time is very long compared to the 7 day period
recommended by the President's Crime Commission.1 4 Furthermore, when the time in district court is added to the time in
county court for the sample defendants, the overall median
time between first advisement in county court and final disposition in district court is 6 months. Median times are the
same for both types of counsel, and are three times longer
than the maximum recommended by the President's Crime
Commission.15
13The P/D in advisement court generally sees the defendant without
counsel when he is brought for first advisement. He talks to the defendant at this time; however, between first and second advisement
when a P/D is appointed, the defendant was unrepresented in 1970 in
the strict sense of the word. This situation changed in 1971. Now, at the
time of arrest, the law enforcement officer is to put the defendant in
contact with a lawyer of his choice. If he has none, the P/D must be

called in. This assists in obtaining information for indigency as well as
providing the defendant with legal counsel. Since late 1971, the P/D

has had a jail check team consisting of a lawyer, two investigators, a
secretary, and a paralegal person.

This team is responsible for the

accused who is without R/C between arrest or first advisement and
second advisement, when the P/D is assigned.
14 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND

TION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FRE

15 Id.

ADMINISTRA-

SOCIETY 155 (1967).
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Although these observations are based on a sample of defendants charged with burglary, it is not expected that the
offense should be a principal factor in either the time between
proceedings or the procedures followed in the processing of
felony defendants in county court. The P/D did not assume
an active role in these cases, nor probably in others, until second advisement.
B.

Defense Counsel in Denver District Court
In the calendar year 1970, there were 1,890 felony cases involving approximately 2,425 defendants filed in the Denver
District Court. These totals include extraditions, insanity rehearings, and consolidated cases that were deleted from the
data base for this study. The cases of the remaining 2,129 defendants and their status as of November 30, 1971, (shown in
Table 1) form the basis for this examination of case proceedings
as a function of defense counsel. Unless otherwise stated, the
analyses consider defendants rather than cases.
TABLE

1

Status and Representation of Defendants Whose Cases
Were Filed in District Court in 1970

Counsel

Number of Defendants
Terminated
No.
%

R/C
P/D

768
1033

Appointed
None
Unknown
Total
Percent

23
1
1864
87.6

39

41.2
55.4
2.1
1.2
0.1
100

Pending
No.
%

127
105
4
26
3
265
12.4

47.9
39.6
1.5
9.8
1.2
100

Total
No.
%

895
1138
43
49
4
2129
100

42.0
53.5
2.0
2.3
0.2
100

Forty-two percent of these defendants were represented by
R/C; 53.5 percent were represented by P/D. Where conflict or
other cause arises in a case represented by P/D, a private attorney is appointed to represent the defendant. This occurred
with 2 percent of the defendants. Due to the small size of this
latter group, all of the analyses and discussions in this article
relate only to R/C and P/D. Only terminated defendants are
examined in this study. Pending defendants- a small group are not discussed. 16 The analysis is organized around three major
16 Of the 265 pending defendants, one-third were in a fugitive status (a
bench warrant had been issued by the last court action recorded as of
November 30, 1971), 22 percent were awaiting
plea or trial, 30 precent were awaiting action on
percent were on deferred prosecution. The latter
prosecution is postponed to give a defendant an

sentence after guilty
the trial date, and 15
is an action in which
opportunity to make

restitution or exhibit good behavior. After a specified time period,
charges will be dismissed if there has been compliance with the court's
directive.
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considerations: type of disposition, sentence, and time to disposition. The approach is to proceed from two-variable analysis, to
three-, and finally to four-variable analysis to examine the associations or relationships that may exist, to identify differences,
and to draw inferences and suggest models that fit the data
wherever possible.
1. Retained Counsel Compared to Public Defender: Type of
Disposition
The first set of comparisons is the guilty/not guilty disposition of defendants by type of defense counsel. Using this
categorization, the frequency of guilty/not guilty dispositions
is independent. of type of counsel. 17 The data in Table 2 shows
that the not guilty rate for defendants represented by R/C is
35.4 percent; for the P/D, 32.3 percent. The frequencies do not
differ significantly from what might be expected if there were
no association between type of counsel and the guilty/not guilty
dispositions.
TABLE

2

Disposition by Defense Counsel

Total
P/D
R/C
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
33.6
601
32.3
331
35.4
270
Not Guilty
66.4
1187
67.7
695
64.6
492
Guilty
100
1788
100
1026
100
762
Totala
a The totals are less than the previous table because 13 defendants
whose dispositions do not fit in the categories of guilty/not guilty
were not included here: those where there was a mistrial (3), the
defendant was found insane (1), writ denied (1), case consolidated (2),
and other (6).
Considering dispositions in this gross guilty/not guilty
classification does not account for the gradations of the two
classifications. Within the not guilty classification there are
prosequi
four subclassifications: dismissed, dismissed/nolle
(hereinafter referred to as dismissed/nolle), acquitted, and not
guilty by reason of insanity. The dismissed category represents
charges dismissed as opposed to defendants dismissed- in general, the defendant has pleaded guilty or been sentenced in a
different case on another charge.' 8 On the other hand, dismissed/
17 Chi square = 2.0 with one degree of freedom. This is not significant
at the .05 level.
18 This category does, however, include defendants who have successfully
completed a time period of good behavior under the deferred prosecution action and have had their cases dismissed. These are mostly narcotics and dangerous drug cases. There were 14 defendants represented
by R/C and two by P/D whose cases were dismissed after deferred
prosecution. In addition, there were five defendants whose cases were
dismissed after preliminary hearings in the district court.
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nolle generally occurs in cases where the prosecution cannot
prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt (perhaps because of
a successful motion to suppress) or the complaining witness
does not wish to prosecute. 19 Acquittals are the result of a
trial. Not guilty by reason of insanity generally results from a
bench trial consisting mainly of a psychiatrist's testimony and
lasting less than an hour. In summary then, the not guilty
category consists mainly of (1) dispositions where the accused
is released (dismissed/nolle and acquittals), (2) dispositions
where the charge is dismissed but the defendant remains in the
system, and (3) dispositions where the defendant is found not
guilty by reason of insanity and committed as criminally insane.
Since the guilty category indicates that the defendant has
been convicted of an offense charged in the filed case, it is
more uniform. But this category also has gradations. The defendant may be convicted of (1) the felony as charged, (2) a
lesser felony, or (3) a misdemeanor. Furthermore, the conviction may result from a guilty plea at arraignment, a change of
plea during the processing of the case, or a guilty verdict following trial.
An examination of the gradations in the guilty and not
guilty categories for the two types of defense counsel is shown
in Table 3. The results of this analysis lead to a rejection of the
hypothesis that type of counsel and disposition are independent
of each other. The R/C has a high percentage of defendants
dismissed/nolle when compared to the P/D. The R/C has a
low percentage of clients pleading guilty to a felony when compared to the P/D. Finally, when compared to the P/D, a high
TABLE

3

Types of Disposition by Defense Counsel

Type of Disposition

R/C

P/D

Total

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

Dismissed
176
Dismissed/Nolle
78
Acquitted
11
Not Guilty/Insanity 5
Guilty:
Felony/Trial
7
Misdemeanor/Trial 5
Felony/Plea
224
Misdemeanor/Plea 258
Total
762

23.1
10.2
1.4
0.7

215
60
12
44

20.9
5.8
1.2
4.3

391
138
23
49

21.9
7.7
1.3
2.7

0.9
0.4
29.4
33.9
100

9
5
407
274
1026

0.9
0.5
39.7
26.7
100

16
8
631
532
1788

0.9
0.4
35.3
29.8
100

Not Guilty:

19This category does include seven defendants dismissed after deferred
prosecution and 10 dismissals after preliminary hearing.
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percentage of the R/C defendants plead guilty to a misdemeanor
when originally charged with a felony. On the other hand, the
P/D has a higher percentage of defendants found not guilty
by reason of insanity.
It is of interest to note that the two types of counsel do
not differ on trial disposition (acquitted and convicted). Trial
dispositions represent a small fraction of total dispositions and
yet represent a different kind of workload for both counsel and
the court. Because there are so few trials, the subsequent analyses will consider these separately from nontrial dispositions
(dismissals and guilty pleas). The not guilty by reason of insanity dispositions fall somewhere between the 'true adversary
trial and the plea or dismissal dispositions, in terms of trial
time and nature of the outcome. These will be discussed along
with trials in the following section; the remaining discussion
will examine nontrial dispositions.
Retained Counsel Compared to Public Defender: Trial
Dispositions
A total of 106 defendants were disposed of at trial. This
includes dismissals at the time of trial,20 defendants found not
guilty by reason of insanity, acquittals, convictions, and mistrials. The trial disposition rate is 5.7 percent of the total dispositions. Excluding the 49 defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity, the remaining 57 defendants represent 3.1 percent of the total dispositions.
2.

a.

Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity

Ninety percent of the defendants found not guilty by reason
of insanity were represented by the P/D. They included all
types of defendants, although the majority involved defendants
charged with murder, rape, kidnapping, robbery, and burglary.
The 10 percent of the defendants represented by R/C were
21
charged with murder, kidnapping, and robbery.
The differences in disposition rates between P/D and R/C
are not readily explained. However, since the P/D represents
indigents and has a higher rate of defendants found not
guilty by reason of insanity, the results suggest that the indigent defendant population is more likely to have mental dis20There were seven dismissals at the time of trial.
21 All trials in 1970 represent 8 percent of all dispositions in that year,
regardless of date of filing (177 trial dispositions; 2183 total disposi-

tions). Fifty-three of these trial dispositions were not guilty by reason
of insanity (NG/I); the remaining trial dispositions represent 5.8 percent of the dispositions (124 defendants disposed of by trial other than

NG/I; 2130 defendants disposed of in 1970 without NG/I).
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orders. Some outside evidence supports this theory- a higher
incidence of schizophrenia has been reported among the low
income, the lower educated, and the blue collar worker population when these latter are measured in terms of census tract
22
characteristics.
b.

Other Trial Dispositions

Retained counsel represented 24 defendants and P/D represented 34 defendants of those cases terminated at trial. 23 This
represents respectively 3.1 and 3.3 percent of the terminated
defendants represented by R/C and P/D.24 The similarity of these
rates does not support the opinion of some in Denver that the
P/D goes to trial in a higher percentage of cases than does R/C.
The appearance of the P/D at trial almost three times for every
two times R/C appears could be attributed to a heavier case
load. Additionally, this neither supports nor contradicts the opinion that the P/D goes to trial in cases where the defendant
would have been "better off" accepting a prosecution offer in
terms of both the offense of which the defendant was convicted
and the sentence received. An evaluation of that opinion would
require a knowledge of the prosecution's offers which were unavailable for this study. 25 Furthermore frequency of trial appearance does not, by itself, address the question of whether the P/D
goes to trial because he is working for "causes" or a "philosophy," or whether he goes to trial only when he feels that course
to be in the best interests of his client. On the other hand, if one
postulates that R/C and P/D represent defendants who are
equally likely to be innocent (and therefore this variable would
not be related to economic status), then the rate of trials should
be, and actually is, approximately the same.
22

C. Bodean, E. Gardner, E. M. Willis & A. K. Bahn, Socioeconomic Indicators from Census Tract Data Related to Rates of Mental Illness,
Working Paper No. 17 presented at the Census Tract Conference, September 1963 (Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce).
The study used all reports on new patients during the year 1960 from
inpatient and outpatient hospitals, clinics, and private psychiatrists in
Rochester, New York.

23

These are terminated cases as of November 30, 1971; for the convicted,

this includes sentencing. There were two R/C and 11 P/D defendants
in the pending group for whom there was a guilty verdict (to a felony)
but who were still awaiting sentence as of November 30, 1971.
24 If the defendants who were tried, but were awaiting sentence, are
added in and the rate is based on terminations, defendants awaiting
sentence, and deferred prosecution cases, the rates would be 3.2% and
4.2% for R/C and P/D respectively.
25

There was documentation of four cases where the district attorney had
offered lesser offenses carrying a maximum penalty of 10 years prison

term; these cases went to trial and resulted in convictions of the offense with penalties of 50 years, life, and sometimes consecutive
sentences.
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Both counsel represented defendants at trial who were
convicted of the major crimes against person, property, and
public health. The acquittal and dismissal rates as a result of
trial are approximately the same (R/C 50 percent, P/D 53
percent). The rates of dismissals and acquittals combined do not
26
differ between counsel; similarly neither do guilty verdicts.
About 30 percent of the R/C trials and 46 percent of the
P/D trials were held on the initial scheduled date. Overall,
R/C had a higher continuance rate (1.4 per defendant) than the
P/D (0.91 per defendant). In the case of trials ending in a
guilty verdict (felony), the continuance rate was 2.1 for R/C
and 1.5 for P/D. In the case of defendants represented by
R/C, two of the continuances were requested by the prosecutor
and seven were requested by the defense; the remaining 24
were unspecified..2 T In the case of P/D defendants, four continuances were requested by the defense, and the rest were
unspecified.
More R/C defendants were on bail at the time of trial than
were P/D defendants. Two-thirds of R/C defendants in jail
were found not guilty; 50 percent of the P/D defendants in
jail were found not guilty. The not-guilty rate for defendants
on bail was about 50 percent for both types of counsel. The
median time to disposition by major categories of trial dispositions is shown in Table 4.
TABLE 4

Median Time to Disposition
Median Time in Months
Trial Disposition

R/C

Acquittal
Guilty, Misdemeanor
Guilty, Felony

5.5
6.0
11.0

P/D
2.5
3.25
8.75

Total
3.0
5.0
8.75

It is clear that the times for P/D are shorter than for R/C.
However, for both types of counsel the time gets longer as
type of disposition goes from acquittal to guilty misdemeanor
to guilty felony. Some of this difference can be accounted for
by time between guilty verdict and sentencing. In the case of
verdicts of guilty to a misdemeanor, sentencing often occurs
on the day of verdict, whereas for felony convictions there
If the defendants who were tried and awaiting sentence are taken together, the combined dismissal and acquittal rate would be 46 and 41
percent, and the guilty rate would be 46 and 57 percent, respectively,
for R/C and P/D. These differences are not significant. The Chi Square
for defense counsel and disposition is 0.3 with 2 degrees of freedom.
27 The unspecified continuances could be due to court procedure or to the
failure to identify the moving party in the court's daily minutes.

26
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is at least 1 month, sometimes 3 to 4 months, between verdict
and sentencing. The median time to sentencing for felony convictions for both types of counsel is 2 months.
3.

Retained Counsel Compared to Public Defender: Nontrial Dispositions

There were 1,695 defendants terminated by November 30,
1971, either by dismissal or guilty plea. 28 Ninety-seven and
one-half percent of these were charged with an offense against
the person (358 defendants), property (628 defendants), or
the public health and safety (666 defendants) .29 Possession of
marijuana accounted for over half of the defendants in the
public health and safety category; nearly two-thirds of the
defendants in this category were charged with some sort of
drug-related offense.
Two-thirds of the nontrial dispositions in these crime categories were guilty pleas to a felony or a misdemeanor when
the original charge was a felony. This was true regardless of
counsel type. However, there are significant relationships between type of disposition and counsel. Retained counsel is significantly high on dismissal/nolle, and low on guilty pleas to
TABLE 5

Nontrial Dispositions as a Function of Type of Defense
Counsela

Disposition

E/C
No.
%

P/D
No.
%

Total
No.
%

170
(45)

206
(55)

376
(100)

23

135

8

24

Dismissed

No.
%

Dismissed/Nolle

No.

76

%

(56)

(44)

217 .j 30

399

Plea of Guilty/Felony

No.

%
Plea of Guilty/Misdemeanor No.
%

Total
aChi Square = 31,
28

No.
%
df = 3

(35)
253

4

11

35

,

6

(100)
'"

(65)
272

43

29

(52)

(48)

716
(43)

59

22

100

936
(57)

616

37

(100)
525

32

(100)

100

1652
(100)

100

The analysis of nontrial dispositions is confined to defendants represented by the P/D and R/C who are charged with crimes (1) against
the person, (2) against property, and (3) against public health and
safety. Crimes against the person include murder, rape, assault with a
deadly weapon, other assault, and robbery. Crimes against property

include burglary, theft, forgery, and short checks.

Crimes against

public health and safety include mainly possession of narcotics( marijuana and heroin) and dangerous drugs (depressants, hallucinants,
and stimulants).
29

There were less than 50 defendants charged with offenses against public
decency, justice and public administration, and other miscellaneous
crimes.
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a felony. The converse is true of P/D as can be seen in Table
0
5. Significant associations are shown with an arrow.3
The guilty plea to a felony actually contains several gradations. The defendant may plead guilty to the most serious
offense charged or to a lesser felony. When this distinction is
made for defense counsel, the distribution on guilty pleas to
a felony can be seen in Table 6.
TABLE

6

Distribution of Guilty Pleas by Type of Counsela

R/C
P/D
Total
No.
%
No.
% No.
%
No.
89 4 12
182 1' 19
271
16
%
(33)
(67)
Lesser Felony
No.
128 4 18
217 j' 23
345
21
%
(37)
(63)
aThe percentages shown are of total defendants represented by the
counsel.
Guilty Plea To:
Most Serious Offense

The table shows a strong association between type of counsel
and disposition including misdemeanor. The only exception is
dismissal. Overall, R/C obtains fewer convictions on the most
serious charge than does P/D.
Considering dismissals, pleas to a lesser felony, and pleas
to a misdemeanor as a measure of successful plea bargaining,'" the R/C has a 77 percent success rate, the P/D a 74
percent success rate. This difference is not significant; counsel
appear to be roughly equally effective. However, the association between types of disposition as shown previously is strong
for each type of counsel. The following discussion addresses
these relationships in the light of other factors relative to the
defendant, to defense counsel activity, and to the system.
a.

Type of Offense

The representation of defendants charged with an offense
in the three major categories varies.Whereas R/C represent about
37 percent of persons charged with crimes against the person
30

31

The Chi Square value reported in this and in all succeeding tables
measures the statistical significance for the contingency table. The
symbol "dr" refers to the degrees of freedom employed in the Chi
Square measure. In addition to computing these values, a recently developed statistical method, permitting an analysis of the interaction
between qualitative variables was used to determine the significance
of associations for each cell of the table. The results of this technique
are shown hi the table as follows: Whenever an arrow (T") or(...)
appears, the association for that cell is statistically significant. An
arrow pointing upwards (rT) designates a higher than expected frequency and an arrow pointing downwards (4,) a lower than expected

frequency.
Dismissal/nolle is assumed to result most often from a successful suppression of evidence or loss of witnesses and is not included here.
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or property, they represent over half of those charged with
public health crimes (see Table 7). This disparity in representation may be explainable by an economic relationship to the
public health category. Half of the defendants in this category
are charged with possession of marijuana and many of these
probably come from socio-economic groups who can afford
counsel. On the other hand, the other two crime categories
contain specific offenses that have an economic motivation such
as robbery, burglary, theft, or larceny, and consequently defendants are less likely to be able to afford counsel.
TABLE

7

Counsel

Counsel Representation of Major Crime Categoriesa
Crimes Against
Property
Person

No.
R/C
P/D

%

135 438
223t 62

358 100
Total
Chi Square = 41, df = 2

Pub. Health

Total

%

No.

%

229 436
64
399'

352 ' 53
47
314,

716
936

43
57

628

666

100

1652

100

No.

%
100

No.

This disparity in representation questions whether the associations discussed earlier between counsel and disposition are
because both counsel and disposition are related to offense. Certain offenses are considered more serious than others, and the
dispositions vary, as shown in Table 8, for the three offense
categories. For example, dismissals are low and felony convictions are high in the category of crimes against property; the
reverse is true with public health crimes.
TABLE 8
Disposition

Disposition and Major Crime Categoriesa
Property
Person
%
No.
% No.

77
21
Dismissed
22
6
Dismissed/Nolle
Plea of Guilty/Felony 153 1 43
30
Plea of Guilty/Misd. 106
358 100
Total
aChi Square = 73, df = 6

107
17
33 , 5
293 " 47
31
195
628 100

Pub. Health
No.
%

192 'j 29
80 "t 12
170 , 25
34
224
666 100

Total
No.
%

376
135
616
525
1652

23
8
37
32
100

When counsel, disposition, and offense are examined together, the strong associations between R/C and dismissed/
nolle (high) and R/C and felony conviction (low) are partially explained; however, they remain significant. The converse associations of P/D with these dispositions also remain
significant.
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b. Specific Offenses
Within the categories of crimes against the person, property, and public health, there are five specific crimes with frequencies large enough to consider individually across several
classifications. These are assault with a deadly weapon (ADW),
aggravated robbery, burglary, theft, and possession of marijuana. Counsel representation of these is shown in Table 9.
In the previous analyses, ADW and robbery have been included in the category of crimes against the person, burglary
and theft in the category of crimes against property, and possession of marijuana in the category of crimes against the
public health and safety. As shown in Table 9, the distribution
32
of counsel varies greatly over these five crimes.
TABLE

9

Counsel Representation of Specific Offensesa
ADW

Robbery

Burglary

No.

%

No. %

No.

R/C

45

50

28

P/D

45

50

93 -77

Total

90

100

121

23
100

Theft

Marijuana

Total

No. %

No.

%

No.

%

79 4 28

77

52

223

"64

452

45

208 1'72

72

48

125 ..
,36

543

149

100

348

995

287

%

100

100

55
100

a Chi Square = 112, df = 4

If dispositions are examined by the specific type of offense,
the interactions between type of disposition and type of counsel disappear. This can be seen in Table 10.
TABLE

10

Proportion of Defendants Represented by R/C and
P/D According to Disposition and Offensea

Disposition

ADW Robbery Burglary Theft Marijuana Total
R/C P/D R/C P/D R/C P/D R/C P/D R/C P/D R/C P/D

Dismissed
Dismissed/Nolle
Felony
Misdemeanor

38
50
59
51

Total

50 50

62
50
41
49

10
60
29
8

90
40
71
92

23 77

27
36
28
25

73
64
72
75

28 72

43
57
58
51

57
43
42
49

52 48

69
73
54
63

31
27
46
37

64 36

44
60
38
51

56
40
62
49

45 55

a Chi Square = 16, df = 15

For each disposition, there are large variations in the distribution of counsel across the specific offenses. However, examining for a specific offense, the counsel distribution in each
disposition category is more nearly uniform. For example, the
distribution of ADW defendants is 50/50 for R/C and P/D.
32

This subset of five offenses represents 60 percent of the nontrial dispositions in the three offense categories. The distribution of disposi-

tions by counsel for all five offenses is similar to that of all nontrial
dispositions.
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This holds for misdemeanor convictions and dismissed/nolle
dispositions. Although dismissals and felony convictions vary
from this 50/50 distribution, they are not statistically significant.
Similarly, other deviations from the proportions in the last row
of each column in Table 10 are not statistically significant when
considering the entire table.
Certain offenses tend to have higher R/C or P/D representation, but these offenses are associated with distributions of
dispositions, those distributions being independent of representation. For example, if a person is charged with ADW, the
odds are 0.45 that he will be convicted of a misdemeanor
whether represented by R/C or P/D. On the other hand, if
one is charged with burglary, the odds are 0.59 he will be
convicted of a felony regardless of defense counsel. There is a
32 percent chance that the marijuana charges will be dismissed and a 50 percent chance of a misdemeanor conviction,
again regardless of counsel.
Thus, within specific crimes there appears to be no strong
relationship between counsel and disposition. However, 40 percent of the nontrial dispositions are not included here because their frequency is too small to consider individually.
Therefore, the next sections will again examine the gross categorization of the three types of crimes using additional variables, namely, characteristics of defendants, counsel, and the
court system.
c. Bail Status
Two-thirds of the defendants were on bail at the time of
disposition. 33 Whereas defendants on bail are represented about
equally by both types of counsel, over 80 percent of the defendants in jail have the P/D as counsel (see Table 11). It is
of interest to note that about one-fourth of the P/D defendants who are on bail are on personal recognizance bonds as
compared to 16 percent of those represented by R/C. The percentage obtaining release on money bond as a function of the
amount set varies of course greatly between counsel; R/C consistently have a higher proportion that make bail in each category. This is understandable in view of the fact that bail
status is a function of many factors. On the one hand, bail
status probably affects the court's finding of indigency and appointment of P/D; on the other hand, R/C express some reluctance to represent defendants in jail because of the time they
33

There were 82 defendants-, or 5 percent of the defendants with nontrial
dispositions whose bail status was unknown.
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would have to expend in visiting the defendant in jail, the
inability of the defendant to help in preparation of the case,
and the fact that rehabilitation of the defendant cannot commence prior to sentencing. However, the defendant who is able
to post bond will not necessarily have sufficient funds to
retain counsel, considering that fees may range into thousands
of dollars.
TABLE 11

Bail Status of Defendants by Type of Counsel

Counsel
R/C

Bail
No.
%
569
53

Jail
No.
%
88
18

Total
No.
%
657
42

P/D

500

47

413

82

913

58

Total

1069

100

501

100

1570

100

The distribution of bail/jail status of defendants by offenses is not uniform. Forty-eight percent of the defendants
charged with offenses against the person were free on bail,
67 percent of the defendants charged with offenses against
property were free on bail, and 80 percent of the defendants
charged with crimes against the public health and safety were
free on bail. Sixty-eight percent of all defendants in the sample were free on bail.
There is a strong relationship between favorable disposition and the status of being free on bail. Seventy-six percent
of those defendants who were dismissed/nolle and 79 percent
of those defendants who were convicted of a misdemeanor
were on bail. Only 59 percent of those convicted of a felony
were on bail.
d. Prior Felony Convictions
The information on the number of prior felony convictions
was not available for all of the defendants in the data base.
Since the probation report is the major source for this item,
the records of defendants whose cases were dismissed or who
pleaded guilty at arraignment and requested immediate sentencing did not contain this information. 34 But the records
of a sufficient number of nontrial convictions did contain this
information, and this subgroup was used to determine what
relationship exists between counsel, disposition, offense, and
prior felony convictions.
The results indicate that given the offense, defendants'
34 Even for the sample of burglary defendants in which court records
were examined in detail, the prior felony record could no be determined for 29 percent of the defendants.
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prior record, and distribution of defendants between counsel,
the disposition will not differ significantly from the proportional representation by counsel (see Table 12). This proportional representation exists whether the conviction is for a
felony or for a misdemeanor when originally charged with a
felony. As shown in Table 12, the proportion of counsel representation changes as prior felony convictions go from zero to
one to two or more. But these defense counsel proportions are
the same for level of conviction within a prior record category
and an offense category. The deviations are not statistically
significant.
TABLE 12

Proportion of Defendants Represented by R/C and
P/D According to Offense, Guilty Disposition, and
Defendants' Prior Felony Convictions
Person
P/D
%
%

Property
R/C P/D
%
%

Felony
Misdemeanor

43

57

37

63

49

51

45

55

40

60

62

38

Total

44

56

38

62

57

43

Felony
Misdemeanor

26

74

19

81

40

60

33

67

15

85

0

0

Total

28

72

18

82

40

60

Two or More
Prior Felony

Felony
Misde-

36

64

20

80

17

83

Convictions

meanor

33

67

57

43

37

63

Total

35

65

25

75

25

75

R/C

No Prior Felony
Convictions

One Prior Felony
Conviction

Pub. Health
f/C P/D
%
%

Defendants with prior records are more likely to be in jail
prior to disposition. Unfortunately, because of the lack of prior
record information on all the defendants, the relationship between prior record, bail, and all dispositions (dismissals as well
as convictions) cannot be determined. 85
85

Another important variable is age. When this variable is used with
counsel and disposition, an acceptable hypothesis is that each of these

is related to offense but is independent of each other. Unfortunately,
information on age is missing for 30 percent of the defendants and

this alone could bias the data such that the result would not be an
accurate reflection of the true situation. Even in the burglary sample
where court records were examined closely, age was missing from 12
percent of the records.

DENVER DEFENSE COUNSEL

e.

Continuances

A counsel-related activity that may have a bearing on disposition is continuances. It may be postulated that the more
often the trial date is continued, the higher the probability that
witnesses will tire of appearing or the better the deal that can
be made with the prosecutor. Thus, there should be a relationship between dismissal or level of conviction rates as a function
of the number of continuances. Defense counsel are frequently
regarded as seeking continuances in order to delay the proceedings for better results, or in the case of R/C, for both better
results and to obtain the fee prior to conclusion of the case.
Although the P/D might see continuances as a means of improving the outcome, fee collection would not be a factor. To
the extent that case load affects continuances, it probably exists
for both types of counsel.
In nontrial dispositions, over one-fourth of the defendants
were disposed of without a trial setting, 44 percent had a trial
set with no continuance, and the remainder (29 percent) had
one or more continuances. Counsel distribution shows that R/C
has a higher percentage of defendants whose cases have been
continued one or more times; however, this is not significant
when compared to P/D (see Tabe 14). There is a difference
between counsel with respect to no trial date set and a trial
date set with no continuances. Within these categories, there
is a strong relationship between R/C and no trial setting (high)
and trial date set only once (low). The reverse is true of the
P/D. In the cases where there is no trial date set, either the
defendant has pleaded guilty at the arraignment, or the judge
has continued the case at the time of the arraignment to provide the parties time to negotiate. Consequently, there may be
a guilty plea or the case may be dismissed without the case
having been set for trial.
Retained counsel has a high number of defendants with
no trial settings relative to his proportion of total defendants.
There is also a strong association between R/C and dismissals
(high) and felony pleas (low) (see Table 13). The reverse is
true for the P/D. This is in part because R/C has a high case
load of public health crimes with their associated high dismissal rates. On the other hand, P/D representation is high on
crimes against person and property where felony convictions
are high. Although earlier results indicated that defense counsel do not differ significantly on types of disposition, given bail
status and offense, the fact that P/D has a high plea rate with-
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out trial setting reflects the fact tha he is processing these
cases faster.
TABLE 13

Disposition of Defendants Without a Trial Date Setting

Dismissed
Dismissed/Nolle
Felony
Misdemeanor
Total

R/C
No.
70
33
52
59
214

%
62
70
33
48
49

P/D
%
No.
38
43
30
14
67
106
52
63
51
226

Total
%
No.
100
113
100
47
100
158
100
122
100
440

Before examining continuances and their effect on disposition, it should be noted that the defense counsel is not the
moving party for all continuances. A few are at the request of
the prosecutor and many cases are continued because they cannot be processed on the scheduled date. The moving party was
3
the reidentified for about one-third of the continuances;
have
could
of
these
maining two-thirds were unspecified. Some
been on the part of the defense or prosecution, however a
large part are probably because of over-scheduling on the
date set.3 7 Thirty-one percent of all continuances were at the
request of the defense, 2 percent were by the prosecution, and
67 percent were unspecified. There are more continuances requested by and granted to R/C than to the P/D (37 percent
versus 26 percent). The frequency of trial resettings in any
one case varied between one and six.
TABLE

14

Proportion of Defendants Represented by R/C and
P/D According to Continuances and Disposition

Dismissed
Dismissed/Nolle
Felony
Misdemeanor
Total

Set Only
R/C P/D
69
31
60
40
71
29
53
47
63
37

Reset Once
R/C P/D
55
45
36
64
53
47
52
48
52
48

Reset Twice
R/C

P/D

51
53
47
54
51

49
47
53
46
49

Examining the defendants by type of disposition, number of
continuances, and type of counsel reveals some significant interactions. As mentioned earlier, R/C is low on "set only," and
the P/D is high in this category (See Table 14). However,
36 This information is recorded in the daily minutes of each court division

and the moving party is not uniformly recorded among divisions.
37 There is a tendency to pack the individual calendar, scheduling upwards
of 10 cases for the same trial date in an effort to induce pleas. If a
plea is not forthcoming and the defense wants a trial, all but one case
will be continued by the court to another date, usually 2 to 4 months
hence.

DENVER DEFENSE COUNSEL

there is no strong association with type of counsel and one or
two or more continuances. Furthermore, there is no significant
interaction with defense counsel and type of disposition. Thus,
although it appears that R/C is -using continuances more often,
there is no significant association between type of counsel and
type of disposition for cases where there were continuances.
f. Motions to Suppress
The most frequent hearing on a motion recorded in the
data base is on a motion to suppress evidence. 3

Seventy-one

such motions were heard for all 1970 defendants terminated
by November 30, 1971; these were on behalf of 67 defendants,
or less than 4 percent of all defendants.3 9 Based on all nontrial
dispositions, the R/C rate of hearings was 4 percent and the
P/D rate was 3 percent. The majority of the motions occurred
in narcotics and dangerous drug cases (largely possession of
marijuana). Using dismissal/nolle as a measure of success for
the defendant's motion, R/C has a 45 percent and the P/D a
41 percent success rate. There is no relationship between case
disposition (guilty/not guilty) and type of counsel for those
40
defendants in whose cases a motion to suppress was heard.
g.

Activity

As a measure of activity in the case from the time of filing
in district court to final disposition, the number of court-related events that were recorded in each case was counted. This
includes, in addition to the previously discussed trial settings
and resettings and associated motions for continuances, all other
motions,4' preliminary hearings (in district court), bench warrants, continuances for mental observation, and a few other
infrequently recorded events. The number of such activities
ranged from one to 14 for all cases.
Of interest in this study was whether R/C generated more
activity than the P/D, and whether this activity was related
to type of disposition. One can postulate that the more activity
38

Hearings on motions for discovery were not being recorded in 1970.
Based on the burglary, ADW, and robbery subsamples, the rate of filings for motions for discovery is approximately 8 percent. About

three-fourths of these are heard.
39 This is the same as the rate of filing of motions to suppress in the
samples of ADW, robbery, and burglary defendants, namely less than

4 percent. Measured in terms of hearings on motions to suppress, the
rate was closer to 3 percent which is lower than the total data base.
This is because the total base includes public health crimes where motions to suppress are used more frequently.
4oChi Square = 2.5, df = 2.
41

This includes a few motions to sever, withdraw, and dismiss in addition to the previously discussed motions to suppress.
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in a case, the better the outcome from the defense point of view,
and that R/C would be more likely to engage in heavier activities. However, when the frequency of activities is examined,
there is no significant difference between counsel. 42 About 60
percent of all cases had two or less activities regardless of type
of counsel. About 30 percent of the cases had three to five
activities, again, with no difference in type of counsel. Comparisons for higher numbers of activities per case yielded similar results. The low activity rate is strongly associated with
dismissals. None of the other activity rates are significantly
associated with types of disposition. Insofar as court activity
is concerned, R/C and P/D are similar; there is no strong
association between activity and type of disposition, with the
exception of dismissals, where activity is low. Since dismissals
include a large proportion of defendants who are terminated
in another case, activity understandably is low in such cases.
4.

Retained Counsel Compared to Public Defender:
Sentences

A major step in the processing of a felony case is the determination of guilt. For those found innocent, the verdict is
essentially the end of the process; however, for the convicted
group, sentence lies ahead. Defense counsel view their input
into sentence determination as a major part of their role in
representing the defendant. When the case against the defendant
is indisputable, the defense counsel's role is one of preparing
the defendant for the sentence, while at the same time working
with the prosecution, judge, and probation personnel to present the defendant in the best perspective in order to reduce
the sentence.
The sentence may be a part of the plea bargaining process.
However, in Denver there was no clear indication of the role
of either prosecutor or judge in the sentence negotiations. It
was reported that the district attorney took no part in the
sentencing, and only rarely at the time of sentencing would
he object to or suggest a sentence. Similarly, some judges reported that they would make no commitments and would not
negotiate sentences. On the other hand, defense counsel reported that there were judges who would forewarn counsel
as to severity of sentence.
As discussed previously, the two levels of conviction studied
are felony and misdemeanor from an original felony charge.
42 Chi

Square = 5.1, df = 3.
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The former carries a prison term, the latter a year or less in
jail. At either level, the sentence may be suspended 43 or the
defendant placed on probation for a specified period of time.
These sentence levels are examined in the next two subsections
by type of counsel; first comparisons are for felony convictions,
and second comparisons are for misdemeanor convictions. The
analysis will utilize categories of sentence - penitentiary/reformatory, 44 probation, and suspended sentence - without distinction as to length of sentence because finer breakdowns
45
result in too many zero entries for statistical analysis.
a.

Felony Convictions

There is a strong relationship between counsel and sentence as shown in Table 15. Retained counsel is high on probation and low on prison/reformatory. The converse is true
for the P/D. Using the major offense categories and examining
type of counsel and sentence does not explain this relationship
between sentence and type of counsel. Although there is an
TABLE 15

Sentences of Defendants Convicted of a Felonya
R/C

Sentence
Penitentiary/Reformatory
Probation
Suspended Sentence
Total
a

No.
63
122
28
213

4'

Total

P/D
%

30
'" 57
13
100

%

No.

%

210 ' 54
125 , 32
55
14
390
100

273
.247
83
603

45
41
14
100

No.

Chi Square = 39. df = 2.

association between type of offense and sentence (crimes
against persons and property are both high on prison terms
and low on suspended sentences), there is no strong relationship
between type of counsel and offense in this convicted group.
The significant relationship between counsel and sentence
disappears if the defendants are distributed over bail/jail status
according to sentence category and type of cotinsel. This is
shown graphically in Figure 1. Shown at the top, Part A, is
the distribution of defendants convicted of a felony by type
of counsel. These are then distributed by type of sentence in
43

Generally if the sentence is suspended, the defendant is placed informally under the supervision of the probation department.

Although

they are treated separately in the analyses, the categories of probation
and suspended sentence are similar in operation.
44
Reformatory is included with the prison grouping because the entries
there are too small to be treated separately.
45 It is of interest to note that of the 160 defendants convicted of a felony
and sentenced to the penitentiary, the median of maximum sentences
was 6 years. This median was the same for both R/C and P/D.
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Part B. A comparison of A with B shows the disparity of
sentences and counsel shown in Table 15. The defense counsel/sentence combinations are then spread over the bail/jail
categories in Parts C and D. Now, comparing the bars across
the sentences with the pair of bars on the right which represents proportion of defendants on bail (C) and in jail (D)
represented by each type of counsel, sentence distributions
resemble the bail distribution in C and jail distribution in D.
The major deviations occur in the penitentiary/reformatory
and probation categories for defendants on bail; however, these
counsel/sentence associations are not significant when considered over all combinations of defense counsel and sentence.
A model may be suggested as follows: Given the defendants
convicted of a felony and on bail, their distribution by counsel
in the three sentence categories will be essentially the same
as distribution by counsel for bail. A similar statement is valid
for defendants in jail. For example, if the representation ratio
of convicted felons in jail at the time of disposition is 15 percent
R/C and 85 percent P/D, the representation of defendants in
each of the three sentence categories will be the same (see
Figure 1, Part D). Thus, sentence is not strongly associated
with type of defense counsel, but rather it is associated with
the bail/jail status of the defendant.
Among other variables, a strong association between prior
felony convictions and sentence exists. This is not surprising.
Those with no prior record more often receive probation or
suspended sentence; those with two or more felony convictions
generally receive prison sentences .4 When sentences and prior
record are considered by type of counsel, there is a strong
relationship between counsel and sentence, and between sentence and prior record, but counsel and prior record are independent of each other- each has a similar distribution of defendants with no record, and with one or two or more prior
felony convictions.
Misdemeanor Convictions from Original Felony
Charge
Examination of the sentences of defendants convicted of
a misdemeanor when originally charged with a felony yields results different from those described above for felony convictions.
The strong association between counsel and sentence is not
b.

46

Defendants with two or mcre prior felony convictions are reportedly

not eligible for probation; with few exceptions, this appears to be the
case in the data base.
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FIGURE 1

Sentences of Defendants Convicted of a Felony

Key:

Mi R/C
El P/D

A. Percent of Defendants Convicted
of a Felony

B. Sentences of Convicted Felons

Penitentiary/
Reformatory

Probation

Suspended Sentence

C. Sentences of Convicted Felons on Bail

Penitentiary/
Reformatory r

Probation

rfI

On Bail

D. Sentences of
Convicted Felons
in Jail

Penitentiary/
Reformatory

Probation

Suspended Sentence
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completely explained by any of the variables considered. This
association is shown in Table 16. Retained counsel is high on
probation and suspended sentence and low on jail; 47 the opposite
is true for the P/D. When these counsel/sentence combinations are considered for the three major crime categories, the
strong counsel/sentence associations are decreased. In fact, the
interactions between counsel and suspended sentence are no
longer significant. However, significant interactions remain in
the jail and probation categories.
TABLE 16

Sentences of Defendants Convicted of a Misdemeanora

Sentence
Jail or Reformatory

R/C
%
No.
16 1, 6

163 T 66
Probation
69 t" 28
Suspended Sentence
248 100
Total
a Chi Square = 59, df = 2.

P/D
%
No.
84 1" 31

112
74
270

4
4

42
27
100

Total
%
No.
19
100

275
143
518

53
28
100

Although the addition of the bail/jail variable either alone
or together with offense, further reduces these interactions,
they continue to be significant. Not only do the significant relationships remain, but bail/jail status is related to each of the
three variables (counsel, offense, sentence) independently.
Therefore, unlike the result with felony convictions, the bail/
jail variable does not completely explain the strong counsel/
sentence association.
Thus, with the exception of the suspended sentence/counsel
combination, the strong relationship of defense counsel and
sentence of misdemeanants cannot be explained by the variables
considered. Although bail status and prior felony convictions
each and together with offense reduce the strong association
between R/C and probation (high) and jail (low), this association is not completely accounted for. There are undoubtedly
activities connected with negotiation with the prosecution,
circumstances relative to the crime, or characteristics of the
defendant that affect the sentences of defendants who were
charged with a felony, pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor, and
are sentenced as a misdemeanant.
5. Retained Counsel Compared to Public Defender: Time to
Disposition
With the exception of a few early dismissals of R/C de47Reformatory is combined with jail because there were few (26)

de-

fendants convicted of a misdemeanor who were committed to the
reformatory.
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fendants, P/D defendants are disposed of at a faster rate than
R/C defendants. The median times are generally 6 weeks shorter
for the P/D, with the exception of dismissals where the difference
is 2 weeks. It should be noted that felony and misdemeanor dispositions include the time from guilty plea to sentencing which
can be zero sentencing on the date of plea) or several months
(when probation reports have to be prepared and counsel
schedules met).
The time distributions examined as a function of bail status
of the defendant show that both types of counsel dispose of
cases where the defendant is in jail at a more rapid rate than
where the defendant is on bail; however, whether on bail or
in jail, the P/D generally has shorter median times. The distributions for both counsel are quite similar for defendants on
bail who plead guilty to a felony or to a misdemeanor. On the
other hand, there is a great disparity for jailed defendants in
times for the P/D
these two convicted categories -median
are about 2 months shorter than for R/C.
Thus, disposition and bail/jail variables do not explain the
relationship between type of counsel and time to disposition.
Furthermore, when these three variables (counsel, type of disposition, and time) are examined as a function of the three
crime categories, time and offense are independent of each
other. Therefore, offense is not a factor in explaining these time
differentials.
a.

Trial Settings and Continuances

One of the factors cited most often as contributing to delay
is trial date continuances. As seen earlier, there was no significant difference between type of counsel and number of continuances once the case was set for trial. However, R/C is high
on no settings, and the P/D is high on setting for trial with no
continuances. When the case is not set for trial, the P/D has a
faster rate of disposition than R/C. This faster rate is especially strong for guilty pleas to a felony. A similar result pertains
to those cases that were set for trial and disposed of without
continuances.
It is interesting to note the results in time and disposition
as a function of counsel when there are trial date continuances.
Among those defendants whose cases were set and continued once,
varithere were no significant associations between any of the
This is
ables (type of counsel, type of disposition, or time).
similar
very
is
shown in Table 17. The proportion of defendants
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in each type of disposition, time, and counsel category. As a
group then, cases that are continued once have a longer average
time between filing and disposition, but this is not related to
type of counsel or type of disposition.
TABLE

17

Proportion of Defendants with One Continuance According to Time, Counsel, and Disposition
Dismissed
R/C P/D

Time (Mo.)

48
42
57
48

0-4
4-8
>8
Total

52
58
43
52

Felony
R/C P/D
35
48
51
47

65
52
49
53

Misdemeanor
R/C P/D
45
45
55
48

55
55
45
52

Total
R/C P/D
44
45
55
48

56
55
45
52

When the case is continued two or more times a significant
association between type of counsel and time appears. Retained
counsel take longer, but this is independent of type of disposition. In other words, if R/C are seeking continuances in anticipation of a better type of disposition, it appears to be to no
avail. This can be seen in Table 18. Whereas the proportion
of defendants in each time slot varies with type of counsel,
the distribution in type of dispositions (last row of table) by
counsel is not significantly different from the distribution of
counsel in the total group (51/49).
TABLE

18

Proportion of Defendants with Two or More Continuances According to Time, Counsel, and Disposition
Dismissed
R/C P/D

Time in
Monthsa

30
70
53

0-8
>8
Total

70
30
47

Felony
R/C P/D

33
54
47

67
46
53

Misdemeanor
R/C P/D

47
55
54

53
45
46

Total
R/C P/D

36
59
51

64
41
49

a The 0-4 and 4-8 month categories were combined because of low
frequencies.

b.

Activity in the Case

The same measure of activity in the cases discussed earlier
under dispositions was examined to determine its relation with
time, type of disposition, and counsel. As expected, there is a
strong association between time and the number of actions
recorded in a case - fewer activities are associated with shorter
time. There is a very strong association with five or more
activities and cases with a disposition time of 12 months or
more. However, these activities and times are independent of
type of counsel.
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III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
A. Defense Counsel in Denver County Court
The median time between first advisement in county court
and bindover to district court in the burglary sample was 6
weeks. Whereas the P/D achieved this median, R/C took 2
weeks longer. Waiver of preliminary hearing occurs in about
40 percent of the cases regardless of counsel. However, the time
to bindover for R/C is 10 weeks when preliminary hearing is
waived as opposed to 5.5 weeks for P/D. That shorter times are
not related to waiver is because waiver generally occurs on
the date set for preliminary hearing.
In general, defendants represented by R/C have longer
median times between steps in the process; in particular, between (1) first and second advisement, (2) second advisement and preliminary hearing, and (3) second advisement and
bindover when preliminary hearing is waived. Continuances
do not account for these differences; instead the time set for
these procedures appears to be longer for R/C. There are two
time intervals that are shorter for R/C than for P/D: (1)
the period of time between arrest and first appearance before
the magistrate where the defendant is advised of the reason
for his arrest, advised of his rights, and bail is set; and (2) the
time between arrest and entry of counsel. These both represent critical steps from the defendant's point of view.
B. Defense Counsel in Denver District Court
The P/D represented 53.5 percent and R/C represented 42
percent of the felony defendants whose cases were filed in
district court in 1970. The guilty/not guilty dispositions do not
differ with counsel. Furthermore, when trial dispositions (which
represent less than 6 percent of dispositions) are considered
separately from nontrial dispositions, both R/C and P/D have
the same trial rate and outcome, with the exception of not
guilty by reason of insanity, where the P/D rate is higher.
However, within the guilty/not guilty categories for nontrial dispositions there is a disparity: retained counsel has high
rates of dismissal/nolle and guilty pleas to a misdemeanor and
a low rate of guilty pleas to a felony. The reverse is true of P/D.
There is also a disparity of representation according to
offenses and the bail status of the defendant. When these two
characteristics of the defendant are used along with counsel
and disposition, an acceptable hypothesis is that counsel and
disposition are independent of each other. The relationships that
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exist are between counsel and offense and counsel and bail;
additional relationships emerge between disposition and bail
and offense. These results indicate that it is not counsel which
is the primary factor in the outcome of the case (except to
the extent he affects bail), but rather characteristics of the
crime, the defendant, and perhaps the system.
These results are obtained when the offenses are categorized: (1) against the person, (2) against property, and (3)
against the public health and safety. When individual crimes
are examined, the relationship between counsel and disposition
disappears. Certain crimes tend to have higher R/C or P/D
representation, but these offenses are associated with certain
distributions of disposition. This association is independent of
representation for the offenses examined (assault with a deadly
weapon, robbery, burglary, theft, and the possession of marijuana). Prior felony convictions also relate to level of conviction (felony versus misdemeanor from an original felony charge)
and offense, but once prior convictions are accounted for, there
is no significant relationship between counsel and level of conviction.
Although R/C appear to use continuances more often (perhaps in part to collect fees), there is no significant association
between type of counsel and type of disposition for cases
where there were continuances. Furthermore, there is no relationship between type of counsel and type of disposition
(guilty/not guilty) for those defendants' cases in which a
motion to suppress was heard.
There is a strong relationship between counsel and sentence of defendants who plead guilty to a felony. Whereas
R/C is low on defendants committed to the penitentiary or
reformatory and is high on probation, the reverse holds for the
P/D. However, if one examines the defendants convicted of a
felony who are on bail, their distribution over sentences (prison, probation, suspended sentence) by type of counsel is essentially the same as the distribution by counsel for all defendants on bail. Similarly, distribution over sentences by type
of counsel is essentially the same as the distribution by counsel for all defendants in jail during trial court processing. The
median felony conviction prison sentence (6 years) was the
same for both types of counsel.
Unlike the case of felony convictions, the strong relationship between counsel and sentence of defendants who plead
guilty to a misdemeanor when originally charged with a felony
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cannot be explained by the variables considered. Although bail
status and prior felony convictions each singly and together
with offense reduce the strong association between R/C and
probation (high) and jail (low), this relationship is not completely accounted for. Nor is the P/D and probation (low) and
jail (high) reverse relationship completely explained.
Although R/C and. PiD achieve essentially the same results
in disposition and sentences when viewed in the context of
the defendant-related and system-related variables studied, this
is done in significantly different time periods. Overall, the
P/D's defendants are disposed of at a faster rate than R/C's,
regardless of type of disposition or bail status of the defendant.
Thus, although R/C take longer, there is no variance with respect to more favorable dispositions. Of course, taking a longer
time may be a consideration with respect to the collection of
fees.
When time is examined relative to continuances, it is found
that when the defendants' cases were set and continued once,
there were no significant associations between counsel, disposition, or time. When defendants' cases were set and continued
two or more times, there was a significant association between
time and counsel, R/C taking longer. However, this is independent of disposition.
CONCLUSION

As stated in the beginning of this article, there are many
views on the quality of defense counsel. provided for the indigent. Through numerous analyses of interrelations between
defendant-related and system-related factors, this study has
presented a meaningful information base for destroying myths
about the relative effectiveness of the public defender and
retained counsel. For example, where at first blush it appeared
that retained counsel was obviously superior, careful analysis
often revealed some differentiating factor. For misdemeanants'
sentences, variations in effectiveness could be related only to
type of counsel - given the variables available in the data base,
none could be found to explain the differences. Overall, however, the basic findings indicate only slight variations in performance between the public defender and retained counsel.
Generally, inferences beyond the obvious have not been
made. It has not been the purpose of this article to draw conclusions about or suggest alternatives to the methods of providing counsel to indigent defendants. Obviously, the quality
of defense extends beyond that revealed by statistical analyses.

NOTE
THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL: A CASE
STUDY OF THE DENVER PUBLIC DEFENDER*
INTRODUCTION

IN

a series of decisions spanning the last half century, the
Supreme Court has recognized and progressively expanded the
constitutional right of indigent defendants to free counsel in
criminal cases. This guarantee, imposed on the states, created
a new and larger demand for criminal defense attorneys. Those
responsible for the administration of criminal justice in urban
areas, where the increased demand was exceptionally great,
responded by creating a new agency of government, the public
defender office. These offices have been warmly praised and
roundly criticized.' But lauded or despised, the phenomenon
of the "public defender" (PD) is growing steadily and now
provides the predominant source of criminal defense in many
2
areas.
As the "right-to-counsel" cases unfolded in the Supreme
Court's decisions, it became apparent that a state could not
discharge its duty to the criminal defendant by mere formalities of representation. Instead the right to counsel came to
mean the right to effective counsel. Criticism of the public defender system continued, but now it focused on the issue of
whether defense counsel provided by the same government
which prosecutes a defendant may be objectively labelled "effective counsel."
Although few systematic studies exploring the effectiveness
of the public defender appear in the literature, 3 it is a question
of growing interest to much of the legal community. This Note
seeks to contribute some insights to this barren landscape.
• The authors wish to thank the many persons participating in this study,
especially Mr. J.D. MacFarlane, Chief Deputy Public Defender, for his
cooperation.

1 See, e.g., Note, Comparison of Public Defenders' and Private Attorneys'

Relationships with the Prosecution in the City of Denver, 50 DENVER
L.J. 101 (1973).
2 E.g., the Denver public defender office handled approximately 60% of
all felony and nontraffic misdemeanor cases completed in Denver during the 1971-72 fiscal year.
3
See, e.g., Comment, The Allegheny County Public Defender Office:
A Study, 32 U. Prrr. L. REV. 533 (1971); Comment, Client Service in a
Defender Organization: The PhiladelphiaExperience, 117 U. PA. L. REv.

448 (1969).
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To begin, the right to effective counsel is traced from its origins
to its present status. From this development and from reference
to other case law, a set of definite indicia of effective counsel
are set forth. Then, results of a case study of the Denver public
defender office, conducted between April and August 1972,
are reported. Analyzing these results in terms of the assumed
indicia provides some measure of the effectiveness of counsel
provided by the Denver public defender. Finally, the relevance
of this study to the development of future constitutional standards of defense effectiveness is explored.
I.

ORIGINS

OF

THE RIGHT

TO EFFECTIVE

COUNSEL

The right to counsel originates in the sixth amendment
to the United States Constitution, which states in part, "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense. ' '4 This sixth amendment constitutional
mandate is exceedingly broad yet straightforward on its face.
Its plain meaning is given support by statutes and rules on both
the federal and state levels. 5 But, to have any substance at all,
its meaning must go beyond the theoretical and incorporate
some notion of assistance, not just by counsel, but by adequate,
competent, or "effective counsel."
The development of these guarantees is typically traced to
the Supreme Court's 1932 decision in Powell v. Alabama.6 In
Powell, nine black youths were charged with the rape of two
white girls. On the morning of the trial the judge appointed
the entire local bar to defend the youths. Additionally, one
out-of-state lawyer volunteered his assistance. Eight of the
defendants were convicted, and the Alabama appellate courts
affirmed seven of the convictions. On grounds that this procedure was a denial of due process of law, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the remaining convictions. Noting that
due process included a "right to be heard," Justice Sutherland
reasoned: "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel."'7 Moreover, Sutherland declared that the right to
counsel, where guaranteed, meant a right to "effective and substantial aid."8
4U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3006A(c), (h) (Supp. 1972); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 39-21-1(1) (Supp. 1969); FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(b), 44(a); COLO.
R. CRnm. P. 5 (b), 44.
(3287 U.S. 45 (1932). For a discussion of earlier development, see W.
BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS

7 287 U.S. at 68-69.
8 Id.at 53.

(1955).
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The Powell decision predicated the right to counsel on a
"fair trial" standard.! The courts were still to look to all the
circumstances of each case and to assess the fairness of refusing to provide counsel for the defendant. If the trial was "fair,"
no denial of due process had occurred despite the absence of
counsel. In short, Powell did not create a sixth amendment right
to counsel in state criminal prosecutions.1 0
The weakness of the "fair trial" rule became evident,
when, in 1942, the Court was faced with a "close decision" in
Betts v. Brady." The defendant was accused of robbery in
Maryland, a state which provided counsel only in murder and
rape cases. Betts requested counsel, but his request was denied,
and he was subsequently convicted. Upon appeal to the Supreme
Court, his conviction was affirmed in a now infamous decision
written by Justice Roberts. The decision denied both the sixth
amendment and due process arguments of the appellant:
The Sixth Amendment of the national Constitution Dpplies only
to trials in federal courts. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate, as such, the specific
guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment ....12

The Court further reasoned that the due process-fair trial
standard of Powell required the appointment of counsel only
in special circumstances. Since the defendant, Betts, had been
convicted of a crime once before, he "was not wholly unfamiliar with criminal procedure. 1 3 Justice Roberts therefore
concluded that the special circumstances which might preclude
him from adequately defending himself were absent, and the
14
conviction was affirmed.
During the next 20 years and into the Warren Court era,
the substance of the "special circumstances" exception was
gradually expanded until the exception had swallowed the
9 Id. at 57-58.
10
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ

counsel,
because
it is the
counsel

and is incapable adequately of making his own defense
of ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy, or the like,
duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign
for him as a necessary requisite of due process of

law ....
Id. at 71.

11 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
12 Id. at 461-62.
13 Id. at 472. For a stunning criticism of Justice Roberts' simplistic treatment of this case, see Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused,
30 U. Cn. L. REv. 1 (1962).

14

In Betts the Court refused to grant rights to defendants in state courts
which were already granted in federal court. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938).
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rule. 5 Finally in 1963, the Court acknowledged explicitly the
abrogation of the Betts precedent by its decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright.0 Here, the Court accepted full incorporation of
the Sixth Amendment, applying a federal standard of right-tocounsel to state prosecutions and characterizing Betts as an
interruption of the sound principles begun in Powell.
[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled
into court who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.17
Faced with the nearly insurmountable burden of providing
counsel for the many indigent defendants shuffled through their
courts each year, states chose to borrow the federal test for
right to counsel which distinguished between petty and nonpetty offenses. 18 For crimes in which the maximum allowable
sentence did not exceed 6 months or $1,000 fine, or both, the
right to counsel did not attach. Then in 1972, the Court discarded this distinction in its decision of Argersinger v. Hamlin,19
and the right to counsel was extended to any misdemeanant
if his sentence could include imprisonment.
While the constitutional guarantee of right to counsel has
been expanded, it is the effectiveness of such counsel which
gives vitality to the guarantee. Yet many courts have been
reluctant to recognize a denial of effective assistance except
under the most extreme circumstances. The policy underlying
this reluctance has been outlined in these terms:
(a) To honor the claim is to implicitly censure the trial court;
in effect the appellate court is saying that the trial court was
blind to injustice committed in its presence. To readily honor
the claim would (b) force the trial judge to intervene whenever possible error is being committed by the defense attorney;
(c) make most lawyers much more reluctant than they already
are to accept court assignments; (d) permit a lawyer with a
desperate case to2 0insure his client a new trial by deliberately
committing error.
Clearly none of these arguments bears any rational relationship to a defendant's right to "effective and substantial
15 See Beaney, The Right to Counsel, in RIGHTS OF Tif AccusED - (S.
Nagel ed. 1973); Annot., 9 L. Ed. 2d 1260, 1264 (1963).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
17 Id. at 344.
Is18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(a) (Supp. 1972).
19 407 U.S. 25 (1972). The Court there said:
16

[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be

imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at

his trial.

Id. at 37 (footnotes omitted).

20

L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W.
cEv'RE 79 (3d ed. 1969).

LAFAVE

& J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PRO-

1973
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aid," a right recognized by the Supreme Court four decades ago
in Powell.
Gradually, however, the Court has come to accept the full
rationale of Gideon as embracing a constitutional right to
effective counsel. In McMann v. Richardson,2 1 a 1970 decision,
the Court ruled:
[D]efendants facing felony charges are entitled to the effective
assistance of competent counsel. Beyond this we think the matter, for the most part, should be left to the good sense and discretion of trial courts with the admonition that if the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose,
defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel,
and that judges should strive to maintain proper standards of
performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in
criminal cases in their courts. 22
From Powell through Gideon and on to McMann, the right
to counsel has expanded into a right to effective counsel. Implicit in this expansion was the further recognition that counsel's
effectiveness depended upon his timely appointment. He must
represent the defendant at the earliest "critical stage" of the
proceedings. 23 Originally, this meant at whatever point the
defendant first came before a judge or magistrate. 24 The Warren Court, however, feared that the effectiveness of counsel at
trial would be severely impaired if the attorney did not represent his client's interest at earlier stages in the proceedings,
stages at which the government might violate the defendant's
constitutional rights or gain other unfair evidentiary advantage.
This reasoning gave rise to the dramatic expansion of the right
to counsel, with regard to the time of appointment. The right
soon came to include the guarantee of representation at:
25
- custodial interrogation
26

- initial appearances
27
post-indictment lineup identification
- preliminary hearings2"
29
arraignments
-

sentencing

30

U.S. 759 (1970).
Id. at 771 (emphasis added).
23 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
24 See, e.g., White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
25 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26 White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
27 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
28 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
29Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
30 McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968).
21397
22
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probation hearings 31
32
- appeals
-

Recently, however, the Burger Court may have begun to
retreat from this "absoluteness" of the right to counsel developed by the Warren Court decisions. In Kirby v. Illinois,"3
the Court held that the right to counsel did not attach as early
as a pre-indictment lineup, ruling instead that the right was
guaranteed only "at or after the time that adversary judicial
proceedings have been initiated. '34 Only future cases will determine the extent to which the Burger Court intends to withdraw
from its predecessor's concept of the right to counsel.

II.

DTERMiNING THE INDICIA OF EFFECTIVE COUNSEL

Although the courts had firmly cemented the right to
effective counsel in constitutional law, they had, until recently,
done little to define the term "effective counsel" in anything
but the most generic terms. 35 Several broad rules for deciding
challenges to the effectiveness of counsel have emerged from
state and federal courts:
- Improvident strategy, mistake, bad tactics, carelessness and inexperience do not necessarily amount to
ineffective counsel unless, taken as a whole, the trial
31

Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). There has been considerable dis-

pute over whether Mempa can be read this broadly, many courts holding
that the McConnell decision restricts Mempa to sentencing. See United
States ex rel. Bishop v. Brierly, 28 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
Holder v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Tex. 1968); Sammons
v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 100 (S.D. Tex. 1968); United States v.
Hartsell, 277 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. Tenn. 1967). But see Hewett v. North
Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969); Ashworth v. United States, 391
F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1968). For a complete discussion of the problem, see
Beaney, supra note 15.
32
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
33406 U.S. 682 (1972).
34 Id. at 688. Justice Brennan, however, said in dissent:
[T]he initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings ...
is completely irrelevant to whether counsel is necessary at a
pretrial confrontation for identification in order to safeguard
the accused's constitutional rights to confrontation and the effective assistance of counsel at this trial.
The plurality offers no reason, and I can think of none, for
concluding that a post-arrest confrontation for identification,
unlike a post-charge confrontation, is not among those "critical
confrontations" of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial
proceedings where the results might well settle the accused's
fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.
Id. at 697-99.
35 The Code of Professional Responsibility, recently promulgated by the
American Bar Association is similarly broad. Canon 6 of the Code
provides: "A lawyer should represent a client competently."

DENVER PUBLIC DEFENDER

was a mockery of justice.3 6
37

-

Inexperience is not equivalent to incompetence.

-

Effective counsel does not mean the "most effective"
3
counsel.
Negligence of an attorney is only one factor pointing
39
to a violation of a constitutional right.
40
Counsel is not to be judged by hindsight.

-

-

As is obvious, these rules reflect more judicial pragmatism than
desire to enhance defense counsel effectiveness. At present,
the resolution of many questions of effective counsel,41 from
timely appointment of counsel, 42 to client interviews, 43 to trial
36

See People v. Washington, 41 111. 2d 16, 241 N.E.2d 425 (1968).
As no two men can be exactly alike in the practice of the profession, it is basically unreasonable to judge an attorney by
what another would have done, or says he would have done,
in the better light of hindsight. Scott v. United States, 334
F.2d 72 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 842 (1964); Williams v.
Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 706 (5th Cir. 1966).

[M]istakes, although indicative of lack of skill or even incompetency, will not vitiate the trial unless on the whole the
representation is of such low caliber as to amount to no representation and to reduce the trial to a farce. United States
ex rel. Feelley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976, 980-81 (7th Cir. 1948).
Id. at 19, 241 N.E.2d at 428.
37 United States v. Helwig, 159 F.2d 616 (3d Cir. 1947).
38 People v. Sorrentino 146 Cal. App. 2d 149, 303 P.2d 859 (1956).
39 United States v. Butler, 167 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Va. 1957).
40 MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960).
41 Most courts ask what is not effective counsel, and in cases involving
appointed counsel, have held that ineffective counsel may mean, for
example, failure to investigate. People v. Morris, 3 Ill. 2d 437, 121
N.E.2d 810 (1954).
(time of appointment
42 Callahan v. Russell, 423 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1970)
alone does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel); Evans v.
Beto, 415 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1969) (a "judicial stopwatch" not to be
applied as a constitutional standard of counsel effectiveness; same day
appointment upheld); United States ex rel. Chambers v. Maroney, 408
F.2d 1186 (3d Cir. 1969) (in the late appointment of counsel, a prima
facie presumption arises that the accused was prejudiced thereby; the
burden is upon the State to overcome this presumption); Doughty v.
Beto, 396 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1968) (15 minute pretrial consultation. with
client was not held ineffective); Bentley v. Florida, 285 F. Supp. 494
(S.D. Fla. 1968) (five minute preparation prior to entering a guilty
plea was held a "perfunctory" representation). See United States v.
Helwig, 159 F.2d 616 (3d Cir. 1947) (one minute preparation before
trial was too brief. See also United States ex rel. Mathis v. Rundle,
394 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1968); Twiford v. Peyton, 372 F.2d 670 (4th Cir.
1967); Mathis v. North Carolina, 266 F. Supp. 841 (M.D.N.C. 1967);
United States ex rel. Spears v. Rundle, 268 F. Supp. 691 (E.D. Pa. 1967),
af 'd per curiam, 405 F.2d 1037 (3d Cir. 1969).
43 Bush v. State, 209 So. 2d 696 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
[O]ne charged with crime cannot be properly represented
unless given fair opportunity to talk in private with his counsel. If in such a case the public defender, for any reason, finds
himself unable to afford an interview with his client for a
complete review of the case, this fact should be reported
promptly to the trial court for appropriate disposition.
Id. at 697-98.
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preparation, 44 to the making of proper objections, 45 to the posttrial assistance of counsel, 46 must depend upon a factual de47
termination to be made by the trial court.
Nevertheless, when faced with the task of defining effective counsel, some courts have pinpointed several standards
which must be met: (1) counsel must be available to consult
with the client;48 (2) counsel must have issues of fact and law
researched; 4 and (3) counsel must plan a defense. 50
Several federal circuits have established minimal standards
to evaluate the effectiveness of appointed counsel. 51 The Fourth
44

People v. Simms, 10 Cal. App. 3d 299, 89 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
[T]here is imposed upon counsel the minimal duty to investigate all defenses of law or fact and his failure to do so may
result in the denial of effective assistance of counsel.
Id. at 313-14, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
45 People v. Odom, 71 Ill. App. 2d 480, 218 N.E.2d 116 (1966).
[D]efense counsel made no effort to exclude the confession
despite the fact that he must have known, if he conferred at all
with his client or his client's wife, that serious question
existed as to the voluntariness of the confession. In doing so
he gave his client no protection whatsoever against being convicted on the basis of a coerced confession. To compound the
offense, no instruction was even given to the jury to disregard
the confession if it found that it was given involuntarily.
An independent investigation of this record discloses that it is
replete with evidence of a lack of diligence on the part of
court-appointed counsel in violation of appellant's right to a
fair trial.
Id. at 484, 487-88, 218 N.E.2d at 118, 120.
46 Shackleford v. United States, 383 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
[A]ny practice of assigning a lawyer for the few moments the
accused is before the magistrate and no more would mock the
requirement of assistance of counsel. The appointment must
continue until the prosecution is terminated or other counsel
is appointed, which should normally be before arraignment.
Id. at 216.
47
See, e.g., Andrews v. United States, 403 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1968).
48
Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
[T]he denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to confer, to
consult with the accused and to prepare his defense, could convert the appointment of counsel into a sham and nothing more
than a formal compliance with the Constitution's requirement
that an accused be given the assistance of counsel.
Id. at 446.
49
The attorney's client is entitled to a thorough analysis of the facts,
circumstances, pleadings, and law involved in the case. Based upon this
examination, the attorney should be able to offer an informed opinion
as to the proper plea to enter. The counsel is obligated to investigate
all defenses that may be available to his client; his failure to perform
this duty will constitute a denial of the defendant's right to effective
counsel. See In re Williams, 1 Cal. 3d 168, 460 P.2d 984, 81 Cal. Rptr.
784 (1969). See also Von Moltke v. Gilles, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); People
v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).
50 White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
51 The following "standards" have been developed by the Tenth Circuit
for evaluation of the effectiveness of appointed counsel:
(1) Effective representation by counsel does not insure subjective satisfaction for their clients. Tafoya v. United
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Circuit's requirements are perhaps the most thorough: 52 (1)
counsel for the indigent defendant should be appointed promptly; (2) counsel should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
prepare his defense of the accused; (3) counsel must confer with
his client without undue delay and as often as necessary, to
advise him of his rights and to elicit matters of defense or to
ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable; and (4)
counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual
and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed,
and to allow himself enough time for reflection and preparation
for trial. An omission or failure to abide by these requirements
constitutes a denial of effective representation of counsel unless
the state, which has the burden of proof, can establish lack
of prejudice resulting from such failure.
Colorado courts have also carved out some definitions of
effective counsel.5 3 The Colorado approach is simliar to that
of most jurisdictions in that very general criteria for judging
the effectiveness of counsel are set forth only to be followed
by an ad hoc development of permissive standards of that which
is not ineffective. Among the Colorado standards determined
since the formation of the state public defender system in
197054 are:
-Trial
strategy cannot be subject to the defendant's
hindsight judgment following a guilty verdict. 55
-

-

The right to assistance is not a guarantee against
mistake of strategy. "'
Differences of opinion over trial strategy does not
57
constitute a deprivation of effective counsel.

(2)
(3)

States, 386 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1034 (1968).
Pretrial difference of opinion over trial tactics does not
constitute a deprivation of effective counsel. Mitchell v.
United States, 432 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1970).
Lack of experience on the part of counsel is a factor that
may contribute to ineffective representation, but such result is not dictated thereby. Alire v. United States, 365

F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 984

(1967).
Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968). See also Fields v.
Peyton, 375 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1967); Twiford v. Peyton, 372 F.2d 670
(4th Cir. 1967); Martin v. Virginia, 365 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1966).
53 See generally 6 T. BORRILLO, COLORADO PRACTICE, CRIMINAL PRACTICE &
PRocEDURE §§ 264-65 (1971).
52

54COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§

39-21-1(1)

(Supp. 1969).

55 Maynes v. People, 495 P.2d 551 (Colo. 1972).
56
57

Diggs v. People, 492 P.2d 840 (Colo. 1972).
Evans v. People, 486 P.2d 1062 (Colo. 1971).
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A trial court's refusal to grant a continuance does not
demonstrate a denial of effective counsel. 58
-Failure to file or argue a motion for new trial is not
necessarily proof of ineffective counsel. 59
-

-

Failure to object to police questions in a specific case
6
may not be a denial of effective counsel. "

The burden of collateral attack against a conviction based on
the claim of ineffective counsel is on the defendant. He must
show that the representation was a sham, farce, or that his
attorney acted in bad faith.61
While Colorado courts have followed the general approach
of other states in defining effective counsel, they have taken
one step beyond a mere recitation of the rules just outlined.
The Colorado Supreme Court has adopted and vigorously enforced the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility regarding lawyer competency, a consideration
2
wholly ignored in the older Canons of Professional Ethics.
In a recent case, the supreme court also incorporated a portion
of the American Bar Association Standards of Criminal Justice
referring to instances when the will of the defendant must
prevail. 3 Although these various criteria are not absolutes at
the present time, the trend is definitely toward firmer standards by which the effectiveness of counsel may be judged.
Despite
standards,
developed
ness." For

the progressive development of right-to-counsel
neither the federal nor the Colorado courts have
a comprehensive standard for measuring "effectivepurposes of studying the Denver public defender,

58 Padilla v. People, 171 Colo. 521, 470 P.2d 846 (1970).

59 Reynolds v. People, 172 Colo. 137, 471 P.2d 417 (1970).
60 Romero v. People, 170 Colo. 234, 460 P.2d 784 (1969).
61 Evans v. People, 486 P.2d 1062 (Colo. 1971); Torres v. People, 159 Colo.
254, 411 P.2d 10 (1966); Bustos v. People, 158 Colo. 451, 408 P.2d 64
(1965); Melton v. People, 157 Colo. 169, 401 P.2d 605 (1965).
62

ABA

CODE

OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY,

CANON 6 (A lawyer should

represent a client competently). The Code position is summarized in
the following statements: 'The fair administration of justice requires
the availability of competent lawyers .... Those persons unable to pay
for legal services should be provided needed services .. " ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY EC8-3 (1970).

There have probably

been more supreme court cases involving lack of lawyer competence in
the last five years than in all prior state history. See, e.g., People v.
Welch, 174 Colo. 177, 483 P.2d 218 (1971); People v. Burns, 164 Colo.
490, 435 P.2d 897 (1968).
63Martinez v.People, 173 Colo. 515, 518, 480 P.2d 843, 844 (1971), citing
the ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution
Function and The Defense Function, Feb. 8,1971 (approved draft). The
court pointed out three areas where the attorney may engage in fair

persuasion as to his professional opinion, but ultimately the defendant's
views must prevail: whether to plead guilty, whether to request a jury
trial, and whether to testify.
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more definite standards of effectiveness were required for two
reasons. First, the courts' guidelines were developed on a caseby-case basis in which specific tests were tailored to individual
facts and circumstances. The courts were faced with measuring
the effectiveness of a single attorney in a particular situation.
In contrast, this case study seeks to evaluate and describe the
Denver public defender as a system or institution. The performance of any particular attorney is irrelevant.
Second, court-developed standards are not comprehensive,
since it was never necessary for the courts to articulate all
elements of effectiveness at any one time. Although the authors
make no claim that this study is comprehensive, it does offer
a relatively complete set of indicia for measuring the effectiveness of the Denver public defender system.6 4 These indicia are
assumed, but they do reflect input from the bar and judiciary.
The investigators have added their own perceptions and common
sense to these sources:
A. The public defender system must be able to operate
effectively under its caseload volume and time demands.
B. The public defender system should be adequately
funded so that physical facilities and support personnel may be provided in sufficient quantity and
quality.
C. The public defender system should provide sufficient resources for fact investigation and legal research.
D. The public defender system should be comprised of
attorneys qualified by prior experience, formal
training, current experience (time as a public defender), and continuing legal education.
E. The public defender system should be comprised of
highly motivated defense attorneys.
F. The public defender must be an effective "pleabargainer."
G. The public defender system must "deliver" representation at a point early enough to adequately represent the defendant's interests.
64 Originally the study included a ninth indicium: client perception of
the effectiveness of the public defender. See, e.g., Casper, Did You Have
a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had a Public Defender, 1
YALE REV. L. & Soc. AcTION 4 (No. 4, 1971). The authors in no way
intend to minimize the importance of this indicium; we were simply

unable to pursue it given the resources available.
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The public defender system should possess functional independence from all other governmental
institutions, thus precluding political influence of
defense attorneys.

These indicia lay the groundwork for the remainder of this
study. After brief descriptions of the PD system characteristics
and of the methodology employed in the study, the significance
of these indicia will be examined as the results of the study
are presented and analyzed.
III.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DENVER PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM

Until 1970, the State of Colorado relied on counsel appointed
from the private bar to represent indigent criminal defendants.
In 1966, the City of Denver, in response to an increasingly
heavy caseload, created its first public defender office. Originally staffed with only nine attorneys, the office steadily grew
in size. When, in 1969, the Colorado General Assembly authorized
a state-wide public defender system, the Denver office became a
part of it.6 5 During the summer of 1972, when much of the
data for this study was collected, the state defender office
employed 65 attorneys, 22 of whom were assigned to the Denver office. 66 Mr. J.D. MacFarlane was the Chief Deputy Public
Defender heading the Denver office, and Mr. Rollie R. Rogers
was serving as the State Public Defender, responsible for all
Colorado public defender operations.
Structurally, the Colorado Public Defender system was part
of the judicial branch of government and was supervised directly by the supreme court. 7 Funding and budgetary matters
were channeled through the court to the legislature in whose
65 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-21-1 (Supp. 1969).
66 Of these, four were assigned to juvenile court and, therefore, beyond
the scope of this case study. One was out of town and unavailable for
interviewing. The remaining 16 defenders became the basis of this
study.
67
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-21-2 (Supp. 1969).
(1)
office Deputy and assistant public defenders -regional
(a) Subject to the approval of the supreme court, the state public defender shall employ a chief deputy state public defender,
assistant and deputy state public defenders, investigators, and
such other employees as may be necessary to discharge the

function of the office.
(b) Subject to supreme court rules, the chief deputy public
defender and assistant and deputy public defenders shall serve
at the pleasure of the state public defender and shall be employed on a full-time basis and not otherwise engage in the
practice of law.
(c) The compensation of persons appointed under this subsection shall be fixed by the supreme court.
(2) Subject to the approval of the supreme court, the state
public defender shall establish such regional offices as he deems
necessary to carry out properly his duties under this article.
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hands ultimately rested decisions on public defender appropriationsY8
The Denver public defender office was composed of four
sections, each corresponding to a criminal division of the
Denver District Court. These sections were responsible for
felony cases. Two of the PD sections contained three defenders,
all of whom were assigned to a district court. A third section
had three defenders assigned to a district court, and four defenders assigned to juvenile court. The fourth section included
three district court defenders, four defenders assigned to county
courts, responsible for defense in misdemeanors, petty offenses,
and violations of city ordinances, and one defender assigned to
"police court." Personnel were not rotated on any regular basis,
although no one defender remained in police court for more
than a month or two before reassignment.
Each section had a basic supporting staff of one secretary
and one investigator. The section responsible for the county and
police courts employed three investigators and two secretaries.
Finally, the office also employed two secretaries who were not
6
assigned to any one section.
To understand the defenders' method of assignment, one
must first understand the Denver courts' system of processing
suspects. After arrest, a felony suspect was brought to the police
building, which also contained the city jail and the "police
court." As soon as practicable (usually no later than the next
morning unless the suspect was arrested on a weekend), the
suspect was brought from the jail to the police court, where he
was given his "first advisement." At the "first advisement,"
the suspect was informed of his rights, bail was set when applicable, and, upon request, the public defender office was
provisionally appointed for his defense. At this point, the suspect typically would not yet have been formally charged, but
was being held "under investigation." In cases where an arrest
warrant had issued, however, the suspect was "charged" at the
first appearance. In either case, the suspect met with a public
defender once just prior to the "first advisement" through a
process known as "jail check." Each morning, the PD assigned
to "police court" was given two lists: a "jail sheet" and a
"docket." The "jail sheet" listed all the prisoners then being
held in the city jail. By comparing it with the previous day's
See text pP. 82-84 infra.
69 One of these was primarily a telephone operator and receptionist; the
68

other operated a "mag card" typewriter.
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sheet, the defender "checked" the names of all new prisoners.
He would then speak briefly with the prisoners, familiarizing
himself generally with their cases, and would fill out forms to
determine indigency.
The "jail sheet" served a second function. By looking at it,
the PD determined if any suspect had been kept in jail too
long without a "first advisement." When such cases were discovered, the defender would bring this to the attention of the
court, and the suspect would be brought before a judge for
his "first advisement."
In cases in which the suspect had been charged at "first
advisement," the court clerk assigned the case to one of the four
district courts. A secretary from the defender office then gave
the suspect the name and telephone number of one of the three
defense attorneys assigned to that court with instructions to
contact one of them.
In cases where the suspect had not been "charged" at first
appearance, he was later returned to court for a "second advisement," at which time he would again be apprised of his rights
and informed of the charges against him. At this point, he was
assigned a public defender in the same manner as a suspect
who had been charged at "first advisement."
Because the public defender seldom interviewed the suspect in depth until after the first appearance, the PD rarely
had any input into the amount of bail initially set. Instead,
initial bail was determined by schedule. Then, sometime after
the first advisement, a defender could file a motion for reduction of bond. Hearings on such motions were held 4 days
after filing, and thus, if the accused could not meet the original
bond or suffered the misfortune of being arrested on a Sunday
or Monday, he waited 6 days before any real consideration
was given to appropriate bail.
Motions for preliminary hearings were filed as a matter of
course, though they might later be withdrawn by the attorney
70
ultimately assigned to the case.
The above procedures are applicable to murder and aggravated robbery, the two felonies examined in this case study.
Driving under the influence, the misdemeanor studied, was
handled differently. Typically, the driver accused of drunkenness was arrested and taken to the police station where physical tests were performed. Afterward he was sent home, having
70 Many of the respondents in this study pointed to the lack of continuity
in defense as a major problem of PD effectiveness.
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been issued a summons and complaint requiring him to return
to court for arraignment. In rare cases, the suspect was kept
in jail and "dried out" before his release.
Defendants charged with driving under the influence normally met a public defender for the first time at arraignment;
however, if they took the initiative, they could contact a PD
earlier. When a person accused of driving under the influence
was kept in jail and bail was required for his release, the
public defender entered the case at the initial appearance.
IV.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology of this study was designed to provide
a variety of measures of the effectiveness of the Denver public
defender, measures which correspond to the eight indicia of
effectiveness discussed above. To arrive at such measures, three
possible approaches were apparent. First, the defense record
of the public defenders might be compared to that of the
71
private bar. While this "information" is of obvious value, it
offers no indication of the true effectiveness of representation
offered by either group of attorneys, but rather provides a
measure of the relative quality of their defenses. No absolute
measure of public defender effectiveness is obtained by this
method, unless one assumes that the private bar is "effective."
Additionally, the validity of the relative measure requires that
the type of offense charged, the defendant's financial resources
for trial preparation, the identity of the court, and a host of
other variables are adequately controlled. This approach was,
therefore, rejected.
Second, some criteria could be developed (or assumed) to
measure the effectiveness of counsel in terms of the ultimate
result achieved by the public defender (e.g., assumed acquittal
rates), and this could be compared to actual result-oriented
data (e.g., actual acquittal rates). But an actual acquittal rate
which exceeded the assumed rate could be caused by a nmber of factors wholly unrelated to an effective defense; e.g.,
poor police preparation and ineffective prosecution. Despite the
objective appearance of such result-oriented data, any measure of defender effectiveness based on it requires several highly
subjective judgments includng the choice of an assumed acquittal rate and standards of interpretation. This latter problem
is best understood by the following illustration: Public defender
71 See Taylor, Stanley, deFlorio & Seekamp, An Analysis of Defense
Counsel in the Processing of Felony Defendants in Denver, Colorado,
50 DENvER L.J. 9 (1973).
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A disposes of 90 percent of his cases by "plea-bargaining," wins
8 percent, loses 2 percent, and achieves relatively short sentences for those defendants he represents who do go to jail.
Public defender B "plea-bargains" 80 percent, wins 13 percent,
loses 7 percent, and obtains, on the average, shorter sentences
for his clients than does public defender A. Deciding which
attorney is more effective involves complexities of interpretation beyond the scope of this study. 72 These complexities, combined with the problems of control previously noted, required
the rejection of this approach.
The third alternative, the one adopted for this case study,
is to measure the self-perceptions of PD attorneys as to their
system's performance. These perceptions correspond to the
eight assumed indicia. The perceptions of judges and district
attorneys on the same subjects are then compared to those
of the public defenders. 73 In essence, the research design taps
the most direct source of information about the public defender system- the attorneys comprising the system. But recognizing that self-perceptions are always subject to varying
degrees of distortion, the authors utilized the other actors in
the administration of criminal justice, the judges and prosecutors, as a check on the defenders' responses. What this design
lacks in precision, it gains in the validity and depth of infor74
mation gathered about the system under study.
To examine the perceptions of the three groups, a struc5
tured interview questionnaire was designed and pretested.
The questionnaire employed both fixed alternative items and
questions aimed at eliciting open-ended responses. The strategy
of the interview was to obtain several different meaures of
the respondents' perceptions of the operation and performance
of the Denver public defender system. Interviewers were trained
with this strategy as their primary objective, and neither interviewers nor respondents were informed of the indicia being
used to judge effectiveness. The average time for each inter-.
view for all three groups was slightly less than 1, hours.
The three groups of respondents included 16 public de72

Problems of such comparisons are examined in Oak & Lehman, Lawyers

73

for the Poor, in THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 91 (A. Blumberg ed. 1970).
For a report of client perceptions of the defender system, see Note,
supra note 1.

74 For a detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of this approach,

see S.

BRUYN, THE HUMAN PERSPECTIVE IN
OLOGY OF PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION (1966).

SOCIOLOGY:

THE METHOD-

75 The interview schedules are reproduced in appendices A, B, and C

infra.
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fenders, 10 criminal court judges'7 and 15 former district attorneys. 77 Responses for these groups were controlled for type
of offense, including first degree murder, aggravated robbery,
and driving under the influence.78 Clearly, each of these groups
is small in number, and no attempt is made to qualify the
groups as representatives of any larger population of public
defenders, judges, or prosecutors. Thus no generalizations from
a sample to a population are intended. Instead, this study seeks
to describe the operation of one defender system, and the conditions under which it operates. Where a correlation or causation between two relevant variables is reported, the authors
have employed statistics appropriate for the total number of
respondents comprising the study.79 Given the statistical limitations imposed by the number of subjects studied, the authors
have relied heavily on descriptions of results measured directly by the questionnaire items. These descriptions themselves provide valuable insights into the effectiveness of the
Denver public defender.
V.

A.

THE CASE STUDY RESULTS AND THEmi

MEANING

Time and Volume Problems: The Public Defender's Response

Any examination of the effectiveness of the Denver public
defender office must begin with an evaluation of the caseload
under which the public defenders operate. We are interested
in answering two questions: (1) What is the PD caseload? (2)
what effect does this caseload have on PD operations?
As expected, the caseload of the Denver office is staggering.
In addition to cases not within the scope of this study, the
eight felony defenders who had handled first degree murder
cases reported an average of 3.6 such cases pending for which
no trial level disposition or verdict had been reached. The 13
attorneys assigned to felony court averaged 46.8 pending aggravated robbery cases, and the defenders in misdemeanor court
76 This included all judges then sitting in criminal divisions in Denver
County.
77 The authors repeatedly attempted to gain permission to interview members of the Denver district attorney's staff; however, the District Attorney who held that office during the time of this study refused to
ccoperate. The authors were thus forced to utilize former prosecutors
now in private practice.

These will variously be referred to as murder, robbery, and DUI.
79 The statistic used herein is kncwn as the "contingency coefficient."
It is equal to C/Cmx, where C is the observed frequency of response
78

and Cm,

is the maximum expected frequency.

Cmax

is defined as

-\/----where k is the smallest number of correlated responses for
k
any two variables. This statistic minimizes the validity
problems of the small total responses.
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averaged 95 driving under the influence cases. These same
respondents indicated that the Denver office completes one
murder case per month, and that individual defenders complete more than 25 aggravated robbery and roughly 80 driving
under the influence cases per month. To cope with this volume
of cases, the public defender, on an average, worked more than
80
60 hours per week.
What effect do these time and volume pressures have upon
the public defender? Surprisingly, the defenders themselves
did not express a great deal of concern over the effect of such
pressures. For example, in cases where the public defender
admitted he lacked facts when negotiating with a district attorney, the reasons given were more often the absence of
police cooperation or general investigatory resources than the
lack of personal time due to caseload.8 1 In fact, the volume
problem was ranked with inadequate client and district attorney
cooperation as a relatively minor obstacle to defense effective82

ness.

As to decisions to file motions, the vast majority of public
defenders said that demands on their time were not factors
in such decisions. 8 3 Similarly, 10 of 13 (77%) of the attorneys
responding indicated that their caseloads did not affect their
meaningful use of preliminary hearings as a discovery device.
Fifteen of 16 (94%) said that time demands were not relevant
to decisions on the use of pretrial conferences. Every felony
defender and all but one misdemeanor defender reported that
their caseloads did not preclude adequate legal research in
preparation for trials.
Certainly, these perceptions of caseload influences on public
defender performance are more favorable than one might expect. But how realistic are these perceptions? It may well be
that in the minds of defense attorneys, working daily in the
modern criminal justice system, norms of adequacy become
depressed, and that the attorney becomes conditioned to believe
the "best he can do" is equivalent to an effective defense.
The public defenders interviewed offer some evidence of this
80 This average is based on responses to question number 36 of Public

Defender Interview Schedule, app. A i'nfra.
81 Only four respondents attributed their lack of facts to caseload pressure.

Eight attributed it to limited investigative resources; 10 said the facts
were not ascertainable; and 13 reported a lack of police cooperation.
82 Four responses each attributed the PD's lack of necessary facts to caseload, uncooperative clients, and uncooperative DA's.
83 Of a total of 15 responses for murder and robbery cases, 13 (87%) indicated that time was seldom or never a factor in decisions to file motions.
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very normal response to caseload pressures. Ten (62.5%) of the
public defenders interviewed admitted forgetting to file a motion because of their heavy caseloads. When contrasted to the
otherwise neutral attitudes of the respondents toward the effects of caseload, it is quite possible that Denver public defenders are minimizing the true impact of time and volume
pressures upon their performance.
The results of interviewing the judges and district attorneys also suggest that the public defenders' responses did not
reveal the full extent of caseload impact. The judges and prosecutors agreed that the public defender is often too busy to file
some motions (though many of the district attorneys attributed
such failure to other causes) .84 Several of the judges and even
more of the prosecutors felt the defenders' time demands precluded them from spending sufficient time with clients before
trial.8 5 Although both groups of respondents agreed with the
public defenders that their caseloads did not interfere with
the quality of legal research, some expressed doubts as to
interference with fact investigation.8 0 In felony cases, 37 percent of the judges and one-third of the district attorneys interviewed contended that caseloads limited the depth of defense investigation to a point where plea-bargaining with the
prosecutors was adversely affected.
The judges and district attorneys also felt the public defenders were somewhat constrained by time demands in their
use of procedural devices.87 Some judges indicated that caseload was a critical factor in defense decisions to utilize pretrial
conferences and preliminary hearings.88 Moreover, even where
the defender used a preliminary hearing, many judges felt
his preparation for those hearings was limited by time pressures.8 9 Prosecutors reported that defenders almost never failed
to file motions for discovery because of their caseloads, 90 but
84 Ten of 25 (40%)

judges and prosecutors said that defenders forget to
file motions because of- caseload.
85 For noncapital offenses, one-half of the total judges and DA responses
(21 of 42) indicated that defenders cannot spend sufficient time with
86

their clients before trial. Only two of 27 total PD responses (7%) reflected any such problem.
Caseload ranked second to lack of investigatory resources as reasons for

inadequate fact research.
See questions 34-36 of the District Attorney Interview Schedule, app. B
infra; the corresponding items for judges are 36-38, app. C. infra.
88 The total responses of judges split eight to eight as to the effect of time
87

pressures on the use of these devices.

89 Although five of eight judges reported that caseloads did not affect
90

PD use of preliminary hearings, all but two of these respondents felt
that caselcads did interfere with the effectiveness of this use.
0nly two of a total of 39 DA responses (5%) suggested that demands

on time caused defenders to forego motions for discovery.
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agreed with judges that such pressure did diminish defense
effectiveness in preliminary hearings." More than half of the
DA's responding felt that caseloads affected the defenders'
decision to use pretrial conferences.
If there is a conclusion to draw from this analysis, it is
that the public defenders' caseloads are heavy, and that, on
the average, they work many hours to meet these demands.
If any facets of representation suffer because of these pressures, they are fact investigation and the use of pretrial procedures.
Funding, Physical Facilities, and Support Personnel
Whatever demands their caseloads may make upon the
public defenders, the impact of such demands may be aggravated or minimized by the quality and quantity of the defenders' physical facilities and support personnel; both factors
being limited by the funding of the public defender office.
On the question of whether the physical facilities were
sufficient to provide effective counsel, the vast majority of
defenders indicated that office space, desks, phones, and other
equipment were definitely adequate.9 2 Fourteen (87%) of the
staff attorneys reported they had sufficient privacy to carry
on their work effectively. Only four (25%) of the defenders
felt the physical working conditions had any adverse effect on
office efficiency, and just three identified inadequacies in funding for physical facilities. District attorneys shared the PD's
93
satisfaction with the physical resources of the defender system,
but, in contrast, many judges believed the public defender
94
lacked funding for adequate physical facilities.
B.

With regard to clerical and support personnel, the defenders,
as a group, expressed some doubts as to the sufficiency of these
resources.9 5 Similarly, they felt the funding for these functions
91 Only five of 15 prosecutors reported effective PD use of preliminary

hearings.
92

On physical facilities and equipment items, 56 of 64 (88%) of the pub-

lic defender responses indicated these resources were sufficient to provide effective counsel. The difference in response may have been as
much a difference in the physical facilities of the respondents, as a per-

ception of what constituted an adverse effect on office efficiency. While

mcst of the attorneys had private offices, two, and in one case, three
attorneys shared an office.
93 Twelve of 18 total DA responses (67%) on the public defenders' physi-

cal resources were favorable.
94

Only two of 10 judges thought the PDs' physical facilities were ade-

quately funded.
95 Of 129 total defender responses as to the funding and quality of clerical

assistance, 71 (55%) were negative. This is in comparison to a 21%
negative response rate for all other forms of support. The open-ended

suggestions to improve clerical assistance included establishing a central
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was inadequate! 6 Both the judges and district attorneys disagreed with the PD's, reporting that the defenders' work usually
reflected adequate clerical assistance. 97 The judges, however,
agreed with the PD's that funding of the defender system for
clerical assistance was deficient. 98
An issue related to the quantity and funding of office
resources is the quality and organization of those resources.
In general, defender attitudes toward the organizational structure of the Denver office were favorable;9 9 few staff attorneys
felt that the current structure interfered with effective defense
representation.
The public defenders' perceptions of funding were generally negative with most attorneys finding the financial resources of the defender system poor as to personnel salaries,
legal research, and investigatory resources. 100 Judges agreed
substantially with the PD's regarding the latter two items
but expressed far fewer negative perceptions of personnel salaries. 10 1 In contrast, many district attorneys indicated that the
public defender had sufficient funds for all his needs except
investigation.10 2 Whatever the true status of public defender
funding, it is apparent that some increases are required. As
one former prosecutor remarked:
They (the PD's) should get $20,000 a year at least. They need
better facilities, but so do the DA's. Whatever they need, the

money should be available; money is important in criminal
03
defense.
An especially critical problem all defense attorneys face is
filing system. Many PD's reported that research done for a particular
case by one defender was unknown to others, thus causing innumerable
duplications of effort.
96 On funding alone, the negative response rate was 62%.
97 Eighteen of 24 total judge and DA responses (75%) indicated that the
public defenders' work reflected adequate clerical assistance.
98 Only one of 10 judges (10%) felt PD funding in this regard was adequate, but five of eight prosecutors (62%) felt this funding was sufficient.
99 Ten of 16 (62%) of the PD's were satisfied with the current organization of the office.
100 The negative response rate for personnel salaries was 15 of 16 (94%),
for legal research 12 of 16 (75%), and for fact investigation 12 of 16
(75%).
101 On the funding of legal research and fact investigation, the judges had
a negative response rate of nine of 12 (75%), identical to that of the
PD's; but on salaries, one-half of the judges responding felt the PD's

were compensated adequately.

102

103

The DA negative response rate for funding for fact investigation was
seven of 11 (64%). In contrast, for all resources, not related to trial
costs, the prosecutors' negative response rate for funding was 23 of 51

(45%).
Open-ended response to question No. 15, District Attorney Interview
Schedule, app. B infra.
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compensating for the extreme disparity between the financial
resources of the state and those of the defendant. This problem is amplified where the defendant is indigent. For example,
if the defendant lacks the money to pay for specialized court
costs, such as an independent chemical analysis of marijuana,
the defender makes a motion asking the court to assume the
cost. If such a motion is denied, the defender office must either
absorb the expense or forgo the analysis. 0 4 When asked if
funding for such contingencies was adequate, most public defenders responded negatively. 10 5 Money for expert witnesses,
witness travel fees, scientific experiments, and preparation of
demonstrative evidence were similarly lacking. 0 6 Most judges
shared this perception, though few felt that witness fees
suffered from insufficient funding.' 7v The prosecutors identified
fewer inadequacies, but did note some deficiencies in funding
for scientific experiments. 0 8
These results, then, require the following conclusions. In
the two areas where the public defender identified adequate
funding, clerical support and physical facilities, most judges
thought funding was insufficient, but former prosecutors believed these resources were supported adequately. Summing
responses for all three groups of respondents, a majority found
financing for specialized court costs lacking.'"1° The only area
where all three groups identified a deficiency in funding was
for fact investigation. The nature of this resource and its
companion resource, legal research, are the subject of more
detailed analysis in the next subsection.
Fact Investigation and Legal Research
As reported earlier, 110 the public defenders perceived some
deficiencies in the research and investigative support they received. Thirteen of the 16 PD's reported they seldom or never
C.

104

In open-ended responses a number of public defenders expressed the

need for staff experts in drugs (chemical analysis) and in the use of
polygraphs.
105Nine of 15 (60%) of the PD's felt funding for special court costs was

insufficient.

106 Summing responses for the four items, funding was lacking in 38 of 57
cases (67%).

Of 21 total judge responses on the-four items, 14 (67%) suggested inadequate funding. On witness fees, only two judges reported a deficiency.
108 Excluding scientific experiments, the negative response rate for DA's
was 47% as compared to 60% for the PD's and 67% for the judges.
However, seven of 11 of the DA's (64%) felt funding for scientific experiments was inadequate.
109 These summed responses are 85 negative, 53 positive (negative response
rate for all those groups of respondents for all trial-related resources
107

was 62%).
11o See text pp. 64-66 supra.
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had legal research assistance and 10 of 16 said they lacked
assistance in fact investigation. Of those respondents who identified inadequacies in funding for fact investigation, nearly all
said a similar funding problem existed for legal research."'
Despite the deficiencies in funding and assistance that
the defenders perceived, all but one respondent reported their
cases were adequately researched as to legal issues. These results
included 100 percent of the responses for both murder and
robbery cases. This suggests that the legal research necessary
to the defenders' cases is being prepared by the defenders
themselves, although apparently some outside assistance is desired by most of the staff attorneys. This conclusion, though
potentially biased, is supported further by the responses of
judges and prosecutors who also felt the public defenders'
legal research was adequate in quality, though increases in
11 2
financial resources were recommended.
Responses on the quality of fact investigation available to
the PD's were markedly different from the results obtained
for legal research. The defenders again indicated they received
little assistance and that funding was inadequate, 113 but here a
substantial number of respondents felt their overall fact investigation, irrespective of its source, was deficient. 114 Both the
judges and prosecutors, however, disagreed with the public
15
defenders in this observation.'
This equivocal result is, at least in part, explicable in terms
of an informal "open file" policy, whereby many district attorneys permit the public defender access to all investigatory
reports filed prior to trial. These prosecutors may well have
felt the "open file" policy obviated the defenders' need for
any additional assistance in fact investigation." 6 Judges with
11 The contingency coefficient for this correlation was .87.

Although 73 or 74 total judge and DA responses (99%) suggest adequate
legal research, these groups had a combined negative response rate of
57% on. funding of legal research.
113 Ten of 16 of the PD's (62%) desired more assistance in investigation
and 12 of 16 (75%) felt funding was inadequate to support effective
fact investigation.
114 For all offenses, the overall negative response rate of public defenders
was 70% for fact investigation adequacy, irrespective of source. In contrast, the same rate for legal research was only 3% (one negative response of 33 total responses for all offenses).
115 Seven of 10 judges (70%) and 12 of 14 prosecutors (86%) felt fact investigation was adequate.
116 Those defenders who were denied "open file" privileges were often
characterized by the district attorneys as unreasonable. These DA's
may have seen the lack of facts suffered by the public defenders
112

as more a result of individual PD "misconduct"
deficiency.

than any resource
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knowledge of this policy may have reacted in a similar manner.
But one judge observed that the police consider themselves
investigators for the prosecution and not for the court, the
point being that "open file" policies may provide the defense
with the prosecution's facts; however, these facts may not be
sufficient for an effective defense. In spite of the formal presumption of innocence, many successful defense cases are necessarily built on evidence which the prosecutor may never possess,
or which the police may never report.
Given that the public defenders are in need of some legal
research and even more fact investigation assistance, there are
at least five sources of such assistance which should be explored. First, the public defenders might assist each other,
especially in legal research. Though few public defenders recalled sharing responsibility for a noncapital case with another
attorney, several suggested that advice at all levels of defense
was helpful. Open-ended responses indicated that such mutual
assistance did occur on an informal, ad hoc basis. One defender
analogized the assistance he received from fellow defenders to
that one finds in large private law firms. The defenders also
pointed to the availability of some 80 attorneys in the statewide system whose past research products, briefs, and memoranda were available to all other defenders via the state office.
Additionally, the state office provided all PD's with a periodically revised Criminal Evidence Manual"7 which apprised
the staff attorneys of recent developments in the law.
A second potential source of assistance to the public defender is the use of law clerks, utilized in a manner much like
that of private firms. At the time of this writing no clerks, as
such, were employed by the Denver office; however, the state
office had recently begun an internship program comprised of
law students aspiring to future positions as staff attorneys." 8
Ostensibly, these interns will be used in a manner not unlike
law clerks, augmenting both the legal research and fact investigation prepared for each case.
The third source of information is technical. In discovery
procedures, the public defenders possess a formal means of
obtaining some information not voluntarily disclosed to them
117 J.Quinn, Criminal Evidence Manual, 1971 (available from the Colorado
Public Defender Office).
118 The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration provided a grant which
permitted the Defender office to release one senior attorney to work
full time with nine University of Denver law students for a 9 month
period. These students were to work approximately 20 hours per week
assisting with felony case preparation and personally defending in-

digents charged with misdemeanors.
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by opposing prosecutors. 119 When asked if formal discovery
motions were necessary to get sufficient information about a
case, affirmative responses were made by six of eight defenders
(75%) for murder cases, and nine of 13 (68%) for robbery
cases, but in DUI's, seven of 10 attorneys (70%) felt such motions were not necessary. Although a majority of judges and
prosecutors indicated these motions were unnecessary, 120 a
substantial number felt this varied greatly among defense attorneys; those having good working relationships with the DA
were less apt to need the formal motion to gain needed information.
Fourth, the most obvious, though unrealistic source of
assistance in fact investigation is the police. They already have
the trained personnel and experience in such functions, and
indeed, they currently supply the bulk of evidence offered in
criminal trials. But as observed above, the police do not conceive of themselves as agents for both defense and prosecution, and predictably, 14 (88%) of the defenders had never
used such services.121 Only two had ever used police investigators, and one of these reported that he rarely sought such
assistance. Essentially this situation is a by-product of the
continuing adversary relationship between defender and police.
Some PD's indicated they would never rely on police sources
for exculpatory evidence, and most judges and prosecutors said
the public defender should not have the use of police investi22
gative assistance.1
Finally, the fifth and perhaps most promising source of
defense assistance is the use of paralegals. In an office with
the heavy caseload and the support deficiencies already identified, the prospects of paralegal use, in theory at least, must
be inviting. Although 10 (62%) of the public defenders felt
they spent excessive time doing tasks which could have been
performed by paralegal or nonlegal personnel, no such personnel were employed in the Denver office at the time of this
writing.
119 The scope of formal discovery in Colorado is set forth in COLO. R.
Cram. P. 16.
120

Forty of 62 total responses (65%) summed for murder, robbery, and
DUI cases, given by judges and DA's, indicated that formal motions were

seldom or never necessary for the public defender to obtain essential
information.

121

122

This does not include the defenders' use of police reports filed with
the district attorneys' office, to which many PD's have access under the
"open file" policies discussed earlier.
Eleven of 14 responding prosecutors (79%) and six of 10 judges (60%)
said the public defenders should not have the use of police investiga-

tive assistance (total negative response rate = 17 of 24 (71%)).
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Of the public defenders who responded affirmatively to
paralegal use, all indicated that such personnel could be productively utilized for research as well as for drafting motions
and pleadings. Several of this group indicated that paralegal
use in client interviewing, brief preparation, and investigation
should be considered. 12 3 Of those defenders who did not see
paralegal use as a way to save staff attorney time, most still
identified research and motion preparation as appropriate functions for paraprofessionals. 124 Only one attorney interviewed
was opposed to all uses of paralegals.
The differences in response among the public defenders
on the question of paralegal use may be explained in part
by differing notions of what constitutes a "paralegal." For
example, some defenders who opposed the use of paralegals
also expressed a need for better trained legal secretaries who
could assist them with more than typing.
A few public defenders, however, did express some fear
about paralegals, at least in narrow contexts. One attorney felt
that no one but the lawyer should be involved in the basic
lawyer-client relationship, and the potential for leaks of confidential defense information and strategy was too great to
justify the use of a nonprofessional. But even those defenders
who were negative about utilizing paralegals recognized that
in some functions they would be not only appropriate, but of
great benefit to the defender system. Examples of the functions
cited include liaison with parole officers, social service organizations, prosecutors in other counties, witnesses, and the families of inmates.
Evidently, some PD's simply believed they spent little time
at tasks which could have been performed by a paralegal. To
illustrate, three of the public defenders reported they were
provided with adequate assistance in preparing legal research.
Two of these three attorneys did not favor employment of
paralegals. Similarly, six attorneys indicated they had sufficient support in fact investigation and five of these six did not
favor paralegal use.
Prosecutors agreed with the majority of public defenders
123 Ten of 16 (62%) felt brief preparation was appropriate, nine of 16
(56%) suggested client interviewing, and eight of 16 (50%) suggested
124

investigation.
Of the six defenders who answered "no" to the question "Do public
defenders spend excessive time doing work that could be accomplished
by one with nonlegal or paralegal training?" five (83%) said research
and motion preparation were permissible paraprofessional functions.
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that the use of paralegals could mean important time-savings.
All prosecutors responding suggested PD use of paralegals to
do legal research. Nine DA's favored defender use of paralegals
for client interviewing and eight cited both the drafting of
motions and the preparation of briefs as appropriate paraprofessional functions. Conversely, only three of the 10 judges
interviewed felt the paraprofessional would be an asset to the
public defender system, but in a strangely inconsistent response,
eight judges thought employing paralegals in client interviews
was proper; this was the one function about which several
12
PD's expressed grave reservations. 1

Certainly the public defender system is in need of increased
assistance in case preparation, especially with regard to fact
investigation. Several of the judges voiced concern over the
disparity in investigatory resources between defender and prosecutor. Some felt that a separate investigatory agency on a par
with the police should be created for the public defender system.
District attorneys expressed the belief that the lack of evidentiary weapons from which some defenders suffered was not
caused by ineffective defense counsel or by poor assistance,
but rather from a variety of system characteristics. These included lack of police and prosecutorial cooperation as well as the
prevalence of uncooperative defendants.
Experience and Training as an Index of Effectiveness
During the months of this study, one of the most frequent
comments of judges and district attorneys was that public defenders, as a group, lacked experience, especially trial experience. The results of this study lend support to these opinions.
Experience is arguably the most important element of a defense attorney's qualifications, but it is certainly not the only
element. In this fourth indicium, the researchers evaluate the
education, training, and experience of the defenders, prior to
and since joining the staff.
Nine of the 16 (56%) of the PD's had some criminal trial
experience before joining the defender office. While not all
these respondents indicated the extent of this experience, those
that were specific gave answers ranging from 3 months to 8
years. Five (31%) of the public defenders had held clerkships
with judges, and five had clerked with private law firms.
Several of these respondents had worked for other government
D.

125Ten of 13 DA's (77%)

fenders' operation.
26

1 See text p. 70 supra.

felt paralegals would be beneficial to the de-
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agencies. These included a former deputy district attorney,
municipal court judge, Peace Corps volunteer, and OEO attorney. Of the seven public defenders who had no prior criminal trial experience, two had held clerkships with judges,
three had practiced civil law for firms, and one had extensive
experience in the juvenile court system. Only one public de-fender answered that he had no prior experience relevant to
his present position.
In contrast, 12 (80%) of the DA's had practiced private
criminal law before becoming district attorneys. Only five
prosecutors had any prior experience other than private criminal law practice. 12 7 This suggests that, at least with respect to
the Denver office, the public defenders had a wider range of
prior experience than the prosecutors they faced in court, but
the latter group brought more criminal trial experience to their
jobs than did the public defenders.
Another measure of the public defenders' qualifications is
the training and education of the attorneys. Naturally, all were
graduates of accredited law schools and members of the Colorado bar. What we were more concerned with, however, was
the nature and extent of specialized training received by the
defender staff.
It appeared that there was little formal initial training in
the PD office. All but one defender responded that they received no initial introductory training. Apparently it was normal procedure for an experienced PD to spend a short period
("20 minutes" and "the first day" were mentioned) explaining
the procedures to the new attorney. Thereafter, learning came
from on-the-job experience and inquiring of other attorneys.
Moreover, any "initial training" which was received was considered of little help since the real lessons were learned "in
1 28
the pits."'
The picture of continuing legal training was somewhat better. All PD respondents had attended seminars relevant to
criminal defense. The majority, 14 (88%), had attended seminars concerning "updated developments in law," 8 (50%) in
"trial technique," and a few had received continuing training
in "plea-bargaining strategy," "client relations," and "office pro127

The prior experience included clerkships with judges and with firms.
One former DA had been a public defender before becoming a

prosecutor.
128A number of PD's, including the only one who said he had received
initial training, expressed the belief that such training would be virtually useless. This result came from open-ended responses to question
No. 9, Public Defender Interview Schedule, app. A infra.

DENVER PUBLIC DEFENDER

cedures." It is interesting to note that attorneys who had been
in the public defender office more than 2 years had a wider
range of specialized training than those with less than 2 years
experience. The vast majority of public defenders (all but
one) felt the continuing legal training they received in the
office was helpful. Many pointed to the opportunity for exchanging ideas with their colleagues, and to supplemental printed updates on new developments in law as the most important
products of such training. The less experienced public defenders felt that the instruction of their more experienced counterparts was invaluable. The only complaint voiced was that
training relevant to the "day-to-day" demands upon the public
129
defender was lacking.
A third and final measure of formal qualifications of the
public defender is the actual amount of his experience as a
public defender, perhaps the most objective of the three measures discussed thus far. Two of the public defenders (12%)
had been employed by the Office less than 6 months, five (31%)
between 1 and 2 years, six (38%) between 2 and 3 years, two
(12% ) between 3 and 4 years, and one for more than 4 years.
Thus the office dichotomizes, at the point of 2 years, into
"relatively highly experienced" attorneys and those we label
"relatively less experienced." This dichotomy of low and high
experience provides some meaningful correlations to the activity and attitudes of the public defender. Eight, or precisely
one-half, of the respondents have defended first degree murder
cases. All eight are high in experience (more than 2 years).
None of the public defenders with less than 2 years experience
0
have defended a first degree murder case. This high correlation'
is explained in part by the fact that three of the seven attorneys with less than 2 years PD experience are assigned to misdemeanor court. Moreover, none of the public defenders assigned to felony courts who have less than 2 years experience
have ever defended a first degree murder case. This suggests
that the murder defendant is represented, on the average, by
counsel with 2 or more years public defender experience, and,
at a minimum, 1 year of felony court experience.
Being a more experienced public defender affects a wide
range of perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of the
129 This complaint was most common among public defenders assigned to
misdemeanor court.
ISO This correlation, based on 2 years experience as the point of dichotomy,

is of course perfect at 1.00, but even if the point is moved to 3 years to
exclude less experienced felony court defenders (those with 1 year or

less in felony court), the correlation is still perfect.
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public defender system. For example, more experienced public
defenders felt that there are a sufficient number of attorneys
in the defender office, but less experienced respondents felt
additional attorneys were needed. 13 1 In particular, this inadequacy appears to be felt most acutely by counsel assigned to
12
misdemeanor courts.
As was reported earlier, some public defenders found their
clerical assistance insufficient, but most felt the physical facilities were adequate.1 3 3 It does appear, however, that the more
experienced attorneys find these support functions relatively
1 34
more adequate than do their less experienced colleagues.
Similarly, more than one-half (55%) of the public defenders
high in experience felt that their investigative assistance was
adequate, yet only one (14%) of the less experienced attorneys
found this assistance sufficient. With regard to a different form
of support, the use of paralegals, high experienced defenders
were far more favorable toward the use of such assistance than
were less experienced defenders. 13 5
It was mentioned at the beginning of this subsection that
judges and attorneys frequently commented on the relative
inexperience of the public defenders. Many of these comments
were directed at specific attitudes displayed by the defender
staff, attitudes which are reflected in the correlations just discussed. There are, however, other correlations with experience
which have a direct bearing on the effectiveness of the defender
system. These will be explored in subsequent analyses of the
defenders' plea-bargaining abilities and their point of entry into
cases. But before turning to these indicia, a more inchoate
indicator of effectiveness, the motivation of the public defender,
is examined.
E.

Motivation

The fifth indicator, that effective counsel must be a highly
motivated individual, was perhaps the most difficult of the
indicia to study. Models of the social scientist used to measure
motivation have not demonstrated any significant degree of
reliability.136 For these reasons, the authors constructed a func131
132

The contingency coefficient for this correlation was 0.82.

All three of the misdemeanor defenders in this study fell in the "less
experienced class" and all expressed the need for additional staff.

133

See text p. 64 supra.
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Contingency coefficient = 0.78.

135
136

Contingency coefficient = 0.89.
Some of the interpretive problems are explored in C. OSGOOD, G. Suci &
P.

TANNENBAUM,

THE MEASUREMENT OF MEANING (1957).
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tional index based on time demand and time supply to artificially measure the relative degree of motivation exhibited by
public defenders.
The index was designed to compare answers to time supply
questions with answers to time demand questions. One item
in the structured interview asked the public defenders the number of hours per week they worked (time supply).137 A series
of other items questioned the respondents as to the various
demands on their time and the adequacy of time to meet such
demands (time demand). The index, then, depends upon the
assumption that an attorney who worked fewer hours relative
to his colleagues but who also perceived a number of inadequacies in meeting time demands could be tentatively classified as "less motivated" than the rest of the respondents. To
illustrate, a public defender relatively low in number of work
hours per week who also felt the legal issues in his case had not
been sufficiently researched would be deemed "low" in motivation. In short, the index is not an absolute measure of motivation;
rather, it defines a sub-group of attorneys who are less motivated than any other sub-group of the defender office, if
indeed any sub-group is less motivated. The significant results,
then, depend upon describing the characteristics of this "suspect class" of counsel, and comparing them to the characteristics of the other defenders.
The time demand items selected were as follows: (1) "Are
138
there enough public defenders in the office?";

(2)

"Do the

public defenders spend excessive time doing work that could

139
be accomplished by one with nonlegal or paralegal training?";
(3) "On the average, how many times do you meet with a
40
(4) "Are the legal issues
client before the day of trial?";1
4
in your cases adequately researched?";' 1 and (5) "How many
14 2
cases do you finish per week?"

Regarding time supply, eight (50%) of the PD's worked
from 51 to 60 hours per week, two (12%) worked between 61
143
than 70 hours.
and 70 hours, and two (12%) worked more
Four (25%) of the respondents said they put in less than 50
hours per week, and it is this group for which time demand
137 Question No. 36, Public Defender Interview Schedule, app. A infra.
138

Id. at question No. 15.

139 Id. at question No. 16.
140

Id. at question No. 23.

141 Id. at question No. 32.
142
143

Id. at question No. 35.
Neither experience nor court assignment was correlated with number
of hours worked.
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responses are checked, and then compared to the answers of
the other 12 defenders.
Time demand responses for the two groups indicate little
variation in demonstrated levels of motivation. The evaluation
by the "less-hours" group of the adequacy of legal research
in defense preparation was no different than their colleagues'
assessment.14 4 They also had similar perceptions of the need
for paralegal assistance. 14 5 More importantly, they spent as much
time with their clients as did the other attorneys, and their
caseload completion rates (averaging just less than six non146
capital felonies per week) were identical.
The only item of our index in which the "less-hours" group
was markedly different was the perception of staff size. Only
three defenders felt that there were always enough attorneys
in the office, and all three responded that they worked less than
50 hours per week, some 10 hours per week less than the PD
average. The fourth member of the "less-hours" group felt
there were never sufficient numbers of defenders, but he was
assigned to misdemeanor court, and attorneys assigned to such
courts are not accurately compared to those in felony court.
This is because misdemeanor defenders, on the average, work
fewer total hours, spend fewer hours with clients, handle more
7
cases, and feel more understaffed than do felony defenders."1
The results of this index comparison suggest that the public
defenders do not vary greatly in motivation, unless those who
are in reality "poorly motivated" reported working more than
50 hours per week. If there is a conclusion to be drawn from
this analysis, it is that public defenders who work fewer hours
relative to their colleagues are probably not less motivated.
They spend as much time preparing their cases and perceive
the demands on their time in a manner very similar to the
other attorneys. They differ only in that they generally do
not feel understaffed.
144

When asked "Are the legal issues in your cases adequately researched?"
the subject group responded seven times with "usually" and once with
"always" for the three offenses studied. The corresponding response
pattern for the control group was five "always," 14 "usually," and one
"seldom." There is no significance between these summed response

patterns.
Responses to this item were identical to the control group. See question No. 16, Public Defender Interview Schedule, app. A infa.
146The average number of meetings prior to trial for both groups was
145

slightly more than three. Moreover, none of the "less-hours" group
reported inadequate time to complete client interviews.

147 Misdemeanor defenders reported working, on the average, 5 hours per

week less, met their clients fewer times, and handled more than twice
as many cases per month as did felony defenders. On the issue of

understaffing, see text p. 74 supra.
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Though, as conceded before, the index comparison yields
no measure of absolute motivation, there is some evidence that
the public defender office is staffed with highly motivated
attorneys. First, the number of hours reportedly worked by the
PD's indicates they do not perceive themselves in nine-to-five
jobs. Second, the responses of judges and prosecutors imply a
high level of defender motivation. Whenever one of these respondents identified a deficiency in the public defender system,
he was asked to attribute the deficiency to some cause. In
several hundred of such open-ended responses, collected for the
two groups, only one comment about "a lack of aggressiveness"
was voiced.
F.

The Public Defender As Plea-Bargainer

The pressures of time and volume, which have been examined before,1 48 are pressures on the entire system of criminal
justice- and its actors- judges and prosecutors as well as public
defenders. "Plea-bargaining" has thus become the necessary
concomitant of the bulging docket. The public defender, in an
overwhelming majority of the cases he handles, will represent
his client at no more "critical" a stage than the negotiations with
the prosecutor for a guilty plea to a lesser offense than the
one originally charged in exchange for the dismissal of the
first charge or charges.
In entering these negotiations, the PD is invariably at a
distinct disadvantage. First, the prosecutor need not bargain
at all, for as one defense attorney observed, the prosecutor has
far greater knowledge of the evidence to be presented at trial;
if his case is weak he may drop the charges, or if his case is
strong he may go to trial irrespective of the public defender's
input. Second, the police will often have gathered sufficient
evidence, and the prosecutor will have properly charged the
defendant, so as to make conviction highly probable should
the defense go to trial. Thus, "good" police work and proper
charging inherently limit the bargaining power of the public
defender. Third, and most important, the district attorney holds
the threat of incarceration over the head of the defendant,
while the defense holds the mere "threat" of going to trial
instead of pleading guilty. Bargaining positions under such
circumstances can seldom, if ever, be equal.
This disparity in bargaining strengths was large in Denver,
where at the time of this study, the district attorney filed
148

See text pp. 61-64 supra.
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many charges for which "probable cause" existed, but for which
the probability of conviction at trial was questionable. With
such "overcharging," the mere possibility of conviction added
further weight to the DA's bargaining position. Given these
conditions, it is not surprising that all the responding prosecutors and judges, as well as 14 of 16 public defenders felt
the district attorney had a more "powerful bargaining position"
than did the defenders.
When the respondents were asked how they would change
this situation, a number said they could not due to the system
characteristics just described. Others said they would not even
if they could, for a variety of philosophical and practical reasons. Some of the defenders felt that a more extensive "open
file" policy and greater prosecutor flexibility were the keys.
Others suggested taking more cases to trial with better preparation. Finally, one defender quipped, "Don't accept cases if people have past records; take only college grads earning $5,000
per year."
Bargaining power is obviously not the exclusive measure
of plea-bargaining ability. Effectiveness in negotiations can compensate, at least in part, for the weakness of the defense's bargaining position. When asked whether the public defenders
were effective plea-bargainers, both judges and prosecutors were
nearly unanimous in their praise of the defenders' negotiating
abilities. 149 Many felt that the defenders were persistent and
aggressive plea-bargainers who used the prosecutors' heavy caseload and the particular personality traits of each prosecutor to
the client's advantage, but both groups suggested means of increasing this effectiveness.
Some judges felt that reliance on one's trial expertise, or reputation thereof, was essential to effective negotiations. 150 Many
public defenders lacked the wealth of trial experience possessed
by the prosecutors,1 5 ' and the judges felt this diminished PD
effectiveness. Judges further criticized the defender system for
failing to provide sufficient investigatory resources to the public
defenders since many of them entered negotiations blindly,
with little knowledge of the prosecutor's case and, surprisingly,
little knowledge of their own. Finally, a number of judges felt
that caseload relief would make the "threat" of trial more real
and thus a more meaningful tool in bargaining.
149All ten judges and 14 of 15 DA's (93%) reported that the public defenders were effective plea-bargainers.

150 Four judges mentioned this factor in open-ended responses.
151 See text p. 72 supra.
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The prosecutors voiced many of the same suggestions for
increasing the public defender's negotiating expertise. Additionally, they suggested that the public defenders be more
realistic in their offers of pleas, and a few identified a need
for greater forthrightness in negotiations.
The "Point of Entry" Problems: The Public Defender as a
Delivery System
Perhaps none of the eight indicia examined in this case
study have a more obvious relationship to the developing constitutional "standards" of effective counsel than does the defender's point of entry into defense cases. There are three fundamental questions about PD operations to be answered: (1) When
does the defender enter the case, both in terms of elapsed time
since arrest and with regard to the stage of the proceedings?
(2) what effect does the point of entry have on the quality
of defense provided by the PD? and, (3) is the current point
of entry early enough to insure effective representation? As
always, each of these questions is answered with reference to
the responses of the prosecutors and judges in addition to those
of the defenders.
In murder cases, the majority of PD's indicated a de152
fender reached the client within 24 hours after his arrest.
For robberies, this average time approached 48 hours, and in
153
DUI's, the point of entry was delayed as much as a week.
G.

As to the stage of entry, murder defendants were usually met
154
Howafter first appearance but before preliminary hearing.
degree
first
defended
had
who
ever, three of the respondents
murder cases indicated they try to meet the defendant before
his first appearance. Of the 13 felony court PD's, seven usually
entered robbery cases at or before the first appearance, and
six reported they entered after first appearance but prior to
the preliminary hearing. None of the felony court defenders
said they made initial contact with their clients at any stage
later than the preliminary hearing. Surprisingly, none of the
misdemeanor PD's reported entering DUI cases any later than
the first appearance. 155
Six of the eight PD's who have defended first degree murder cases said
they saw their clients in less than 24 hours; two said they met the
defendant for the first time between 1 and 2 days after his arrest.
153 Four of the 11 responses for driving under the influence suggested that
they reached their clients between 3 and 7 days post-arrest.
154 Five of the eight PD's (62%) with murder defense experience said they
met their clients after first appearance. Three reported client contact
152

at or before this stage.
155 These results conflict with the description of "jail check" described
earlier. See text pp. 58-59 supra. The authors believe this difference.
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The judges and prosecutors perceived point of entry in
felony cases in a manner identical to the public defenders' perceptions. For misdemeanor courts, however, a substantial number of judges and DA's thought the defenders met their clients
after arraignment but some time before trial, thus disagreeing
with the PD responses. 15
What does the public defender accomplish at this first meeting? All but one defender said they could advise the client
of his rights, assure him that his interests were being protected, and additionally, determine his indigency. Twelve of
16 respondents (75%) said they were able to arrange for bail
or, in an appropriate case, for a personal recognizance bond.
Several of the PD's said they did not have time to actually
"determine" indigency. Instead, the client's word went either
unchallenged, or the defender asked an office investigator to
check his story. A common complaint voiced by the defenders
regarding their first meetings with clients was a lack of privacy. Invariably, someone from the sheriff's department was
present.
Regarding the effects of point of entry, most defenders felt
that defendants would not be released on bail any sooner than
they currently have been simply by an earlier point of entry by
PD's.157 The judges agreed; however, a substantial number of
prosecutors thought the defendant would be released earlier
158
on bail if the defender entered the case at an earlier stage,
and several suggested that the defenders too often failed to
apprise the defendant of his "right to apply" for a personal
recognizance bond.
On the fascinating question of what influence early defender availability has on police behavior, most PD's responded
that such availability usually or always had some effect. 15 9
This result, however, was limited to felony cases, as most defenders felt early availability did not influence police behavior
in result is a "testing effect," whereby respondents, when asked about
stage of entry, answered with regard to entry after formal assignment
to a case. See question No. 24, Public Defender Interview Schedule,

app. A infra.

158 Eight of 13 prosecutors (62%)

and seven of 10 judges (70%) disagreed

with the misdemeanor PD's responses.
157 Only five of 16 defenders (31%) felt earlier entry would. affect time of
release.
158 Eight of 10 judges (80%) agreed with the PD's that earlier entry would
not affect time of release, but 13 of 15 prosecutors (87%) said it would.
159 Summing defender responses for the three offenses studied, 22 of 34
(65%) expressed the opinion that early availability did affect police
behavior. This response rate was 17 of 21 (81%)for felonies.
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in DUI cases. 10° The specific advantages of early availability
identified by the PD's included the following: (1) Police use
of line-ups had decreased; instead mug shot line-ups were used;
(2) police did not obtain as many statements from suspects as
they once did; (3) fewer defendants were held without evidence; (4) police intimidation of suspects had diminished; (5)
the police, as a group, were demonstrating an increased appreciation of civil rights; and, (6) the defendants were less apt
to "break down" and accept the "deal" offered them by the
police to elicit a statement.
In contrast, the judges and DA's were nearly evenly split
on the question of police influence."" While many felt the PD's
presence had a tempering effect on police conduct, many felt
the defenders interfered with police investigations. Some of
the judges believed that the early availability of the defender
accomplished little more than slowing the charging process, an
observation in direct conflict with the defenders' perceptions.
Others noted that the police were spending more time in careful investigation before arrest, relying less on a potential statement from the accused for conviction.
On the issues of jury trials and pretrial motions, all defenders responding said they entered the client's case early enough
to make timely requests for jury trials and to file necessary
pretrial motions. This was true for both felony and misdemeanor courts. All the judges and prosecutors agreed with this
result. Some respondents in all three groups reported that in
misdemeanor cases the public defender representing the client
in the initial stages was often different from the PD who went
to trial. This, unfortunately, took many pretrial motions and
jury requests out of the hands of the trial defender.
As to the overall representation of the defendant, nearly
all judges and prosecutors felt that earlier defender entry would
62
increase the effectiveness of the counsel provided indigents.
16 3
Curiously, the public defenders were split on this issue.
five of 13 respondents (38%) felt early availability affected police
behavior in DUI cases.

160 Only
161

162

Summed responses for judges and prosecutors included 24 who thought
early availability did affect police conduct and 29 who thought it did

not. Misdemeanor responses for these two groups did not differ appreciably from felony responses.
The summed responses included 16 (76%) that felt overall effective-

ness would be increased by earlier entry and six (24%) that said it
would not. Eight of nine judges (89%) responded in this manner.
163 Only nine of 16 PD's (56%) felt early entry would influence overall

effectiveness of their representation.
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Though, as a group, they felt early entry would influence police
behavior, they were evidently satisfied that their current availability was sufficient to guarantee that most rights would be
protected and most procedural devices exploited on behalf of
the client. In contrast, judges and prosecutors, as a group,
expressed some doubts as to the value of early entry in influencing police behavior. Yet, they saw earlier entry as a means
of increasing the defenders' overall effectiveness. It is not
readily apparent what aspect of representation they felt would
be improved thereby. As described above, they saw no advantage to early entry in bond setting, release of detainees, pretrial motions, or jury requests. Indeed, few prosecutors and
fewer judges replied affirmatively to the question, "Is the
district attorney able to obtain incriminating information about
a defendant because the public defender has not seen him soon
enough?'0 4 Perhaps one judge recognized the key to the differences in responses between the PD's on the one hand and the
judges and prosecutors on the other. He remarked that although
the defenders were, in theory, available early enough to protect the defendant's interests, this first contact was, in practice, made under such pressure that the defender's presence
was not very meaningful. In essence, what this judge and many
of the defenders may have been recognizing about point of
entry is that, under present conditions, earlier entry would be
virtually meaningless. For the PD's to make client contacts
before the first appearance would require representation of all
persons arrested by the police. Although the defenders acknowledge the value of defender presence prior to first appearance,
they also realize that 22 PD's simply cannot attend every arrest, investigation, and interrogation. The "screening" by the
system of suspects is essential if the defenders' already burdensome caseloads are to be kept within "reasonable" bounds.
The Functional Independence of the Defender System
It seems axiomatic that a criminal defense attorney must
be free of any inhibiting political influences in defending his
client. Since in Colorado, the public defender is structurally a
part of the judiciary before which PD's defend indigents, 165
the potential for such political influence is present. The examination of the Denver public defender regarding this final indicium
revealed much about the stresses among the various actors in the
criminal justice system.
H.

164 Seven of 41 DA responses (17%)

were affirmative to this question.

165 See text p. 56 supra.

and two of 15 judge responses (13%)
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When asked whether the relationship with the supreme
court affected their daily operation, most defenders said it did
not.'0 " The DA's and judges agreed that no appreciable effect
existed. 167 Only a few PD's expressed a belief in any real
potential for conflicts of interest arising from this relationship
Several defenders were, however, concerned with the image of
a public defender employed by the state. These respondents indicated they often encountered strongly distrustful defendants
who doubted the freedom of the PD to provide them with an
aggressive defense.
Some defenders saw the financial link of the public defender office to the state as a problem. Although complete financial autonomy from the state government was not considered
practicable, these attorneys felt that nondefender personnel, including the justices of the supreme court, should have less input in allocation decisions.
Defenders also mentioned frequently the chilling effect of
"working for the supreme court." As one attorney explained,
"If you appeal, you are attacking the system." 168 Apparently
in the minds of this and several of the other public defenders,
the DA and courts are aligned on one side as the opposition
to the public defender, yet the opposition signs the paychecks.
One attorney characterized this relationship with the state as
a purely adversary one at all levels, and suggested that "great
philosophical differences" between members of the supreme
court and the Denver defender staff existed.
Two of the defenders felt these philosophical differences
were so great that political interference did occur. One noted
that without the supervision of the state office and supreme
court, the Denver public defenders could begin to "change the
system." The other suggested the state office was so closely
tied to the political process there was an "inherent stifling" in
cases which received wide news coverage.
The public defenders' attitude toward the functional independence of their office from the political and judicial branches
of government varied markedly over time. Counsel who were
classified as "high" in experience felt strongly that the Denver
office should be more autonomous from the state, while the
166 Eleven of 16 defenders (69%)
167

168

said this relationship had no effect on

their operations.
Sixteen of 22 judges and DA's (73%) reported no effects on the defender system from this relationship.
Open-ended response to question No. 38, Public Defender Interview
Schedule, app. A infra.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

'

VOL. 50

less experienced PD's were essentially neutral on the issue. 169
When this correlation of experience and attitude is controlled
for court assignment, it increases, 170 the data suggesting that
sometime between the first and second year of experience, perceptions of political autonomy change dramatically. Since this
point in time also corresponds roughly to the average time of
promotion from misdemeanor to felony court, the authors
searched for a felony-related factor to account for this phenomenon. One such factor was suggested by a number of public defenders. These respondents reported that a policy of the defender office restrained staff attorneys from seeking federal
relief such as habeas corpus or injunctions against the police
under federal civil rights legislation. Apparently such actions
are considered an affront to the Colorado judiciary, and thus
this policy is understandable. Two respondents could recall
instances in which this policy was crucial.
Although a majority of PD's responded favorably to questions about the state-city public defender relationship, nearly
all had some criticisms, as reported above. 1 71 Many of the respondents also noted some advantages to the state-wide system,
though none praised the closeness of the state defender office
to the courts and general assembly. A mild complaint was that
the state office could not fully comprehend the special problems
and needs of the city office.
VI.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

From the results of this study it is impossible to characterize
the Denver public defender system as either effective or ineffective counsel, for the term "effective" defies constitutional
and empirical definition. These results can be used, however,
to point to specific areas where an indigent defendant has a
likelihood of receiving less than effective counsel. Identifying
these weaknesses is but the first step in analyzing the performance of the public defender system. The real task is to
examine the perceived deficiencies of the system for their constitutional significance. In the remainder of this Note, the findings of the study are summarized and their relevance to constitutional law is explored.
A.

Caseload
Forgetting to file motions and failing to prepare adequately

169 The contingency coefficient for this correlation was 0.85.
170 The controlled coefficient was 0.88.
171 Quantifying results to open-ended responses, 28 of 42 summed responses
of PD's were favorable to the state-wide defender structure (67%).
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for preliminary hearings are two symptoms of understaffed
and overworked defender offices. In Powell, the Court clearly
stated that the right to counsel was guaranteed to defendants,
at least in part, so that inadmissible damaging evidence could
be excluded.1 7 2 Thus, failure to file a suppression motion might
well constitute an invasion of the indigent's right to effective
counsel. Similarly, failure of counsel to prepare for a preliminary
hearing may result in the client's loss of some defense. This
again, under recent case law, is a denial of effective counsel.173
The results of this study demonstrate that the Denver public
defender suffers from both these symptoms of case overload.
By demonstrating the causal link between caseload and these
deficiencies in representation, some basis is created for an
addendum to the constitutional right of effective counsel: In
a public defender system, the caseload of individual attorneys
must not interfere with the effective representation of their
clients.
Specialized Court Costs
Ever since Gideon, there has been a growing minority of
jurists and legal scholars who maintain that:
B.

[T]he due process clause, the equal protection clause, or the
guarantee of counsel itself may entitle an indigent defendant to
various forms of aid other than counsel in investigating, pre174
paring, and presenting his defense.

Although few courts have held that special costs are part of
the guarantee of effective legal representation, 175 Congress in
1964 enacted legislation providing for some trial costs for indigents in federal courts.1 76 The limit of this aid is $300.00, but
it may be used ". . . to obtain investigative, expert, or other
services necessary for an adequate defense." 1 77 As yet, such
assistance is guaranteed only to defendants in federal courts,
but again, future constitutional standards may well impose such
requirements on the states. In Denver, the authors have established deficiencies in public defender funding for special
court costs, expert witnesses, witness travel fees, scientific
experiments, and for the preparation of demonstrative evidence.
To the extent that such deficiencies interfere with the indigent's
287 U.S. at 69.
In re Williams, 1 Cal. 3d 168, 460 P.2d 984, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1969);
cf. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
174 Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN. L. REV. 1054, 1055 (1963).
175 See, e.g., United States v. Germany, 32 F.R.D. 421 (M.D. Ala. 1963).
176 Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970).
177Id. § 3006A(e) (1).
172

173
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right to effective counsel, the state is arguably violating the
logic of emerging constitutional principles.
C. Fact Investigation
Though certainly an issue related to special costs, fact investigation is already considered a fundamental ingredient to
effective defense. The "right" to "effective fact investigation"
is implicit in much of the case law, and is the very basis of
178
Public dethe Fourth Circuit's standards described earlier.
fenders in Denver felt funding was inadequate for fact investigation, and also expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of
evidentiary tools at their disposal. Such inadequacies may not
only be violative of constitutional standards, but may indeed
constitute a serious threat to the viability of the adversary
system in criminal justice. The disparity in these resources
between the state and the indigent may be so great that some
indigents may indeed prove the "sham" or "farce" of defense
which Colorado currently requires for setting aside convictions.17 9
D. The Point of Entry
As noted earlier, 8 0 the timeliness of the defender's entry
into a case was the one indicium of this study most closely
resembling a firmly established constitutional principle. The
principle, however, suffers from one serious limitation: Before
a conviction is set aside, courts often require the defendant to
prove that the belated appointment of defense counsel has
prejudiced his case.' 8 ' In Denver, the public defenders typically
met their clients quite early in the proceedings, and perhaps
1 82
earlier entry would be meaningless, as theorized previously.
But the fact remains that judges and prosecutors felt earlier
defender entry would enhance representation, and all three
groups of respondents noted the influence of early entry upon
police behavior. In short, though this study does not conclusively demonstrate that the current point of entry of Denver
public defenders has an adverse effect upon the quality of
representation, it does point to critical areas of client representation which early entry facilitates. If one assumes, for example, that later defender entry would be accompanied by a
178
See text p. 53 supra.
179 See text p. 54 supra.
180 See text p. 56 supra.
181 For an in depth review of the precedent and rationale supporting the

182

"majority rule" on this burden, see Judge Craven's dissenting opinion
in Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 227 (1968) (Craven, J., dissenting).
See text p. 82 supra.
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regression in police practices, then the current stage of entry
may be considered a minimal standard of timely defense.
E.

Political Autonomy

A number of public defenders expressed concern over the
image of defense attorneys employed by the state, but these
same respondents felt the threat of political influence was
negligible. It is doubtful if this image problem or the closeness
of defender-state relations per se will ever become part of a
constitutional standard, no matter how distrustful indigents
become of the public defender.
A more serious issue of functional independence rests with
the defenders' reluctance to seek federal relief from state convictions. This practice raises some grave constitutional questions, and only challenges of public defender systems will
determine the extent to which political autonomy will become
a constitutional necessity.
CONCLUSION

The remedies available to the indigent convicted of an
offense after inadequate representation by the public defender
are numerous. Aside from having the conviction set aside on
constitutional grounds, he may avail himself of two other
remedies external to criminal law.
First, the indigent may seek a quasi-contractual "remedy"
before the public defender is assigned to his case. 183 He simply
retains private counsel of his own choosing and then bills the
state for those services. This remedy is predicated on the existence of a state statutory obligation to provide the effective
counsel for indigent defendants.1 8 4 The conditions which must
be met before relief will be granted include: (1) The obligation
must be actual; (2) prompt performance must be of grave
public concern; (3) the obligor must have failed to perform his
duty; and (4) the intervening party must be a proper person
to render substitute performance. In the appropriate case, one
where the defendant meets these conditions, the remedy of
quasi-contract shall be permitted.1 8 5 Of the four conditions,
only one - proving "the obligor has failed to perform his duty"
183 For a review of the rationale supporting quasi-contractual relief, see
Sommers v. Putnam County Bd. of Educ., 113 Ohio St. 177, 148 N.E.
682 (1925).
18 4
The necessary statutory obligation is set forth in COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 39-21-1 to -4 (Supp. 1969).
185 A judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily be executed
against an appropriated fund of state government such as the funds

provided for public defense of indigents.
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should entail any difficulty. Evidence of the state's failure
to provide effective counsel should be available from the combination of (1) studies measuring client perceptions, (2) studies
comparing the private bar to the public defender, and (3)
studies such as this one.
A second noncriminal remedy available to the indigent is
the so-called "1983" action based on federal statute,1 86 under
which "every person" who, acting under the color of state law,
causes the "deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution" is subject to "an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." As an agency
of the state government, the public defender office clearly acts
"under the color of law," and thus after establishing the deprivation of constitutional rights, the indigent should obtain relief.
This approach again requires that case studies, such as this
one, be utilized by the plaintiff as a form of "evidence." The
potential of such remedies is limited only by the willingness
of the courts to rely on social science results.
Whatever the nature of the remedy provided for a denial
of effective counsel, it is certain that empirical forms of "evidence" must be employed if something more than a case-bycase development of constitutional doctrine is to occur. Submitting such evidence to the courts demands that they announce
more definitive standards of effectiveness. The gathering of such
"evidence" will thus insure that the criminal defense of the
indigent will become more than a hollow formality. It is to
such an objective that this and subsequent research must be
dedicated.
Carol Kocivar
Rodney R. Patula
David K. Rees
Gary H. Tobey
William R. James
-

186 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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APPENDIX A
Public Defender Interview Schedule
1. How long have you been a public defender?
less than 6 months
............
2 years to 3 years
6 months to a year
............
3 years to 4 years
1 year to 2 years
............
over 4 years
2. To what court are you presently assigned?
Felony

............
...........
...........

Misdemeanor
Juvenile
3. Have you handled these types of cases?

Yes
No
First degree murder
............
Aggravated robbery
.........-..
Driving under the influence
4. Other than law school what qualifications do you have which you
feel help you in your position?
Private criminal law practice
----------Graduate work
...........
Clerkship with a judge
-----------Clerkship with a firm
---........
Work with government agency
-..........
Other (specify)
5. Did you receive initial introductory training in the office?
Yes
No
6. What is it and how helpful is it?
7. What kind of continuing legal training do public defenders receive?
None
------...
How to deal with specific
Plea-bargaining strategy -----------judges and district
Trial technique
-..........
attorneys
Client relations
Office procedures
Updated developments
Other (specify)
in law
8. Does this training help you in your work?
Always
Usually
Seldom
Never
9. How?
10. Is your clerical assistance adequate in the following areas?
Typing
Yes
No
Filin g
-----------C opying
............
...........
Obtaining supplies
............
............
Other (specify)
............
11. Do you have assistance in preparing legal research?
Always
Usually
Seldom
Never
12. Do you have enough assistance to investigate facts?
Always
Usually
Seldom
Never
13. Do you use police investigative assistance?
Always
Usually
Seldom
Never
14. Are you satisfied with the quality of investigation wherever it may
come from?
Always

Usually

First degree m urder
-----------.......
Aggravated robbery
............
Driving under the influence
----------15. Are there enough public defenders in the office?
Always
Usually
Seldom
Never

Seldom

Never

......
.........
............

...--..

VOL. 50

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

16. Do public defenders spend excessive time doing work that could be
accomplished by one with nonlegal or paralegal training?
No
Yes
17. Could people with nonlegal or paralegal training do any of the
following subject to supervision by an attorney?
Draft motions or pleadings
Interview clients
.........
Prepare briefs
Research
-----Other (specify)
18. Are the physical facilities sufficient to provide effective counsel?
Yes
No
Office space
............
Desks
Phones

-

Filing

........

Copying

-..--.

.........

Computerized typewriter
Intraoffice communication
Intercom
Mem os

--------.

..

-----Personal contact
Privacy for work
19. Do the physical working conditions have an adverse effect on office
efficiency?
Yes
No
20. Would a different office organizational structure better enable you
to defend your client?
Yes
No
21. Why?
22. Is funding adequate in:

Never
Always
Usually
Seldom
..........
Personnel salaries?
--- -- ---Physical facilities?
------- -Legal research assistance?
Investigation?
......
Clerical?
Specialized court costs?
-----------Expert witnesses?
.......
Scientific experiments?
- - ....Witness travel fees?
...
.Preparing demonstrations?
23. On the average, how many times do you meet with a client before the
day of trial?
5 or
2-4
over
None
One
First degree murder
Aggravated robbery
Driving under the influence
24. How soon after a client is arrested does a public defender first see
him?
1-2
8-or
3-7
days
days
more
6 hrs. 24 hrs.
Within:
First degree murder

-----------......-

Aggravated robbery
Driving under the

----.......

influence

-

---------------

25. At the first meeting is a public defender able to:
Always Usually
-----------Arrange bail or P.R. bond?
Advise client of rights
e.g. Miranda?

Assure client that he is
protected?
Determine indigency
qualifications?

--

Seldom

Never
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26. Would a defendant be released on bail or bond within a shorter
time after arrest if the public defender entered the case at an
..

....

earlier stage?

..

...

Always

Usually
Seldom
Never
client?
your
see
first
ou
27. At what stage of the proceedings do y
First
AggraDriving
under the
vated
Degree
Influence
Robbery
Murder
Before the client's first appear-----------ance before a judge
At the client's first appearance
...........
before a judge
After first appearance but
...........
before preliminary hearing
..................
At preliminary hearing
After preliminary hearing but
.......
before arraignment
At arraignment
--- After arraignment but before
trial
........
At trial
28. Do you feel you could better represent your client if your first contact were at an earlier stage in the proceedings?
No
Yes
29. Are you able to spend adequate time with your client during an
interview?
No
Yes

First degree murder
Aggravated robbery
Driving under the influence
30. Do you receive cases early enough to make timely requests for:
Always Usually Seldom Never
Jury trials in:
First degree murder
Aggravated robbery
Driving under the influence
Pretrial motions in:
First degree murder
Aggravated robbery
Driving under the influence
31. Have you ever forgotten to file a motion because of your heavy
caseload?

Yes

No

32. Are the legal issues in your cases adequately researched?
Always Usually Seldom
First degree murder ------------------------------------A ggravated robbery
D riving under the influence

...... .
-----------------.....
--- ..- .....
------------

Never
--

-.......-- ..

33. Approximately how many pending cases do you have today for
which there has not been a trial level disposition or verdict?
Capital offenses
-----------Noncapital felonies
-----------Misdemeanors
34. In how many of these cases do you have simultaneous responsibility
with another public defender?
-----------Capital offenses
Noncapital felonies
Misdemeanors
35. How many cases do you finish per week?
Capital offenses
Noncapital felonies
-........
Misdemeanors
36. How many hours a week do you work?
41 to 50

51 to 60
61 to 70
Over 70

- -

.

.-----
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37. Does early availability of the public defender influence police behavior?
Always Usually Seldom Never
------

First degree murder
Aggravated robbery
Driving under the influence

-

---

........----.

38. How?
39. In recent cases in which you negotiated with the district attorney
(include cases where no agreement was reached) were there facts
about the case which you wished you possessed but for some reason
didn't?
No
Yes
............
First degree murder
Aggravated robbery
Driving under the influence

40. Were the reasons:

Lack of personal time due to
heavy caseload?
Lack of investigative resources?
Entered case too late to
obtain witnesses?
Facts not ascertainable?
Lack of police cooperation?
Other (specify)

-------------

-

-

First
Degree
Murder

Aggravated
Robbery

Driving
under the
Influence

............
-----------..........-..........
....................

.........

41. Who has the more powerful bargaining position?
District attorney
Public defender
42. How would you change this situation?
43. In cases in which there are facts which might help your client either
at parole or probation hearings, do you enter those facts in the
record, even after a plea bargain?
Never
Seldom
Usually
Always
44. Are formal discovery motions necessary to get sufficient information
about a case?
Always Usually Seldom Never
-----------First degree murder
Aggravated robbery----------Driving under the influence---------- -

45. When you decide not to file a motion for discovery are the demands
on your time a factor in this decision?
Always Usually Seldom Never
-------------------------First degree murder -----.....---------------Aggravated robbery -------Driving under the influence
46. Are you able to prepare adequately for preliminary hearings to use
them effectively as a means of discovery?
Never
Seldom
Usually
Always
47. Is lack of time ever a factor in deciding on the use of a pretrial
conference?
Never
Seldom
Usually
Always
48. Does the structural relation to the supreme court have any effect on
your work?
No
Yes
49. How?
50. What is the best thing about the state defender-city defender
relation?
51. What is the worst thing about the state defender-city defender
relation?
52. What is a better way to organize a public defender system?

DENVER PUBLIC DEFENDER
53. What does the public defender office present as a standard of success? (Number of cases handled? Short sentences? Quick dispositions? Intimidation of district attorneys? Good working relations
with district attorneys?)
54. What do you believe to be the valid standard of success?

APPENDIX B
District Attorney Interview Schedule
1. How long were you a district attorney?
2 years to 3 years
less than 6 months
3 years to 4 years
6 months to a year
over 4 years
-------1 year to 2 years
2. To what court were you assigned?
Felony
Misdemeanor
Juvenile

.........
.......

-

3. Have you handled these types of cases?
No
Yes
First degree murder
Aggravated robbery
............
Driving under the influence
4. Other than law school, what qualifications did you have when you
were a D.A. which you feel helped you in your position?
Private criminal law practice
Graduate work
-----------Clerkship with a judge
-----------Clerkship with a firm
-----------Work with government agency
Work as a public defender
Other (specify)
5. Are public defenders up-to-date on the latest developments in
criminal law?

Always

Usually

Seldom

Never

6. Does the public defender's work reflect adequate clerical assistance?
Never
Seldom
Usually
Always
7. How?
8. Do the public defenders adequately have facts investigated?
Never
Seldom
Usually
Always
9. Should the public defender have
assistance?
No
Yes

the use of 'police investigative

10. Are there enough public defenders in the office?
Usually
Always

Seldom

Never

11. Do public defenders spend excessive time doing work that could
be accomplished by one with nonlegal or paralegal training?
No
Yes
12. Could people with nonlegal or paralegal training do any of the following subject to supervision by the public defender?
Draft motions or pleadings
Interview clients
Prepare briefs
-----------Research
Other (specify)
13. Coulaif-fere-nt---off-ce organizational structure better enable the
public defender to defend his client?
No
Yes
14. Why?
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15. Do you think the public defender's funding is adequate in:
Always Usually Seldom Never
Personnel salaries?
............
............
Physical facilities?
----------------Legal research assistance? --In v estig ation ?

............
............

C lerical?
S pecialized court costs?
Expert witnesses?
Scientific experim ents?
W itness travel fees?

............
...........
............
.........
...---.........
...
.......
-..-------.
............
. ....
...........
.-.......
-----------............

Preparing demonstrations?

---

First degree murder

.----------------

---

16. Is the public defender able to spend sufficient time with a client
before the day of trial?
Always Usually Seldom Never
First degree murder
Aggravated robbery
Driving under the influence
17. Are you able to obtain incriminating information about a defendant
because the public defender has not seen him soon enough?
Always Usually Seldom Never
---

. ---------............
Aggravated robbery
-Driving under the influence
18. Would a defendant be released on bail or bond within a shorter time
after arrest if the public defender entered the case at an earlier stage?
Always Usually Seldom Never
19. At what stage of the proceedings does the public defender first see
a client?
Driving
AggraFirst
under the
vated
Degree
Murder Robbery Influence
Before the client's first
appearance before a judge

At the client's first
appearance before a judge
After first appearance but
before preliminary hearing
At preliminary hearing
After preliminary hearing
but before arraignm ent
At arraignment
After arraignment but

------

----

-

............
-

...........
...........-......

..------..........
............
........
-.....-

before trial
At trial
20. Could a public defender better represent a client if the first contact
were at an earlier stage in the proceedings?
No
Yes
public defender receive cases early enough to make timely
the for:
21. Does
requests
Always Usually Seldom Never
Jury trials in:
............
First degree murder
... ..... .....
-----------Aggravated robbery
...........
............
Driving under the influence
Pretrial motions in:
First degree m urder

....--.....
..........

A ggravated robbery

............
............

Driving under the influence

--------.-----

----

22. Do public defenders ever forget to file a motion because of their
heavy caseload?
No
Yes
23. Are the legal issues in a public defender's case adequately researched?
Always Usually Seldom Never
------.-------------------First degree murder -------------------.------------.---------Aggravated robbery Driving under the influence

-------.....
-----..

..
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24. Does early availability of the public defender influence police behavior?
Always Usually Seldom Never
-------First degree murder ------Aggravated robbery

-..--.............----.------

----------- ---------Driving under the influence 25. How?
26. In cases in which you negotiated with the public defender (include
cases where no agreement was reached), were there facts about the
case which he should have possessed but for some reason didn't?
Always Usually Seldom Never
..

------------..
.--

First degree murder

.

Aggravated robbery --------------------... ..
-----------.........
...... .
Driving under the influence
27. Were the reasons:
AggraDriving
First
vated
under the
Degree
Murder Robbery Influence
Lack of personal time due
-----------.---------..
to heavy caseload?
......
.....
---------Lack of investigative resources?
Entered case too late to
obtain witnesses?

...........

....--

-----------Facts not ascertainable?
-----------Lack of police cooperation?
Other (specify)
plea bargainer?
28. Is the public defender an effective
Always Usually Seldom Never
29. How could the public defender be a more effective plea bargainer?
30. Who has the more powerful bargaining position?
Public defender
District attorney
31. Why?
32. In cases in which there are facts which might help the defendant
either at parole or probation hearings, does the public defender
enter those facts in the record, even after a plea bargain?
Always Usually Seldom Never
33. Are formal discovery motions necessary for the public defender to
get sufficient information about a case?
Always Usually Seldom Never
First degree murder
A ggravated robbery
............
..........
..........
Driving under the influence
34. Does the public defender ever fail to file a motion for discovery
because of demands on time?
Always Usually Seldom Never
First degree murder
A ggravated robbery

-

............

-

............

-

..........-

---

-

Driving under the influence
35. Are public defenders able to prepare adequately for preliminary
hearings to use them effectively as a means of discovery?
Always Usually Seldom Never
36. Is lack of time ever a factor in the public defender's decision on
the use of a pretrial conference?
Always Usually Seldom Never
37. Does the structural relation to the supreme court have any effect on
the public defender's work?
Yes
No
38. How?
39. What is the best thing about the state defender-city defender
relation?
40. What is the worst thing about the state defender-city defender
relation?

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 50

41. What is a better way to organize a public defender system?
42. What does the public defender office present as a standard of success? (Number of cases handled? Short sentences? Quick dispositions? Intimidation of district attorneys? Good working relations
with district attorneys?)
43. What do you believe to be the valid standard of success?
APPENDIX C
Judge Interview Schedule
1. How long have you been a judge?
Less than 1 year
7 to 10 years
..........
1 to 3 years
over 10 years
4 to 6 years
2. To what court are you presently assigned?
Felony
Misdemeanor
Juvenile
3. Have you handled these types of cases?
Yes
No
First degree murder
............
..........
Aggravated robbery
............
Driving under the influence------------4. Other than law school, what qualifications do you have which you
feel help you in your position?
Private criminal law practice
Graduate work
Clerkship with a judge
Clerkship with a firm
-----------Work as a prosecuting attorney
-Work as a public defender
----------Other (specify)
5. Are public defenders up to date on the latest developments in criminal law?
Always Usually Seldom Never
6. Does the public defender's work reflect adequate clerical assistance?
Always

Usually Seldom

Never

7. How?
8. Do the public defenders have facts investigated adequately?
Always Usually Seldom Never
9. Should the public defender have the use of police investigative
assistance?
Always Usually Seldom Never
10. Are there enough public defenders in the office?
Always Usually Seldom

Never

11. Do public defenders spend excessive time doing work that could be
accomplished by one with nonlegal or paralegal training?
Yes
No
12. Could people with nonlegal or paralegal training do any of the following subject to supervision by the public defender?
Draft motions or pleadings
-1..........
Interview clients
-----------Prepare briefs
-----------Research
-----------Other (specify)
13. Coul-d-aifferentoffice organizat-ional structure better enable the
public defender to defend his client?
Yes
No
14. Why?
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15. Do you think the public defender's funding is adequate in:
Always Usually Seldom Never
-Personnel salaries?
-Physical facilities?
- -----Legal research assistance?
Investigation?
------------Clerical?
----------Specialized court costs?
Expert witnesses?
-----Scientific experiments?
....
-------..
W itness travel fees?
-----Preparing demonstrations?
16. Is the public defender able to spend sufficient time with a client
before the day of trial?
Always Usually Seldom Never
First degree murder
----Aggravated robbery
-----------Driving under the influence
----......
..
17. Does the prosecuting attorney obtain incriminating information
about a defendant because the public defender has not seen him
soon enough?
Always Usually Seldom Never
.
.. ..
........
-----------First degree murder
Aggravated robbery--------------------Driving under the influence
-18. Would a defendant be released on bail or bond within a shorter time
after arrest if the public defender entered the case at an earlier
stage?
Always Usually Seldom Never
19. At what stage of the proceedings does the public defender first see
a client?
First
AggraDriving
Degree
vated
under the
Murder Robbery Influence
Before the client's first
appearance before a judge
At the client's first
appearance before a judge
......
After first appearance but
before preliminary hearing
--------At preliminary hearing
-.------After preliminary hearing
but before arraignment
At arraignment
After arraignment but
before trial
At trial
20. Could a public defender better represent a client if the first contact
were at an earlier stage in the proceedings?
Yes
No
21. Does the public defender receive cases early enough to make timely
requests for:
Always Usually Seldom Never
Jury trials in:
First degree murder
------Aggravated robbery
----....--.........
.........- --Driving under the influence
-Pretrialmotions in:
First degree murder
--------...... .. .. ....---Aggravated robbery
- ----Driving under the influence
---22. Do public defenders ever forget to file a motion because of their
heavy caseload?
Yes
No
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23. Are the legal issues in a public defender's case adequately researched?
Always Usually Seldom Never
First degree murder

...........

Aggravated robbery

...........

............

...----.

-----------.....

Driving under the influence

....

-----

24. Does early availability of the public defender influence police
behavior?
Always Usually Seldom Never
First degree murder
Aggravated robbery

--

Driving under the influence
25. How?
26. In recent cases in which the public defender and the district attorney
negotiated (include cases where no agreement was reached), were
there facts about the case which the public defender should have
possessed but for some reason didn't?
Yes
No
First degree murder
.........
Aggravated robbery
Driving under the influence
27. Were the reasons:
First
AggraDriving
Degree
vated
under the
Murder Robbery Influence
Lack of personal time due
to heavy case load?

--

---

Lack of investigative
resources?

Entered case too late to
obtain witnesses?

Facts not ascertainable?
Lack of police cooperation?
Other (specify)

.......

..........

........

-.....

28. Are the public defenders assigned to your court effective plea
bargainers?
Always Usually Seldom Never
29. What strengths do the public defenders assigned to your court have
as plea bargainers?
30. What weaknesses do the public defenders assigned to your court
have as plea bargainers?
31. How could the public defenders assigned to your court be more
effective plea bargainers?
32. Who has the more powerful bargaining position?
Public defender
District attorney
33. How would you change this situation?
34. In cases in which there are facts which might help the defendant
either at parole or probation hearings, does the public defender enter
those facts in the record, even after a plea bargain?
Always Usually Seldom Never
35. Are formal discovery motions necessary for the public defender to
get sufficient information about a case?
Always Usually Seldom
First degree murder
........................
Aggravated robbery
Driving under the influence

Never
...-......

-- -

36. Does the public defender ever fail to file a motion for discovery
because of the demands on his time?
Always Usually Seldom Never
First degree m urder
............
............
Aggravated robbery ------------------Driving under the influence

................

.-

-----

37. Are public defenders able to prepare adequately for preliminary
hearings to use them effectively as a means of discovery?
Always Usually Seldom Never
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38. Is lack of time ever a factor in the public defender's decision regarding the use of a pretrial conference?
Always Usually Seldom Never
39. Does the structural relation to the supreme court have any effect
on the public defender's work?
Yes
No
40. How?
41. What is the best thing about the state defender-city defender
relation?
42. What is the worst thing about the state defender-city defender
relation?
43. What is a better way to organize a public defender system?
44. What does the public defender office present as a standard of success? (Number of cases handled? Short sentences? Quick dispositions? Intimidation of district attorneys? Good working relations
with district attorneys?)
45. What do you believe to be the valid standard of success?

NOTE
COMPARISON OF PUBLIc DEFENDERS'
AND PRIVATE ATTORNEYS' RELATIONSHIPS
WITH THE PROSECUTION IN
THE CITY OF DENVER*
I. Tiz IssuES

AS DEFunE

IN Lwd

LrEmTuRE

A

S an institution, the public defender has long been the subject of controversy. Traditionally, "the state" denoted only
the prosecution. Neither clients nor legal commentators have
wholeheartedly accepted the proposition that the state might
also comprise the defense. Proponents of public defender systems have successfully demonstrated their economy and efficiency. What remains debatable is a defender's ability to remain
autonomous from the prosecutorial arm of the state and give
his allegiance solely to the defendant. The most critical question
is whether creation of a public defense bureaucracy leads
to its amalgamation into a single system for efficiently processing the accused. Unfortunately, investigation of the issue has
only recently started to descend from the abstract to the
empirical.
Typical of early debates, which generated much heat but
little light, was an exchange of opinion published in the American Bar Association Journal in 1956.1 Relying exclusively on

"pure reason,' 2 Judge Edward Dimock wrote, "We should never
yield one inch of ground in the struggle against the creation
of a police state where the government, when it prosecutes a
man, purports also to defend him."'3 A Cook County, Illinois
judge and public defender were indignant. Their response was
based upon the solemn oath that a public defender took to rep4
resent the indigent defendant to the best of his legal ability.
They elaborated little beyond their insistence that "there is a
This study was performed during a summer internship program administered by the University of Texas Criminal Justice Project. The project
places law students as interns with various criminal justice agencies
throughout the nation. In the summer of 1971, the author was assigned
to the Denver office of the Colorado Public Defender System. This Note
is the result of that assignment.
1 Dimock, The Public Defender: A Step Towards a Police State?, 42
A.B.A.J. 219 (1956); Harrington & Getty, The Public Defender: A Progressive Step Towards Justice, 42 A.B.A.J. 1139 (1956).
2 Dimock, supra note 1, at 221.
3 Id. at 220.
4
Harrington & Getty, supra note 1, at 1139.
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distinct cleavage between the court, the prosecuting officials,
and the Public Defender, in exactly the same sense and degree
that would exist between the same parties and private
'5
counsel."
A pair of articles carried some 5 years later in the Minnesota Law Review shed little additional light upon the question.6 Although choosing such captions as "Impartial Search
for the Truth, ' 7 and admitting that "[i]t often happens that
those who are unable to help themselves . . . are the least
deserving of help," s a Los Angeles public defender stated that,
because of their concern with developing their own professional
skills, public defenders in California had reputations for fighting with as much zeal and skill as any private attorney. 9 In the
same volume, a state judge was unrestrained in his praise of
the Los Angeles defender system, stating that he saw no tendency for the public defender's close relationship with the prosecution to dampen ardent advocacy. Instead, he felt that rapport
with the prosecution could be an advantage to the defender in
that he was in a better position to obtain bargains for deserving clients,10 although no attempt was made to explain how
such an ideal defense position was maintained.
Private criminal defense attorneys have been skeptical of
the quality of defense provided by agents of the state, but
usually their opinions have been based upon theory rather than
experience. A survey taken by 100 criminal lawyers by Arthur
Lewis Wood showed that those who did not practice in a city
where a public defender system existed were prone to oppose
it on theoretical grounds. The responses most frequently received were that the system was socialistic and that a public
defender would not defend vigorously." Greater insight into
the nature of a public defender's relationship with the prosecution was revealed in an interview with noted defense attorney Edward Bennett Williams:
In a public defender system there is a strong tendency to
settle problems of human liberty on a mass-production, imper-

sonal basis, the way a claims adjuster, for example, settles cases.
5Id. at 1140.
6 Cuff, Public Defender System: The Los Angeles Story, 45 MINN. L. REV.
715 (1961); David, Institutional or Private Counsel: A Judge's View
of the Public Defender System, 45 MINN. L. REV. 753 (1961).
7 Cuff, supra note 6, at 720.

8Id. at 734.
9 Id. at 731.
10 David, supra note 6, at 766.
"lA. WOOD,

CRnIINAL LAWYER

193-94 (1967).
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The public defender and
against each other every day.
like two wrestlers who wrestle
every night and in time get to
cern of the wrestlers is to be
12
too much.

the prosecutor are trying cases
They begin to look at their work
with each other in a different city
be good friends. The biggest consure they do not hurt each other

Not until Gideon v. Wainwright" made concern with public defender systems more immediate did empirical research
into the peculiarities of the institution begin to take place.
From these studies have come two basic complaints against
public defenders: (1) They cooperate with the prosecution to
the detriment of their clients; and, (2) Even if they are not
co-opted into the prosecutorial establishment, their clients are
convinced that they are.
The first of these charges was presented most convincingly
by David Sudnow in an article based upon his observations of
a public defender office in California. 1 4 Sudnow's description
was distressing. While the private attorney's primary concern
was his client, the public defender focused his attention upon
perpetuating his relationships with other functionaries in the
courtroom. Given his caseload and his confinement to a single
courtroom, there was little opportunity for communication with
his clients. Contact was limited to a few minutes before each
appearance in court, where discussion was solely for the purpose of arriving at an appropriate plea bargain. The public
defender took it for granted that his clients were guilty and
were to be treated accordingly. Moreover, he assumed the basic
morality of those responsible for conviction.

Public defenders

went to trial only when forced to do so by clients who did not
know "what was good for them," and then they merely went
through the motions of complying with correct legal procedure.
A later study of the public defender's performance in juvenile court showed that Sudnow's characterization applied to
other arenas in other cities.1 5 Although Platt, Schechter, and
Tiffany denied that the defender was co-opted into a juvenile
court superstructure, their entire article refutes their conclusion
any reasonable meaning is given to the term "co-opta-if
16
They described the public defender as a member of a
tion."
12

D.

McDONALD, THE LAW: INTERVIEWS WITH EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS

WEBSTER 9-10 (1962).
13372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in A
Normal
14 Sudnow,
Public Defender Office, 12 SOCIAL PROB. 255 (1965).
15 Platt, Schechter & Tiffany, In Defense of Youth: A Case of the Public
Defender in Juvenile Court, 43 IND. L.J. 619 (1968).
' Indeed, they repeatedly analogize the situations they observe with descriptions made by Abraham S. Blumberg, who first applied the word
"co-optation" in this context. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as ConAND BETHEL M.
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political community and a court employee. As such he wants
to avoid confrontations which will discredit his membership in
the court community. For management of his huge caseload,
he is dependent upon cooperation from all other court personnel. In return, he must be careful not to obstruct their
efficient processing of cases. He has a reciprocal arrangement
with the district attorney whereby each informs the other of
the details of his case. Necessary relations are preserved whatever their cost to an individual client: "The court functionaries
17
see themselves as colleagues rather than adversaries ....
child's
the
on
speculated
authors
From their observations, the
impression of his representation. They concluded, "The structural demands under which the public defender operates make
it apparent to his clients that he is not 'their' advocate- dedicated to the best defense possible."' 8 Apparently, the children
had fewer illusions than did the authors as to "their" attorneys'
allegiances. The few who were quoted in the article thought
of the defender as no more than the man who talked to the
judge about their disposition.
Research which has dealt directly with the client's attitude
toward the public defender has been in accord with the speculations by Platt, Schechter, and Tiffany. A study conducted
during the winter of 1970-71 involving 72 interviews with men
charged with felonies in Connecticut revealed the dissatisfaction of those represented by the public defender. 19 The suspicions voiced by the accused concerning the interaction between the defender and the prosecutor bore striking resemblance to the criticisms advanced by more sophisticated legal
commentators. The way the public defender behaved toward
them and his position as employee of the state led most clients
to think of him as a "middleman" or even "the prosecutor's
assistant." The author summarized the feelings of those he
interviewed:
In particular, most of those who were represented by Public
Defenders thought their major adversary in the bargaining process to be not the prosecutor or the judge, but rather their own
attorney, for he was the man with whom they had to bargain.
They saw him as the surrogate of the prosecutor - a member

of "their 20little syndicate" - rather than as their own repre-

sentative.

fidence Game: Organizational Co-optation of a Profession, 1 LAw &
Soc'Y REV. 15 (No. 2, 1967).
'7 Platt, Schechter & Tiffany, supra note 15, at 631.
18 Id. at 633.
19 Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had
a Public Defender, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACTION 4 (No. 4, 1971).
20

Id. at 6.
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When the respondents were asked if. they felt that their lawyer
had been on their side, almost all represented by private attorneys said "yes" -but
the bulk of those represenled by public
defenders said "no." The author explained the attitude of the
public defender's clients not in terms of the lawyer's performance but in terms of the indigent's assumption that one cannot
get something for nothing. The problem was considered one
of creating the appearance of justice.
The charges of both clients and legal commentators have
been answered in three ways. First, some writers have denied
that the public defender is co-opted into the system. 21 Second,
others have asserted that cooperative defense attorneys are no
more common in public than in private practice. 22 Finally, a
few studies have indicated that the entire "adversary" system
of criminal justice is little more than a facade for efficiently
processing the accused - and that the public defender system
23
is but a conspicuous example of criminal law as it is practiced.
A survey reported in a preliminary summary of Lee Silverstein's monumental work, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases
in American State Courts, demonstrated that judges, prosecutors, and defenders in counties which had public defender
offices denied that the public defender's adversariness was in
any way lessened by his position. 24 All three groups almost
unanimously disagreed with the assertion that a public defender
could not be completely independent. The great majority of
defenders responded in the negative when asked if the prosecution cooperated more with them than with retained counsel.
The majority of judges and district attorneys surveyed stated
that the performance of public defenders in their areas was
25
equal to or compared favorably with that of retained counsel.
A comparative study of public defenders and private attorneys in Cook County, Illinois, revealed dissimilarities in their
styles of operation as well as differences in the areas in which
each group experienced its successes and failures. 26 Yet, from
studying their data the authors concluded, "overall, the differences suggest less that one kind of counsel is better than another
21

See, e.g., L.

SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES

AMERICAN ST.tTE COURTS -

A

PRELIMINARY SUMMARY

IN

(1964).

22 See, e.g., Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 52 (1967).
23
See, e.g., Oak & Lehman, Lawyers for the Poor, in THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 91 (A. Blumberg ed. 1970).
24 L. SILVERsTEIN, supra note 21.
25 Id. at 13-16.
26 Oak & Lehman, supra note 23.
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than that they perform somewhat different roles in the overall
operation of the criminal justice system. '27 Dispositions for
cases handled by public defenders were distinguished and explained with reasons other than the defenders' cooperation with
the state. For example, the authors suggested that the 14 percent higher guilty plea rate for clients of public defenders
could be caused by private attorneys' feelings of obligation to
go to trial to earn their fees or by public defenders' obtaining
better bargains for their clients. Public defenders were found
to win 50 percent of the cases which they take to trial, as compared with a 31 percent acquittal rate for private attorneys.
Their overall conviction rate was nearly the same: 91 percent for
public defenders and 93 percent for private attorneys. The
authors reasoned that a defendant against whom the evidence
and the law were clear might be better served by a public
defender's bargain than by a private attorney's propensity to
28
go to trial.
Jerome Skolnick rejected the categorical classifications of
public defenders as cooperative and private attorneys as aggressive. After extensive observation of both public and private
attorneys' perfomances in a single community, he concluded that
"the public defender, as an institution, does not significantly
differ from other 'cooperative' defense attorneys." 29 He found
that the layman's notion of adversariness was rarely in the
client's best interest and that clients of cooperative attorneys
usually obtained lighter dispositions. He implied that Sudnow,
in his study of the same community, 0 tended to confuse ability
with hostility, when in fact the ablest private defense attorneys
were no less cooperative with the prosecutors than were the
public defenders. To district attorneys, it mattered not so
much whether a public defender was handling a case as
whether it was being handled by a "cooperative" defense attorney - a category that included more private attorneys than
public defenders. Skolnick's observations revealed that the
notion of teamwork between the public defender and the district
attorney broke down often enough to be notable and probably
was disrupted more often than were the district attorney's relations with leading private defense attorneys. Differences between the practices of private attorneys and public defenders
were attributed not so much to their attitudes as to the atti27 Id.at 94.

Id. at 95-103.
Skolnick, supra note 22, at 53.
30
Sudnow, supra note 14.
28
29
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tudes of their clients- the clients of public defenders being
harder to "control" and thereby more often forcing them to
31
defend hopeless cases.
II. THE PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
From the survey of the literature just completed, five primary issues surrounding the public defender are apparent. First,
what is the public defender's relationship with the other actors
in the criminal justice system? In particular, what is his relationship with the prosecution? What effects do such relationships have on the quality of defense provided by the public
defender? Second, what is the nature of discovery procedures,
both formal and informal, utilized by the public defender?
Third, what are the conditions under which the public defender
is effective in plea bargaining? Fourth, what are the characteristics of the client/defender relationship, and what effect does
this relationship have on quality of representation? Fifth, to
what extent may a governmental agency such as the public
defender achieve political autonomy from the state?
The purpose of this study is to examine each of these five
issues in the context of the Denver public defender. The mode
of examination is to draw comparisons wherever possible between private defense attorneys and public defenders regarding
their relationships to the larger scheme of criminal justice. It
is these relationships which are represented by the five issues
to be examined.
To achieve this purpose, the author chose a methodology
tailored to the relationships. Since these relationships are
highly informal with most interactions occurring in private,
direct observation was not feasible. Instead, a questionnaire and
interview technique combined with participant observation were
employed as the chief sources of information.
The early stages of the study were spent dbserving and
communicating with the public defenders. During this period,
the author became quite familiar with the varied personalities
and approaches of the individuals, and obtained a broad working knowledge of the Denver criminal justice system. Subsequently, a detailed questionnaire covering nearly every aspect
of a criminal attorney's relationship with the prosecution was
compiled, and copies of this questionnaire were given to 10
public defenders. Five defenders were lawyers assigned to
felony courts who had worked their way up through other
31

Skolnick, supra note 22, at 60-68.
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stages of criminal defense. Four defenders were new attorneys
whose experiences were confined to county courts. The final
defender practiced almost exclusively in the juvenile area.
Each public defender was provided with an explanation of the
research, an hour spool of recording tape, and a questionnaire
and was asked to dictate his responses onto the tape. The
answers were later transcribed and analyzed. Nine of the respondents cooperated fully. As a basis of comparison, nine private criminal lawyers were interviewed personally and asked
questions corresponding to those to which the public defenders
responded.
Using these approaches of comparative reporting and participant observation, some significant insights are gained into the
relationships comprising the criminal justice system in Denver.
Moreover, these approaches permit the author to explore the
issues of public defense current in the literature in the more
concrete context of a particular public defender office. Before
such issues are examined, however, it is essential to have an
appreciation of the fundamental operation of the system under
study.
III.

THE

CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CRIMINAL

DEFENSE IN DENVE

32

The Denver Public Defender Office was established in 1966,
and functioned as a city agency through 1969. A statewide public
defender system was created by the Colorado legislature in
1969, 33 and the Denver office was assimilated into the statewide
system on January 1, 1970. As one of the 18 regional offices in
the state, the Denver Public Defender now operates as an agency
of the judicial branch of the state government.
Although the numbers fluctuate monthly, there were 19
full-time salaried attorneys, four investigators, one social worker,
one law student, and five secretaries employed by the Denver
office at the time of this study. With the exception of murder
cases, the workload was handled by means of a "zone defense";
i.e., attorneys were not assigned to clients- they were assigned
to courtrooms. The courtrooms consisted of four district courts
which handled felony trials, two county courts which held
felony preliminary hearings (plus an additional court for mur32 Shortly after this study was completed, many changes were made in

the administration of the public defender office. The following
tion, therefore, is only applicable to the period covered by this
(Summer 1971). It is hoped that by the time of publication
the problems described in this article will have been remedied
changes.
33 COLO. REV. STAT, ANN. §§ 39-21-1 to -5 (Supp. 1969).

descripresearch
some of
by these
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der preliminary hearings), three county courts for state misdemeanors, two county courts for city ordinance violations, and
two juvenile courts. Ordinarily, two attorneys were assigned
to each of the six felony courts, and one attorney was assigned
to each county court and each juvenile court. Initial appearances
were handled by paralegal help, if handled at all. New attorneys served lineup duty in weekly shifts. Attorneys assigned
to county courts rarely met their clients prior to arraignment,
at which time a plea was entered. A somewhat greater probability existed that an accused felon would have spoken to an
attorney prior to his preliminary heari-g. Motions for preliminary hearings were filed as a matter of course. If an acceptable plea bargain was not reached at the preliminary hearing level, the defendant would find that he had a new lawyer
when he appeared in the trial court, or perhaps sooner if the
public defender handling his case paid a hurried visit to the
county jail. Three months often passed before one charged
with a felony met the defender ultimately responsible for his
case.
Defenders were assigned to their courtrooms on a semipermanent basis. There was no procedure for rotation of assignments; rather, a defender was moved only when a reallocation
of resources was necessary. Usually this was caused by someone leaving or entering the employ of the office. In order to
fill a vacancy or accommodate a new arrival, more than a single reassignment was often required. A vacancy at the district
court level was usually the occasion for promotion and redistribution of talent within the ranks. The high rate of turnover
in the office was the major factor which prevented an attorney
from being assigned to the same judge and the same courtroom
indefinitely. In fact, it was not uncommon for a new lawyer
to advance from county court, the bottom of the totem pole,
to felony trials in district court, the top, within 9 months. The
only desirable effect of such turnover was the fluidity it necessarily entailed in courtroom assignments. Between personnel
shakeups, a defender was moved from a courtroom only if he
so displeased the court that the judge insisted upon his transfer.
On the other hand, certain public defenders were so compatible with the judges of the court to which they were assigned
that this "marriage" survived all changes within the defender
office. District attorneys in felony trial courts were also assigned for an indefinite term. Therefore, the most serious offenses were handled by the same two district attorneys and
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the same two public defenders working with the same judge
week after week. In the county courts and at the preliminary
hearing level, deputy district attorneys were rotated on a monthly basis, thus presenting some barrier to the formation of
symbiotic relationships.
Yet in every courtroom the public defender was a permanent fixture. Nearly 85 percent of the defendants who appeared in any criminal court in Denver were represented by
the public defender. Counsel table was virtually the public
defender's office, into which a private attorney only occasionally
intruded. A defender had no control over his own caseload.
Theoretically, the pubilc defender office made the initial determination of indigency subject to review by the court.34 Actually, the court very rarely questioned representation by the
public defender. Indeed, it appeared that anyone who wanted
to be represented by the public defender was assumed to be
unable to afford private counsel. Also, the court refused to
consider the defender's caseload as having any influence upon
qualification for representation. The few public defender efforts
to limit their own caseloads were sharply rebuked by the
judges. As a result, nearly every attorney had over 100 case
assignments pending at any given time.
Frequently, an attorney not long out of law school with
no previous trial experience was thrown into a courtroom on
a "sink or swim" basis. He went through no orientation program and received no supervision, instruction, or meaningful
evaluation. He was hired to fill a vacancy in a courtroom.
Fill it he must, with little help from others occupied with
their own work. 35 During the period of this study, no regular
organizational or strategy meetings were conducted. Conferences
were convened only to solve specific administrative problems,
although biweekly seminars were reportedly held during the
winter months. This lack of training, supervision, and coordination contrasted sharply with the organization of the district
attorney's office.
The relatively small private criminal bar in Denver seemed
to sustain itself quite well with the 15 to 20 percent of the
defendants who could afford their services. There were very
few marginal practitioners. No "jailhouse crew" was discern341d. § 39-21-3(3)

(Supp. 1969).
35 One public defender took issue with this analysis. He admitted that
there was little formal instruction but he insisted that advice and information were readily available to new attorneys willing to ask for it.
He saw the office as a source of expertise from which a diligent novice
could benefit.
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ible as in many cities where legal service to the indigent is
not so complete. Few criminal lawyers relied upon big-volume
practices. They did not often find themselves forced to engage
in coercive fee collection measures. Most occupied spacious
offices that would be considered prestigious by standards of
criminal lawyers in general. They were not resentful of the
large amount of business preempted by the public defender.
Instead, they were glad to be relieved of the problems inherent
in serving those who could not really afford a private defense.
In addition, perhaps because of the substantial compensation
allowed in Colorado, 36 private attorneys rarely tried to avoid
court appointments which resulted when the public defender
had conflicts of interest.
IV.

COMPATIBILITY OF RELATIoNsHIPs BETwEEN DEFENSE,
PROSECUTION, AND THE COURT

To a man, the private attorneys agreed that good relationships in the criminal justice system made for better client
service and not merely more pleasant working conditions. The
responses of public defenders were not as unqualified. They
saw complexities in relationships with judges and district attorneys with whom they dealt for 6 hours every working day
that were not important to attorneys who entered their courtrooms only a few times each month. Broadly speaking, the
public defender has to combine with other functionaries assigned to that courtroom in order to create a working environment. His relationships depend largely upon how his personality meshes with others involved:
I think that each person must mold himself and his approach
to everything to fit his personality. Some people may succeed
by being antagonistic to everyone. Others may succeed by being
complacent. Everybody has to do it in his own way. My approach is to be friendly, but not too friendly. To be polite, but
not in the pocket of someone. The first thing to consider is
what benefit can your client derive from this. (P.D. 1)37
36

CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-21-5 (Supp. 1969).
identify individual attorneys interviewed. "P.A." designates
private attorneys; "P.D.," public defenders.
P.D. 1 through P.D. 5 were assigned to felony cases. For the most
part, they were attorneys with experience in every phase of criminal
defense in Denver. Their answers, therefore, are based upon a wider
perspective than are those of the other four P.D.'s. Usually they spoke
from personal experience, having been confronted with the problems
dealt with in the questionnaire. On the other hand, the newer attorneys
assigned to misdemeanors or preliminary hearings could only speculate
on their reactions to situations which they had not encountered. P.D. 8
had faced most of the problems inquired about but within the different
context of juvenile court.
The experience of every private attorney interviewed seemed to

37 Numbers

be at least as broad as that of the felony division public defenders. Only
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Quite understandably, most defenders function best when
there is a certain degree of harmony in the courtroom. Unlike
the private attorney who can dispose of his case and then collect himself in more pleasant surroundings, the public defender must stay to handle the remainder of the day's docket.
A volatile courtroom atmosphere may be of little concern to
a private attorney if it does not interfere with his client's disposition. But a public defender confined to unpleasant surroundings may find his energy drained- and his effectiveness
diminished. New and inexperienced defenders are especially
handicapped when they are paired with heavy-handed judges
or prosecutors. One young attorney spent 2 months being bullied in county court only to be transferred to the most domineering judge in preliminary hearings:
The first judge I worked with -we couldn't agree on anything.
He wouldn't even let me in his chambers. Constant friction.
Consequently my clients suffered-just because the situation
was so abrasive that it was impossible for me to do a good job
for them.
Like any job, your success to a certain extent is dependent upon
other people and what they can do for you. Good relations
could make a big difference. Take my situation right now with
Judge [X] in preliminary hearings. He really likes to run them
through. It makes it very difficult in the courtroom. You don't
have time to advise your client, much less discuss the case with
him. (P.D. 6)

Even self-assured public defenders apparently unconcerned with
such frustrations were usually convinced that the client suffered when his attorney had bad relationships with the opposition:
The question is whether the type of relationship that a public
defender has with the system affects the quality of defense provided. I think that it does.... I've heard the D.A.'s mention on
several occasions that these two would not receive the sweat off
the D.A.'s you-know-what. This means that they start into a
case with added weight that lawyers who have not so antagonized
their opponents do not have. ...
In the great majority of cases you're dead on the facts. Then it's
a question of getting the best bargain for your client. If you've
antagonized or alienated the D.A.'s, you're going to get him
nailed. (P.D. 2)

The defender whose style was most disparaged by other members of the office was convinced that his approach was efthe intensity of their contact with a given area was less than that of any
public defender to whom that area had been specifically assigned.
This explanation is offered as a warning against comparing individual attorneys. The only comparison attempted is the general one
between public defenders and private attorneys as groups.
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fective. He asserted that he treated the judges, police, and
district attorneys as enemies, and as such, he was prepared
for them to win a few victories. This was the only type of
relationship in which he was interested:
Good relationships with the criminal justice system are meaningless to me. They are certainly of minimal importance if their
function is to expedite justice, as they call it. Members of the
system function basically out of fear and superstition. I try to
antagonize the district attorneys since they are as susceptible
to fear, if not more so, than other members of the group ...
The effect of my kind of relationship can cut both ways, as seen
in [a case in which he turned down a 14-year sentence offered
by the prosecution, only to have his client get a much heavier
sentence after trial]. This is the kind of risk that I'm willing to
run. It didn't wcrk in this case. But otherwise you end up being
a cop-out artist, and we have enough of those. (P.D. 4)

While most public defenders did not share the attitude of
the public defender quoted above, they were conscious of limits
as to how close their relationships with the system could be
and still be of benefit to the client. The young attorneys were
especially afraid of being "used" by the judge or of having
their allegiance questioned by the client. The older attorneys
were confident that they could not be manipulated, but this
confidence was not always shared by others in the office:
Obviously a defender's relationship with the district attorneys
and judges can be very detrimental to the client if that relationship becomes too close. A close relationship with a judge, for
example, can result in a dampening of necessary aggressiveness
in dealing with that judge, and perhaps an unconscious desire
to please. Probably the biggest danger of a close relationship
with the district attorney is reliance upon what he says about a
given case. It is probably in this area where some attorneys in
this office gain the reputation of cop-outs. Because of the everyday necessity of being in a given court, usually with the same
judge and same prosecutors, it is altogether too easy to transmit
an image of close comaraderie that should never be transmitted,
and probably should never exist. Even if there is not a subconscious effect upon the attorney himself, the loss of confidence in
the attorney-client relationship has great impact on the ability
of the attorney to fully represent the client. (P.D. 3)

To the question, "Which is more important in your practice of criminal law: knowledge of the law or contacts in the
criminal justice system?," half the private attorneys responded that contacts were more important. Presented the same
question, no public defender chose "contacts." It was apparent
that the word with its normal connotation had little applicability to the work of public defenders. Private attorneys may
operate to a certain extent in a world that functions on "who
you know." Public defenders definitely do not:
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place, my contacts are very limited. I certainly have no "friends"
in the D.A.'s office- someone to whom I can go for a special
deal. I have been in the courtroom with [only two deputy

D.A.'s]. Those are my contacts. I work only with them. It's impossible for me to go above their heads. (P.D.2)
Although a public defender's contacts are very limited, he
comes to know those within the limits of his courtroom to an
extent far beyond the means of a private attorney. Most defenders felt that working in such close proximity to their opponents gave them an advantage because they learned the
idiosyncrasies of the other parties involved and could plan
their tactics accordingly. In this, they saw not only expediency
but the means to seize every opportunity for a defensive
maneuver:
You understand what the procedures are. You understand what
the judge and the district attorney are likely to do under certain circumstances, and you try to bring about those circumstances which are most favorable to your client. (P.D. 5)
I've talked to D.A.'s about this. They've told me that they know
we know what can be expected. We know how far we can push
a case. They know that we will hold out until the last, because
we know when they'll have to give in. We deal with them
every day. We watch them every day. Even when we don't
have a case, we're right there watching them.
Being in this constant contact with the D.A.'s has some
effect. [One deputy D.A.] is very much aware of my problems
[New lawyer alone in felony court]. He sympathizes with my
caseload and my difficulty in dealing with certain clients. And
I think he unconsciously bends to try to balance out the difficulty that I'm confronting. (P.D. 2)

The district attorneys were very reluctant to help other defenders in the office. For the latter, proximity only seemed to
increase the friction between themselves and their adversaries.
Two attorneys used the cliche, "Familiarity breeds contempt."
They may have meant that their exposure to the system had
increased their contempt for it, but less aggressive members
of the office agreed that the reverse was also true.
Several attorneys perceived the countervailing forces at
work between parties confined to the same courtroom. While
the defender is sizing up the opposition, he is also being sized
up. One said, "I think that there could only be a disadvantage
in that our ways become known to them, so that they can wait
for the opportunity to counteract our moves." (P.D. 1) There is
the added detriment that a public defender can come to be
thought of as part of the courtroom woodwork:
I think our continual presence can become so mundane for a
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judge and a D.A. that they don't give the attention to our cases
that they give to those of private attorneys. Call it the cry of
human intellect for novelty or what you will, I get this feeling.
It comes from seeing private attorneys treated with more
courtesy than P.D.'s by the bench, from having D.A.'s plea bargain first with private attorneys- little things like that. (P.D.
8)

Asked to choose which relationship was most important for
them: that with the police, that with the district attorney's
office, or that with the judges, only three private attorneys
would make a general statement. Two said that their relationships with the district attorney's office were most important,
and one chose police relations. The only clear-cut sentiment
among the public defenders was that their relationships with
the police were of very minor importance. Of the defenders who
would make a choice, four picked the district attorneys, and
four picked the judges. It is understandable that public defenders feel the weight of a judge's power more since most of
their day is spent under his direct control. Still, most of the
work of the court is hammered out between the P.D. and the
D.A.:
Public defenders and district attorneys in large measure run the
courts. They're the main wheels in the system of criminal justice. The only time the judge plays a critical role is when plea
negotiation breaks down- when the district attorney and the
public defender look at each other and realize that they're going
to have to let the judge resolve it. (P.D. 2)

The public defenders were asked whether they preferred
to be on close terms with the district attorneys in their courtroom. There was a split of opinion among those questioned.
In general, the more experienced attorneys handling felony cases
said that they would rather not be on close terms with the
prosecutors. At the extreme was the following response:
Under no circumstances do I want to be on close terms with the
D.A. in the courtroom. I want this system to remain an adversary one. I will not talk with them at recess. I will not discuss
anything with them when the jury might be present. I don't
want any inference to be made by anyone that we are friends
on the outside or anything other than antagonists. Our relations
aren't important to me at all. They don't want to try cases. I
do. They know that. So they'll offer me a better deal. I'd rather
have them fear me. I don't want to talk with them except when
I have to about business. (P.D. 4)

Most newer attorneys, however, liked a cooperative atmosphere:
Personally, I prefer to be on close terms. It is important for me
to be able to work out dispositions, figure out which case is
going to go to trial, know what the D.A. has through discovery.
I had one district attorney who I could not work with, and as a
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result many hopeless cases which should have been dealt out
were not and at this time are still pending trial, merely because
I could not talk to him. We did not have any workable relaship whatsoever. I think it's definitely to the client's advantage
that I am able to work with the district attorney and to obtain
the best possible disposition for him. (P.D. 7)
Public defenders, more than private attorneys, seemed to
rely upon cooperation from the district attorneys in small routine matters that could otherwise consume much of their day.
Certainly without some administrative cooperation between the
public defender's office and the district attorney's office the
system would bog down. The two offices were most dependent
upon each other for efficient utilization of their limited resources. With neither side having control over its caseload,
each sympathized with the other enough not to cause unnecessary inconveniences. The adversaries were most inclined to
engage in mutual backscratching in dealing with lesser procedural matters in which a defensive stance could be of little
value to the client. It was generally agreed that those defenders
who refused to accomodate themselves to the prosecution's administrative difficulties consequently faced very cumbersome,
time-consuming practices themselves. At least one public defender, however, felt that the time thus saved was of little
significance:
This cooperation is fine, but it's more and more becoming nonexistent. It doesn't matter anyway. Time is not of the essence,
believe me. You spend 70 hours a week. If you were cooperative, you'd spend 60. What the hell difference does 10 hours
a week make? (P.D. 1)
The majority of public defenders did not share this attitude.
They were eager to get their "housework" over as quickly and
painlessly as possible:
Yes, there are a million little ways: setting dates for court hearings, setting certain cases before certain judges, stipulations,
joinder of cases or severance of same, continuances on stipulation, calling ahead of time if you're asking for a continuance
so the other side can call off its witnesses, etc., etc. (P.D. 8)
Yes, it is important in little matters- getting mutually
agreeable court dates and such. Of course, this can work to a
disadvantage if you are too much good friends. If you're set for
trial and the district attorney can't get his police officer there,
you'll want to get the case dismissed, not continued. You can't
get yourself into the position where you're indebted. (P.D. 6)
Social contacts between the prosecutors and the two defense attorney groups were explored to determine if private
friendships might offer some indication of the differences in
their working relationships with the prosecution. Interviews
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indicated that the public-private variable had no casual connection with the extent of their friendships with district attorneys. The only significant factor seemed to be age. Only the
young, gregarious public defenders were likely to have social
contact with their age group in the district attorney's office.
Some were recent graduates of the University of Denver or the
University of Colorado law schools and had simply continued
their friendships with classmates who took jobs on the other
side of the fence. A few felt that their friendships with district
attorneys gave them a slight advantage; others saw a possible
disadvantage. No significant effect was apparent from such
naturally arising friendships:
My friendships with some of the district attorneys go beyond
the courthouse. [One deputy D.A.] has fixed me up with girls.
I've played tennis with him. [Another deputy] is a very good
friend of mine. I've known him for 6 years. I don't think these
friendships hamper my effectiveness at all. I think they help.
... I'm a longtime friend of [a third deputy]. I play golf with
him, party with him, doubledate with him. But we never
divulge anything to each other about our cases. Oh, I might ask
him why his office does certain things, and he might tell me.
If he becomes head of the county court deputies, it will be difficult to achieve a working relationship that doesn't involve our
friendship. But friendships don't have to be a problem. Competition is competition. Friendship may help the competition by
eliminating personality conflicts. You can argue the issues much
more efficiently if you know your adversary and his style.
(P.D. 9)
The private attorneys interviewed had well-established practices, and their social lives did not include any district attorneys.
Both they and the older public defenders made a distinction between their personal friends and their business contacts with
district attorneys confined to the latter category. Their lives had
grown apart from their law school classmates, and their association with district attorneys was limited to the courthouse. All
denied that they ever cultivated relationships with prosecutors
in order to help their practices. Most said, however, that they
had a bond with district attorneys from sharing a common
experience and that they often enjoyed pleasant conversation
together. Only a small minority of public defenders and private
attorneys said that they could not get along with "prosecutorial
personalities."
Certain public defenders were particularly antagonistic to
any member of the district attorney's office. They gave no quarter to prosecutors, in or out of the courtroom, and they received
none. On such terms with the prosecution were several of the
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reputedly best trial lawyers in the public defender's office.
Their relationships with the district attorneys, as well as with
the police and judges, could only be described as hostile. Others
in the office were convinced that the clients of these attorneys
suffered because of their egotism and accused them of taking
cases to trial purely to satisfy their own self-interests. It was
thought that their clients fell hard when they lost at trial and
that they received inferior plea bargains. On the other hand,
the "hostile" attorneys looked down upon other defenders as
"cop-out artists." They felt that by their going to trial many
defendants were freed, and that those who were not served
"easier time" because they went down fighting. They also said
that they got better bargains because of their threat at trial.
Even with this obvious difference of attitude in the office, it was not surprising that every public defender interviewed responded in the affirmative to the question, "Are
some public defenders out of favor with the D.A.'s office?"
However, it was predictable that there would be a clear split
in their answers to the next question, "How did they get that
way?" Depending upon with which group they were aligned,
they either responded, "by being zealous advocates," or, "by
being completely unreasonable."
V.

TiH NATURE OF DIscovERY PROCEDURES

Since formal discovery in criminal cases is limited and
time-consuming, a major derivative benefit from the maintenance of good terms with the prosecutors is having access to
their files for informal discovery. This privilege was extended
as a matter of course to all but one of the private attorneys
interviewed. For them a file would contain the police offense
report and a "supplemental" report. Most said that they were
routinely handed the files in all but the most serious cases:
Yes, they're open to me ....
But it still depends upon which
deputy you are dealing with. The present policy in the D.A.'s
office is to leave that decision up to the individual deputy.
Today, I'm having a bargaining session in which several cases
will be disposed of. I expect the district attorney to just hand
me the files on those cases, and we'll take it from there. Sometimes I'll meet a particular deputy who will not show me anything. Sometimes I don't care to see the file anyway, when I
know the case and how bad it looks for my client. Actually,
the only time I want to see the files is when i'm anticipating a

disposition. (P.A. 6)
The majority of private attorneys spoke of informal discovery
in the context of plea bargaining. Indeed, it seemed to be the
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initial step in negotiations with the prosecution, but they emphasized that the files were not open*to everyone to this extent.
The one private attorney who denied that he gained informal
discovery seemed to be at quite a disadvantage. P.A. 4 said
that he could count on the fingers of one hand the times that
he has seen the district attorney's files in the past 9 years
of his practice. He had no idea that they. were available to
others and was accustomed to "bargaining blind," without
knowledge of the prosecution's case. Most private attorneys had
no knowledge of whether public defenders saw the district
attorney's files. A few, however, thought that public defenders
had more difficulty gaining access than did private attorneys.
Conversations with public defenders tended to confirm this
opinion, although the responses were qualified. Only three were
willing to state that the district attorney's files were open for
discovery as a matter of course. In view of their peculiar position, public defenders seemed more cautious about becoming
dependent upon the D.A.'s files for their information:
They're not open in my courtroom. They're very willing to tell
me what happened. Sometimes they'll let me look at a file.
But I never ask them to let me look. I'll ask for specific information and then let them look in the file and then tell it to me.
I try very much not to look at their files. When they are looking in them, I stand away and let them only tell me what they
want me to know. (P.D. 9)

In general, public defenders refused to speak in terms of a
broad policy. Instead, they spoke of their experiences in specific courtrooms, with specific district attorneys. The only generalization made was that discovery was harder to gain when a
defender advanced to handling felony cases:
Depends upon the D.A. Depends upon the case. Sometimes I
walk over and say, "Can I take a look at this file?" And in certain instances the D.A. will say, "Yes." Now, what are those
instances. Well, they're noncontroversial cases. They're not
supercriminal cases. They're generally possession cases ...
I've had open discovery from a lot of D.A.'s. When I was at
preliminary hearing level, it was a matter of course. I can't think
of a file there ever being closed to me. When I was in misdemeanor courts, never closed. I routinely stood at the D.A.'s
lectern and went through the files of my clients and even other
lawyers' clients. Routinely. This was in misdemeanors, Now,
as you go up the scale into the more complex, or supercriminal
cases, where the D.A. has the burying inclination, the files beNow quite often my discovery
come more and more closed ....
just consists of sneaking peeks. When I'm talking to the district
attorney and he's looking at his file, I read fourteen times faster
than he reads. He has his file. open. I'm standing within a reasonable distance. I read his damn file. (P.D. 2)
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In any courtroom, the amount of discovery practiced appeared most dependent upon the personalities involved. Many
public defenders were convinced that the district attorneys only
opened their files to attorneys whom they liked. Yet the most
belligerent public defender in the office spoke of the opportunities that were offered him:
It's all based upon their fear af going to trial. Whether they
hate me or not, they'll open up their file if they can avoid trial.
At least on many occasions they will, unless it's a client . . .
whom they really want to nail. I think they open them up more
frequently for other defenders. But I'm not that interested in
their stuff. If we've had a gcod investigation, our file's better
Some D.A.'s will routinely
than theirs in many instances ....
hand me material from their files. Others . . . won't give me
the time of day. (P.D. 4)
Both private attorneys and public defenders emphasized the
necessary expediency in gaining discovery by informal means:
It's certainly advantageous to get information from the district
attorneys without having to file motions. It creates one hell of
a lot of work for our secretaries to have to type the motions
and for us to have to write them. It's a lot better to get what
we need from the district attorney on the spot, while the client
is in the courtroom; while the file is there. (P.D. 9)
Many of the defenders in felony courts, however, thought it
dangerous to rely on the prosecution's gratuitous showing of
files. Since time is critical to a public defender, it might seem
strange that he would accept the added burden of filing formal
motions. His caution seemed to be because of his greater susceptibility to dependence:
Generally speaking, it is definitely necessary to rely on formal
motions for discovery, because I simply wouldn't trust the bastards to give me everything unless it was a matter of record.
(P.D. 3)
These same more experienced public defenders also said
that it was their impression that the prosecutors would not
let them have information that would be beneficial to their
case but only that which might induce their clients to plead
guilty. When they had a triable case, they would not enter into
negotiations in order to obtain information for use at trial. Most
private attorneys agreed that this was indeed the motivation
for the district attorneys' showing them their files; but they
seemed to have less hesitancy about deceiving the prosecutor
as to their intentions, gaining whatever discovery they could,
and then using it at trial:
That's what they think they're doing. The statement is only
true to the extent that the D.A. knows what you are doing and
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what he is doing and what he is letting you see. An attorney has
to know what to look for. I can flip through the file quickly until
I find just what I'm after. Often I've got to resort to subterfuge.
That means that I try to get the file by any means -possible, and
then look for what I need. (P.A. 7)

Such deception could not be successfully practiced by a public
defender engaged in daily transactions with the same prosecutors. Private attorneys are no doubt free to use tactics on an
occasional basis that would become very transparent if regularly employed.
Perhaps the greatest danger associated with informal
discovery is that it creates the expectation of reciprocity. Public
defenders seemed very aware of this danger:
There is a very natural tendency for discovery to work both
ways. It may become a matter of fraternalism. In these informal
discussions the D.A. might gain considerable insight into our
They may gain information from me to
theory of defense ....
the extent that I think it will help my client. If a defender goes
beyond this and breaches his client's confidences, he should be
fired. (P.D. 3)
The most that any public defender said that he would reveal
to the prosecution were facts which were beneficial to the defendant and those of which the prosecutor was certain to have
knowledge already. In general, private attorneys advocated the
same restrictions. Two, however, made the following surprising
statements:
Discovery between the district attorneys and me is approaching
that stage [mutuality]. We're not quite there yet, but we're getting there. As far as I'm concerned both sides should have joint
discovery. That's the way I try to work. (P.A. 8)
You've got to give something to get something. I just walk in,
talk to a district attorney, and say, "Here's the way the case
breaks down from my point of view. How does it look to you?"
(P.A. 5)
Public defenders indicated that they would not participate in
such an exchange of information. In general, their responses
were to the other extreme:
The only thing I give the D.A. is a smile and a hardluck story
about my poor, dumb client, and how he'll never do it again.
Once I gave the D.A. my client's address and the kid was arrested two hours later. Never again. (P.D. 8)

All defenders insisted that there were no conditions, express or implied, attached to seeing the prosecution's files.
They admitted that if one repeatedly obtained information by
false pretext his privilege might well be withdrawn, but merely
using the information to his client's best advantage did not
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constitute deception. The prosecution expected defenders to
seize every opportunity to help their clients:
I don't think your access is dependent upon anything like that.
Maybe if they think that you're sneaking around corners, that

you're going to cross them up at every turn, then they're not
going to let you do it. They recognize, of course, that war is
war, that most battles are fought with real bullets. They expect
you to use that information to impeach them if that's what it
takes. (P.D. 6)
Several private attorneys were under the impression that access
to the district attorney's files might be conditioned upon not
impeaching evidence found there. If the condition were imposed,
however, none stated that he would comply with it:
They've verbally made that threat to me, but they don't enforce
it. There's no real penalty for impeaching evidence seen in their
files. Even though it's the understanding at preliminary hearings that you only see the file if you waive the hearing, I've often
looked at their file and then gone ahead with the hearing. It's
hacked them off, but they haven't stopped showing me their
files. (P.A. 3)
When asked, "Would you ever see the necessity for calling
an error or other flaw in the D.A.'s case to his attention if you
learned of it from an informally privileged position, even though
it could help your client to destroy their case?," every private
attorney answered that he would not hesitate to use any mistake by the state against it. Surprisingly, one public defender
responded to the contrary:
If it was a rapist or a murderer that I was turning loose, I think
that I would owe a duty to the court as an officer of the court
to call it to their attention. If you're playing a ball game, you

shouldn't cheat. You have a duty as an officer of the court to
inform them of errors, even though it screws your client. (P.D. 9)
No other public defenders expressed this inclination. Most recalled with pleasure instances in which they had gained dismissals by exposing the prosecution's technical errors:
I never call an error to their attention, and I don't think that
they hold it against me. I don't know why. Maybe again it's
because of my relationship. Maybe it's different with someone
who gloats upon their mistakes. I'm not that type of person.
If there's an error in a date, I argue it as a reason for dismissing
the case, and that's the end of it. After all, the district attorney
didn't prepare the file. The police did. The district attorney
doesn't get overly excited about it .... And I've done this on

occasion. When I was in county court, I knew going into a trial
that the date on the compliant was incorrect and that the police

would testify to another date. But I let the thing go. And, when
I moved to dismiss, my motion was granted. My experience was
that they got a chuckle out of it, rather than feeling destroyed.

Maybe they would take it harder in district court. (P.D. 2)
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VI.

SuccEss IN

BARCATNING

Undoubtedly, most of the time which any defense attorney
spends with the prosecution is for purposes of plea bargaining.
Individual estimates of the private attorneys with respect to the
number of their clients who pleaded guilty ranged from 50 to
90 percent. Public defenders outside of juvenile court estimated
that within their currently assigned courtrooms, their own
records ranged from 80 to 100 percent. A check of the monthly
office reports revealed that most defenders disposed of 5 to 10
percent more cases on pleas than they had estimated. The same
degree of underestimation probably also applies to private attorneys. One felony court defender incurred the displeasure
of the entire judiciary partly because he took as many as 20
percent of his cases to trial. At the other extreme was a defender who had been assigned to felony court for 3 months and
had yet to try a case.
There is no simple explanation for the higher percentage
of guilty pleas entered by public defenders. Perhaps more of
their clients are actually guilty. Certainly, their limited resources do not allow them to prepare as many cases for trial.
The overflowing dockets make it necessary that most of their
cases be disposed of as quickly as possible. Yet the attorneys
themselves do not make the pleas. The decision is ultimately
made by the client. The public defenders whom I observed
were very reluctant to pressure a client into "copping a plea."
Private attorneys, whose allegiance to their clients is rarely
questioned, expressed no hesitation to apply coercion when a
favorable bargain was offered. This led to the inquiry whether
more defender clients pleaded guilty because they were offered
more inducement. The state might well feel the necessity to
offer a larger carrot to those whose clients could clog the
criminal courts.
Public defenders thought that they obtained better plea
bargains than private attorneys for a variety of reasons, not
one of which was that they were on closer terms with the
district attorney:
Our office does get better deals because we know how to manipulate the judges and D.A.'s better than private lawyers. The
bulk of them can't do nearly as well as we can because of our
knowledge of the system. (P.D. 4)
We've got the volume. I could bring my court to a halt if I tried
every case. The district attorney knows that. The judge knows
that. Consequently, by and large we get better deals. (P.D. 6)
The point is that they know a public defender will go to trial.
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This is because he is assigned to a courtroom. He's there. He's
going to be there all day. He may have four or five cases set for
trial, but they're all set for the same court. He has nothing better to do than go to trial if a reasonable offer is not made. The
district attorney knows that if he is not willing to offer a fair
disposition the public defender is going to go to trial. He doesn't
have to cop out. He doesn't have to worry about chasing from
one courtroom to another or back to his office or to another
county the next day. He's going to be there ready for trial. Because they know this, we get better dispositions. (P.D. 7)

When private attorneys were questioned, three out of four
believed that they got better deals than public defenders. Their
most common reason was that the friction between public de-

fenders and district attorneys precluded the productive negotiations that private attorneys enjoyed. One private attorney
who had served 6 months in the public defender office when
it was short of lawyers was able to give the most informed
opinion:
I absolutely get better deals than do public defenders. When I
was in their office I think that I got better deals than the majority of other defenders because the judges and the D.A.'s still
thought of me as a private attorney. The main reason for this
discrepancy is the uncooperative attitude of the D.A.'s toward
public defenders. Probably one of the primary reasons is that
as a public defender the sins of your brothers are cast upon you
-so
when one public defender antagonizes the police or the
D.A., they retaliate against all of them. One time in Adams
County, one public defender angered the head of the robbery
detail of the police department. Immediately the word went out:
no more deals with public defenders. But there doesn't have to
be a specific explosion. There's always a smoldering antagonism
between the district attorney's office and the cops on one side
and the defender office on the other. They've become enemy
camps to each other. Because of their proximity they're much
more likely to have a hostile relationship than we are. (P.A. 7)

One of the most experienced of the private attorneys interviewed agreed with this description of the hostility between
"enemy camps":
Because of their greater familiarity with the law and with the
courtroom, public defenders do better at trial than private attorneys. But because of the hostility which they've provoked, we
seem to get better bargains than they do. (P.A. 2)
Yet the majority of public defenders, as well as private

attorneys, were willing to characterize their negotiations with
the district attorneys as premised upon mutual trust. An expected exception existed in the felony courts assigned to the
"hard line" defenders. "I do not have any trust in any district
attorney or in any police officer in the City and County of
Denver." (P.D. 1) Most defenders, however, admitted that it
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was essential for them and the district attorneys to be able
to rely on each others' word. To discover how far this trust
was carried, both private attorneys and public defenders were
asked if their relationship of trust could be used to convince
the prosecution of a client's innocence so that the charges would
be dropped. Three out of eight private attorneys recalled instances in which that had happened to them, while two out of
nine public defenders had experienced it. Most thought their insistence on innocence had some impact on plea bargaining but
felt that they themselves were never certain of a client's innocence and could hardly hope to do more than raise a doubt
in the prosecutor's mind. Most private attorneys and public
defenders were cynical about their clients' innocence:
I've never had an innocent client. If a guy insists that he is innocent, then I'll take it to trial. I can't say that no one has ever
been able to get them to drop charges, but it seems awfully unlikely to me. The D.A.'s would certainly realize what a Pandora's
box they were opening if they allowed that to happen. (P.A. 6)
There were, however, those attorneys, both public and private,
who claimed to have succeeded in convincing the prosecution
of their client's innocence. One private attorney seemed to have
had a significant amount of success in this regard:
Yes, it's happened. But not on my bare assertion of his innocence. Of course, I had to explain the circumstances of the case,
how my man came to be wrongly accused, etc. When I was
Ivory Soap sure that my client was innocent and could demonstrate his innocence to the district attorney, I was able to obtain
a dismissal four out of the six times that I had such a client.
(P.A. 5)
A public defender assigned to juvenile court said that the prosecution was often persuaded to check out a child's story and,
if it were confirmed, to dismiss the case. It was to be expected
that more compassion would exist for juveniles. Yet, the other
defender who said that he had obtained such dismissals was
assigned to felony court:
Although it's obviously very rare, I've done this in one case in
the past and I'm trying to do it in another case right now where I'm simply trying to convince them of my client's innocence and the codefendant's guilt and get them to drop the
charges. I'm using my nice guy image to persuade them that
what I say is the truth and that they ought to do this so that
substantial justice will be served, blah, blah, blah ....

The har-

vest for this kind of image is in a case where all I have going
is my honesty. (P.D. 2)
When asked whether attorneys who presented a formidable
threat at trial obtained better plea bargains than did more cooperative attorneys, four private attorneys answered that more
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could be gained by cooperation than by threat. They felt that
the idea of holding an ax over the district attorney's head was
a myth, that he usually held all the cards, and that it was
best not to challenge him to play them:
It's rare that you have a triable case in any event. The defense
has little real threat in a criminal case. You're nearly always
negotiating from a position of weakness. So your relationship
becomes much more important than your trial ability. (P.A. 7)
Certainly not all private attorneys felt this way; but it might
be significant that, while four of them had this attitude, only
one public defender expressed similar sentiments. The experienced defenders were even more concerned with presenting
a threat at trial than were the newer members of the office.
On the other hand, private attorneys seemed more inclined
to relax once they had proven themselves at trial:
Initially you have to make them think you are a threat. You
have to go to bat at first. When you first start out with the district attorney, you are both usually on the same level, and you'll
move up together. In your misdemeanors it doesn't really matter
that much, so impress him with your competence, with your
ability to challenge him. Then you've made an impression that
will last you throughout your practice. You don't have to make
additional threats in the days when you don't have time to
carry them out. (P.A. 3)
It seems quite logical that a private attorney would have a
greater need than a public defender to build a reputation upon
which he could coast. By increasing his business, his reputation
as a fighter may make it impractical for him to ccntinue to
fight. Public defenders have no such problem; in fact, they may
have less time for trials while in misdemeanor courts than after
they are promoted to felonies. To public defenders, becoming
competent fear-inducing trial lawyers was more a matter of
pride than of necessity. Most felt that the less aggressive members of the office obtained good and, in some instances, better
deals for their clients. Still, their approach was not as appealing
as that of the defenders who were thought to "wring" their
bargain from the district attorneys:
Plea bargaining is the big argument in favor of close relationships with the D.A.'s. I think it does represent the easy way to
get a good bargain for your client. I do think the better way is
to be a threat. If the opposition considers you a feared enemy,
then I think substantially the same thing can be accomplished as
through close relationships. (P.D. 3)
The response most often received from both private attorneys
and public defenders was that no attorney got consistently better bargains than others, no matter what his approach. Too many
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factors were beyond the defense attorney's control: "If you've
got a lazy judge who doesn't want to sit through trials, it's a
hell of a lot easier to bargain." (P.A. 2) All agreed, however,
that the most important variable in bargaining was the particular district attorney involved and his particular penal philosophy: "There are law-and-order D.A.'s, and there are lawand-order D.A.'s." (P.D. 2)
VII.

ADMINISTRATIVE THREATS To ARMs-LENGTH BARGAINING

When public defenders and district attorneys dispose of 80
percent of the cases that pass through an overflowing courtroom, their procedures naturally become somewhat suspect.
The question arises as to whether this close working relationship and heavy caseload militate against the maintenance of
a truly adversary posture. A qualitative comparison between
the plea bargaining methods employed by the public defenders
and the private defense attorneys should shed light on this
question. Therefore, inquiry was made to discover whether
public defenders resorted to a more "administrative" approach
to plea bargaining as compared to their colleagues in private
practice. Specifically, public defenders might be more tempted
to share their meager information about a case with the prosecution and bargain from that basis. To do so would remove
plea bargaining one step further from the adversary principle
of conflict resolution of issues.
Two public defenders new to the office made statements
that were disturbing if they represented their actual practices.
With little personal experience upon which to base their opinions, they seemed particularly prone to take cues from the following leading question: "Is a policy of turning all cards face up,
even if it reveals facts detrimental to your client, ever justified?"
Your approach should be that of trying to shed as much light
on the case as you can, rather than presenting only those things
which are good for your client. If you don't, the district attorneys won't believe you. They'll know you're hiding those
things which are detrimental to your client. If you're very candid, very often, you'll get a better reception from the district
attorneys and consequently provide better service to your client.

I try to be candid. If I know something about my client,
especially if I know they will find out about it later anyway,
I'll openly divulge it. I think they know that they can rely on
what I say -that I'll give them the straight skinny. (P.D. 9)
Certainly, sometimes you turn all the cards face up, put it all
out in the open. It is justified sometimes, even if it can become
detrimental. Sometimes we get the feeling that it's all just a
game. Sometimes you have to take risks. Sometimes we even
have people who are guilty. [He laughs.] Sometimes you say,
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"Look my guy did it, but here's the situation," and then go on
to make some kind of disposition. And sometimes you do have
to give damaging information to gain credibility. But I would
say that generally there's not a great deal of divulging of confidential client information. Maybe sometimes the public defender gets in the habit of revealing more information than he
should. This could be a problem. Our clients may become less
personal, more routine. Certainly this is an error. I don't know.
(P.D. 6)

In further discussion of the point, however, both insisted that

they would only present positive factors in the case and those
negative factors of which the prosecution was already fully
aware, which might as well be conceded for purposes of bargaining rapport. This clarification harmonized their responses
to a degree with those of other attorneys interviewed.
No attorney, public or private, said that he attempted to
portray his clients as blameless. In fact, most admitted that in
talking with the district attorney they would disparage a client
in a manner that would not adversely affect his disposition but
that would promote camaraderie in arriving at a bargain:
My way of pitching to the D.A. may entail making them think
that I dislike a client, that I think that he's a bum, that he's
just as much a burden to me as he is to them. This is just using
psychology to make them think we're both working toward the
same ends. The D.A.'s wield so much power that you have to
learn how to play them. (P.A. 3)

The fact that plea negotiations with Denver district attorneys rarely concerned factual issues in the case was an interesting revelation. Every public defender and private attorney
made clear that facts were not the meat of plea bargaining. In
the first place, there is little probability that either a public
defender or private attorney knows facts beyond those contained in the district attorney's file:
There's usually not much danger of my revealing facts detrimental to my client because I usually know little or nothing
about my client or the situation until I talk to the district attorney. The D.A. has all the information and I've got to gain it
from him not vice-versa. I never know enough about the case
at the plea bargaining stage to give up anything that could hurt
him. If I did, I certainly wouldn't give it up before the battle.
(P.D. 9)

Usually, the most that a defense attorney could reveal would
be his client's side of the story, which carried little weight with
the prosecution in any event. The focus of plea bargaining is
not upon what happened. The district attorney assumes guilt,
of something. And some degree of culpability is impliedly admitted by the defense's willingness to negotiate. The district
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attorney is not interested in obtaining confirmation of his belief
of guilt. What each side of the negotiation wants is the opportunity to assess the relative strength of his case as compared
with that of his opponent. For the process to work, each party
need only show his strength, not his weakness. No private
attorney or public defender said that he actually turned all
his cards face up in the bargaining although every attorney
interviewed was very willing to show his best cards to the
prosecution. At first, it appeared significant that more public
defenders advocated "candor" in plea bargaining, but further inquiry led to the conclusion that their candor consisted only
of not intentionally misrepresenting material facts.
From a cynical point of view, plea bargaining is regarded
as the process by which the prosecutor is provided a basis for
rationalizing why charges or sentences should be reduced more
in one case than another. Certainly a public defender makes
some distinctions between two burglary cases. To the extent
that he presents such distinguishing characteristics to the prosecutor, he is candid with him. No greater tendency to divulge
information detrimental to a client was discovered among public
defenders as compared to private attorneys. Both seemed to talk
with the district attorneys only in terms of the strength of
the case, mitigating factors, or rehabilitative potential - whatever "pitch" would put the defendant's case in the best light,
without stretching it to the point of transparency. This was
"candor" to defense attorneys:
I try to be honest and frank. That doesn't mean that I walk up
to the D.A. and say, "Here's my client's case." I've never done
that.... In most cases, the degree of candor doesn't do a hell of
a lot of good anyway. When it's a one-on-one situation where
the cop's and the defendant's stories are at odds, even if I were
to tell the D.A. what "really" happened, all I'm saying is that
my client would testify to such and such. And the D.A. knows
that my client usually can't take the stand, and, if he does, that
he can't rebut what the cop says anyway. So in a lot of cases
the degree of candor is not that important. What's really involved is talking about the guy's record and the guy's personality and the guy's future. That happens quite often. A lot of
times the D.A.'s will say. "Aw, come on. You know the guy's a
crook. Let's put him in Canon [the penitentiary] for a while."
My job is to discourage him from this kind of thinking. But, as
a general rule, the D.A. knows a lot better than I do what a
bad ass my client is. (P.D. 2)
I don't lie to them. I don't misrepresent anything. It's not
necessary to reveal facts detrimental to your client. It's not
necessary for maintaining your credibility. You don't have to
tell them everything. You just have to be credible in what you
do tell them. (P.D. 5)
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Candor had its limits. When asked, "Would you ever feel
compelled to mention to the D.A. previous arrests or convictions unknown to him?," every attorney answered that he
would never furnish that information to his client's detriment.
Several mentioned instances of getting the client's permission
to tell them of a prior conviction after the bargain had already
been reached, but this was just to expedite the disposition of
a minor offense before the "rap sheet" arrived. No public
defender or private attorney expressed an ethical duty to provide the prosecution with information:
I recall one case where my client had a prior conviction for possession of narcotic drugs which the D.A. did not know of, which
did not show up on his record. I certainly didn't divulge it.
I felt no duty to divulge it. I don't think that the D.A. would
have been crushed if he had known that I knew of the prior
conviction -even
though I snuck by him a nolo to a misdemeanor in a case where my client was super dead on the facts.
I don't feel an ethical obligation to reveal that kind of information. Generally I'm not asked about prior convictions. The D.A.
has the record, not me. Since I'm not asked, I don't have to lie
about it at any rate. (P.D. 2)

Another possible administrative pressure was that, because of their many transactions together, public defenders
and district attorneys might arrive at a uniform schedule of
plea bargaining dispositions that would be applied mechanically
in most instances. Although public defenders vigorously denied
that they adhered to established schedules, they had to admit
that certain bargaining patterns had evolved. These, they explained, were largely the result of the district attorney's office
policies which limited the bargaining discretion of individual
district attorneys. Public defenders became aware of these
policies and in routine cases were forced to abide by them.
On the other hand, they felt fortunate to be familiar with the
maximum amount a district attorney was permitted to reduce
a charge, because then they could hold out for that great a
reduction. A public defender also became aware of the bargaining criteria employed by the individual district attorney
with whom he regularly dealt, and, to the extent that he could
not manipulate his opponent, his expectations became confined
by those same criteria:
In certain areas, the transactions between the district attorney
and the public defender have resulted in a schedule of sorts. An
example of this at the preliminary hearing level is when a person is charged with felony possession of a relatively small
amount of grass and he's never before had serious trouble with
the law. That individual will automatically get a misdemeanor
disorderly person. Another example is for most first offenders
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on short check cases with some scrt of excuse for iheir actions.
Almost as a matter of course they will get a deferred prosecuBeyond that there is not a uniform schedule between
tion ....
the two offices. Between individual attorneys there might be
something amounting to a schedule. I suspect that there is.
(P.D. 3)
Once I know that my client has to go down on a felony then
I start playing games with sentencing, with amount of time
spent in jail, severity, that sort of stuff. Each case is different
and you have to tailor-make a disposition for it. (P.D. 4)
I am aware of the tolerances within which the district attorneys
are permitted to bargain. For instance, I know that a drivingunder-the-influence case where the blood alcohol content is over
2.0 the deputies are not allowed to offer less than a no contest.
The uniformity arises more from the policies of the D.A.'s office
rather than from any agreement between them and myself.
(P.D. 9)
There is an informal type of thing ....

However, this is by no

means uniformly applied. Unfortunately our clients aren't obliging enough to be placed in neat little boxes. (P.D. 8)
Research

revealed no evidence that any public defender

engaged in "package dealing" his clients. Every public defender,
as well as every private attorney, insisted that h6 never accepted a harsher bargain for one client in order to obtain a
better deal for another:
No -although the caseload is crushingly huge each is treated
separately, even though he may cause great temptation to us
because we know he's the leader of the gang, etc. We face this
problem every day, but so far I've been able to resist temptation.
(P.D. 8)

VIII. ALLEGIANCE TO THE DANGEROUS CLIENT
A remark often heard from inmates at county jail was that
public defenders were "cop-out men" who would "sell them
down the river." These clients seemed especially afraid that
if they admitted their guilt to a defender and told him the
truth, he would cooperate in seeing them punished. As a result
of this feeling, public defenders frequently had a difficult time
finding out the facts of the case from their clients. Each public
defender was asked, "What is your opinion of a lawyer's
cooperating with the prosecution to put away a dangerous murderer whom he could get off by asserting a procedural defense?"
Their answers uniformly condemned such a practice. If anything, public defenders' peculiar position caused them to be
more committed to their clients. They harbored few illusions
about the people they defended. Many said they had yet to
defend a completely innocent client. Those whose daily efforts
were devoted to trying to free dangerous men could not afford
to flinch from their duties:
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You may not like it, and you may not feel happy when you go
home at night. But if you don't do it, then you should be a district attorney or you should be a social worker or you should
raise dogs or you should run a junk shop. But you shouldn't be
a public defender. (P.D. 1)
If he has a feeling that he wants to cooperate with the prosecution to put away a dangerous murderer, then that man should
not be a defense attorney. He should be applying for a job as a
cop. If I have a procedural defense, that's good-or even if it
isn't good, I'll assert that defense as vigorously as I can. (P.D. 4)
I believe in the adversary system. I believe that it is necessary
to have an attorney representing the interests of the client without any consideration for the system itself. The attorney is not
to cooperate with the prosecution in any way which is detrimental to the client. So you dcn't try to put away dangerous murderers. If you have any feelings like that you ought to get off
the case, as I did on one in particular where the guy showed
some sexual psychiatric propensity to murder. (P.D. 5)

Private attorneys' responses to the question showed them
to be just as fully committed to the defense of dangerous clients
as were the public defenders:
When I am employed by a client, he is my only responsibility.
This doesn't mean that I don't care about law and order. But my
role in our scheme of law and order is to give my clients the
most vigorous defense that I can. I don't play God, and I don't
choose to. I just got a client - a bomber, a very dangerous man,
very psychotic. But I'll work to help him any way that I can.
(P.A. 5)
As far as I'm concerned, I owe nothing to society. I owe everything to my client. If I could put Richard Speck back on the
street as a janitor in a nursing school, then I would do it. A
lawyer is a member of the world's oldest profession. As far as
I'm concerned I'm an absolute prostitute to my clients. (P.A. 7)

Private attorneys, however, have an avenue open that is

effectively blocked for public defenders. Nearly every private
attorney said that he could always avoid the dilemma by refusing to take a case that was particuarly repulsive to him.
The only way a public defender could withdraw from a case
was to prevail upon a less squeamish defender to shoulder the
load. Only one public defender mentioned resorting to this.
One private attorney said that he only withdrew from a case
when the client was dangerous to him:
I had a client whom I was so scared of that I had to interview
him with my partner holding a gun on him behind a newspaper
the whole time. His mind was so blown on drugs that I was
scared to death of him. I wanted to withdraw from the case, but
the guy was right beside me in the courtroom. I had to tell the
judge that I just couldn't handle him. (P.A. 3)

Interviews with private attorneys revealed an additional
approach not discussed by the public defenders. One of the first
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private attorneys interviewed provided the following response
which was afterward presented to his colleagues for their reaction:
I know of another lawyer who did essentially the same thing
with a very dangerous child molester. He pled him insane,
even though he felt certain that he would hdve been able to beat
the charges at trial. The state's first psychiatric report found the
guy sane. So he went to the judge and the D.A. and gave them
the alternative: Either they get a new psychiatric report that
finds him insane, or they run the risk of his being back on the
streets. They got a new report and now the guy's hopefully
getting some treatment. (P.A. 2)
Given this option between a complete defense and an insanity
disposition, the majority of private attorneys were willing to
rationalize that treatment in a mental institution was probably
best for the client as well as society.
IX. POLITICAL AUTONOMY
Legal commentators have expressed the fear that adversariness between a public defender's office and a district attorney's office will be tempered by political considerations inherent in their common standing as public agencies. Although
this fear may be justifiable where both offices are responsible
to the same political authority or constituency, the problem
does not arise in Colorado where the public defender is an agent
of the state judiciary. This status produces altogether different
political pressures, which have no direct connection with any
local district attorney's office. No public defender in Denver
felt that the district attorney's political concerns in any way
interfered with his representation of his clients. Every defender
responded in the negative to the questions: "Must public defenders be careful not to embarass the D.A. politically?" and
"Are public defenders ever induced to comply with some politically motivated plan of the D.A.'s?" They usually added that
politics simply did not enter into courtrooms where they dealt
with their counterparts in the district attorney's office. Political
maneuvers were in an arena beyond the courtroom. They agreed
that the district attorney could be expected to react if a defender threatened his political well-being. They were speaking,
however, of adverse news reporting and the district attorney's
efforts to protect his public image:
I don't know about embarrassing the D.A. I've never embarrassed them. I once accused [an assistant district attorney] of
acting in an unethical fashion. And I said a lot of other uncomplimentary things about him in open court. And it, of course,
returned to him. But it didn't affect my relationship with any
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district attorney, least of all [the assistant district attorney in
question]. (P.D. 2)
I would embarrass him politically in every way I could. I did
that with the last D.A. I said things negative about him that
were reported in the papers. I could care less. (P.D. 4)
I don't worry about it. However, I think that dealing with them
on a private basis rather than going to the newspapers produces
better results and better relationships. . . . The only time that a
public defender might go along with a politically-motivated
plan by the district attorney is when it is helpful to the defendant. (P.D. 5)
In our court I do not have to worry about the politics involved
in embarrassing the district attorney. I don't think they do
either. We're just not at that stage in the county courts. (P.D. 7)

Private attorneys also uniformly said that the D.A.'s poli-

tical concerns in no way hampered their practice. Every attorney
denied having any reason to contribute to the district attorney's
election campaign in Denver. They, like the public defenders,
expressed no reluctance to step on the district attorney's political
toes:
I won't go out of my way to damage him for no reason, when
it isn't to the benefit of my client. On the other hand, once when
I knew he was lying I did not hesitate to call him a liar in open
court knowing that it would make the papers ....
I realize that
right now he's trying to boost his conviction record. There's
no reason for me to get spiteful about that. I'll play it for all
it's worth. Their deals get a lot better when he's worrying
about his record. (P.A. 2)
I don't give a shit for their politics. My client comes way before
they do. If it's going to help my client but hurt the D.A., that's
tough. I despise this idea of people operating on fear - being so
afraid for their own security, so afraid they are going to step on
someone's toes. It's incredible that the D.A. would be so insecure
in his job as to get vindictive with an attorney. (P.A. 4)
CONCLUSION

The autonomy of both public and private criminal defense
attorneys in Denver substantially exceeded expectations. Results revealed little evidence of co-optation of either public
defenders or private attorneys. Certainly, the overflowing
dockets of the criminal courts in Denver forced everyone involved to rely upon expedient procedures; however, no relationship between expediency and co-optation was found. Perhaps a greater tendency to cooperate with the prosecution exists
in a system where justice is dispensed on a less hasty, more
personal basis. In Denver, little seemed to depend upon the
individual attorney's standing with the district attorney's office.
Expedient informal discovery was virtually a necessity, and
not a privilege reserved for a select few. The quality of cooperation between the prosecution and defense was more busi-
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nesslike than personal - it was dependent more upon external
forces than the personalities involved. The caseload, the judge's
impatience, and the district attorney's desire to increase his
conviction rate were pressures felt by a prosecutor no matter
with whom he was dealing. Politics played no part of a defense attorney's practice in Denver, where justice was dispensed
more mechanically than arbitrarily. The existence of a public
defender office may do much to institutionalize expediency and
thereby diminish favoritism. Through working with the public
defenders, the district attorneys are forced to employ uniform
cooperative procedures. Thus no defense attorney need "purchase" cooperation at the expense of his client. The system becomes mechanized but no less adversary.
Research produced no indication in Denver that public
defenders were more cooperative with the prosecution than
were private attorneys. In fact, compared to private attorneys,
public defenders must be considered less cooperative. For the
most part, however, the practices of the two groups were substantially similar. The few differences discovered were largely
due to the public defender's caseload and his confinement to
a single courtroom. The scope of a private attorney's cooperative relationships was much broader, and the avenues open to
him were more varied. His efforts could extend beyond one
stage in the criminal process and beyond an appeal to a single
prosecutor. He could approach every person whose discretion
might benefit his client-from arresting officer through trial
judge. More than a defender's isolation restrained him from
engaging in practices employed by some private attorneys:
the defender's institutional position caused him to be more
cautious. He had to be particularly careful not to place himself in a compromising position. Many public defenders were
wary of favors that might entail a quid pro quo detrimental to
their clients as a whole. They chose not to become overly dependent upon the district attorney's files for discovery and
appeared more concerned than private attorneys with the danger
of mutuality. Moreover, a public defender could even less afford
to resort to devious practices that might destroy the integrity
so necessary to his position. A private attorney might occasionally employ surreptitious tactics successfully that would become
transparent with continued use by a public defender. Such considerations might well make for a higher standard of justice
in cases handled by the public defender.
The public defenders'

advantage seemed to lie in their
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expertise and in their familiarity with the system - its procedures and its personalities. It should be expected that their
proximity to their adversaries would allow them to evaluate
and dispose of their cases more quickly. Efficiency was also
achieved through their cooperation with the prosecution to solve
common administrative problems and better allocate their time
and resources. To this extent, defenders were cooperative. They
came to terms with the district attorneys; given those terms,
they were enemies. Heat was generated in cases handled by
public defenders that rarely occurred in private attorneys' work.
Perhaps the temperature rose because of the additional pressures
to which a defender was subjected. That most attorneys in the
Denver office were able to withstand the forces exerted toward
their co-optation is testimony to their dedication and competence.
Among private attorneys and among public defenders there
were negotiators and there were warriors. There appeared to be
no more warriors in one sector than in the other. A given defender's alignment in the disagreement over what was appropriate behavior in a public defender depended upon his own
personality and it seemed that each approach fulfilled an important function. The "vigorous adversaries" preserved the image
of the office, both to their opponents and to their clients. They
fought the battles and won the Denver office a reputation for
aggressiveness not shared by many public defender offices.
The less aggressive "negotiators" handled the bulk of the caseload. They did seem to obtain better plea bargains and lighter
sentences for their clients, and they kept the wheels of justice
rolling.
No matter what his personality, every public defender said
that his primary interest lay solely with his clients. Apparently
most important was not that an attorney employ a particular
technique of defense but that he utilize his own individual
talents to the utmost. It is significant that every public defender said that competence was the most important ingredient
in his relationship with the district attorney's office:
Your competence is vital to your relationship. The same is true
for any other attorney, I suppose. But we have to be particularly
competent. Some district attorneys will take advantage of anybody they can. And our clients have been taken advantage of
enough. They have been dealt out, screwed over, shunted off to
jail without a second thought, neglected by our whole system.
A public defender has to be especially careful that those things
don't happen while he is handling the case. (P.D. 6)
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